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1. INTRODUCTION
As nations become more economically interdependent, the
conflict between individual nationalism and global welfare
intensifies. The linked concepts of market efficiency and global
welfare dictate that every nation should have the ability to engage
in free trade and to fully exploit its natural comparative advan-
tage.' It is through such exploitation that all nations benefit from
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' Natural comparative advantages result from an abundance of natural
resources, efficient production, advanced technology, skilled workers, lower
labor costs, and a favorable climate. These advantages may be compared to
artificial comparative advantages which result when the government protects
or subsidizes labor, capital, and research and development. It can be argued
that the use of natural advantages is merely a fair trading practice, while the use
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an increasing pool of global wealth, the division of which
determines the social, economic, and political well-being of each
nation. To achieve these benefits, individual governments must
no longer rely on policies that focus only on their domestic
producer or consumer welfare. Instead, a new approach must be
developed acknowledging the importance of global welfare and
recognizing that growing economic interdependence mandates a
fusion of foreign and domestic policies.
Unfortunately, current antidumping and antitrust3 policies
do not reflect this global interdependence. Theses policies
continue to be mired in theoretical and nationalistic vacuums
which inhibit the growth of global wealth and distort its efficient
distribution. Conflicts between consumer and producer interests,
as well as between the pursuit of efficiency and the demand for
protection, have led to a constrictive process through which
2 For the purposes of this Article, "antidumping law" refers to 19 U.S.C.
S 1673-1677n (1994), unless otherwise noted. Generally, antidumping law
provides that an antidumping duty may be imposed on imports when those
imports are sold in the United States at less than their fair value and a U.S.
industry is materially injured, threatened with material injury, or prevented
from entering the market as a result of these imports. See id. S 1673.
' U.S. antitrust laws are designed to protect "competition, not competitors,"
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962), and thus do not
have the domestic producer orientation of U.S. antidumping laws. Since "[U.S.]
antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations'
economies," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
582 (1986), and because the Sherman Act reaches conduct outside our borders'only when the conduct has an effect on [IU.S.] commerce," id. at 582 n.6, the
interpretation of our antitrust laws, including the theories upon which such
interpretations are based, often takes on a decidedly nationalistic flavor. The
antitrust laws of primary concern in this Article are sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1, 2 (1994) and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. SS 13-13b, 21(a) (1994). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1994). The relevant part of
section 2 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " Id.
S 2. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits a person from price discriminating
between "purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality," where such
commodities are sold within the United States and where the discrimination
tends to lessen competition, to create a monopoly, or "to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition." Id. S 13(a). The Robinson-Patman Act provides,
however, for price reductions in "good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor. . . ." Id. S 13(b).
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parochial answers are given in response to international questions.
As a result, U.S. competition and trade regimes have barely
acknowledged the inevitable link between foreign and domestic
welfare.
Antidumping laws are protectionist measures applied regardless
of market structure, consumer welfare, or the relative efficiencies
of foreign and domestic industries.4 They effectively outlaw
international price discrimination, while ignoring its domestic
equivalent, by treating predatory and nonpredatory price levels
similarly, providing relief pursuant to a very broad causation
4 See generally Wood, supra note 1 (discussing market structure and relative
efficiencies). For a general survey of the antitrust/trade remedy debate, see
generally S. REP. No. 403, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); ORGANISATION FOR
EcoNoMIc CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT TRADE COMMITTEE, TRADE
AND COMPETITION POLICIES: COMPARING OBJECTIVES AND METHODS (1994);
Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Competition, Competition Policy,
and the GA 77, (The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1228
Dec. 1993); Harvey M. Applebaum, The Coexistence ofAntitrust Law and Trade
Law with Antitrust Policy, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1169 (1988); Harvey M.
Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust
Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 409 (1987); Harvey M. Applebaum & David R.
Grace, U.S. Antitrust Law and Antidumping Actions Under Title VII of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 497 (1987); Donald I. Baker, The
Proper Role for Antitrust in a Not-Yet-Global Economy, 9 CARDOZO L. REV.
1135 (1988);John J. Barcel6 I, A History of GA 7T Unfair Trade Remedy Law-
Confusion of Purposes, 14 WORLD ECON. 311 (1991); Ronald A. Cass, Price
Discrimination aid Predation Analysis in Antitrust and International Trade: A
Comment, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 877 (1993); Joel Davidow, The Relationship
Between Anti-Trust Laws and Trade Laws in the United States, 14 WORLD ECON.
37 (1991); Alfred E. Eckes, The Interface ofAntitrust and Trade Laws-Conflict or
Harmony? An ITC Commissioner's Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 417 (1987);
Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Policy and Trade Policy: An Economist's
Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 439 (1987); Alan F. Holmer, The Interace of
Trade/Competition Law and Policy: Trade Negotiation and Policy Considerations,
56 ANTITRUST L.J. 433 (1987); Gilbert B. Kaplan & Susan H. Kuhbach, The
Causes of Unfair Trade: Trade Law Enforcers'Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 445
(1987); Jeffrey L. Kessler, The Antidumping Act of 1916: Antitrust Analogue or
Anathema?, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 485 (1987); John R. Morris, International Trade
and Antitrust: Comments, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 945 (1993); John D. Ong, The
Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: A Businessman's Perspective, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 425 (1987); A. Paul Victor, The Interface of Trade/Competition
Law and Policy: An Overview, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 399 (1987); A. Paul Victor,
Task Force Report on the Interace Between International Trade Law and Policy
and Competition Law and Policy: Introduction, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 463 (1987);
Presley L. Warner, Comment, Canada-United States Free Trade: The Case for
Replacing Antidumping With Antitrust, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 791 (1992).
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analysis,5 and barring the meeting competition defense available
to domestic producers.6 As a result, pricing strategies lawfully
undertaken by a U.S. enterprise may be unlawful when used by
foreign competitors.
In contrast, U.S. antitrust laws are designed to encourage
competition and promote both lower consumer prices and greater
allocative and productive efficiency.7 As a means of stimulating
s See USX Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 205, 206-16 (1988);
British Steel Corp. v. United States, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 86, 90-91 (1984).
6 The Robinson-Patman Act provides that
nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller [from] rebutting the
prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the
furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was
made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or
the services or facilities furnished- by a competitor.
15 U.S.C. S 13(b) (1994). For a comparison of the antidumping laws with the
Robinson-Patman Act, see Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law
and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, supra note 4, at 410-11; Applebaum &
Grace, supra note 4, at 507-12; Davidow, supra note 4, at 43-4; Kaplan &
Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 447-50. For discussions noting that predatory pricing
is not a prerequisite for an antidumping finding, see Applebaum & Grace, supra
note 4, at 512-14; Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 450-52.
7 "Allocative efficiency ... refers to the placement of resources in the
economy, the question of whether resources are employed in tasks where
consumers value their output most. Productive efficiency refers to the effective
use of resources by particular firms." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A PoLIcY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91 n.* (1978). Bork notes that the
sole goal of antitrust is "to improve allocative efficiency without impairing
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in
consumer welfare." Id. at 91. For a description of other characterizations of
allocative and productive efficiencies, see Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization
of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1159-61 (1981);
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern ofAnti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 72-74, 77-80
(1982). According to Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, "antitrust laws should be
treated as if their sole objective were increasing allocative efficiency." Frank H.
Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 715
(1982). One commentator has indicated that "the maximization of the value
of total output" can be achieved only when sellers "are supplying goods and
services in accord with consumer preferences." Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals
of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 1191, 1192 (1977). For the author's opinion about the inadequacy
of an antitrust approach based solely on efficiency concerns, see Wesley A.
Cann, Jr., Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of Economic "Objectivity":
Is there Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger Policy?, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 273 (1985); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Toward the Depoliticization of
Takeover Theory: Creation of an Innovation Factor, 40 SYRAcUSE L. REV. 1167
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both global trade and product innovations, this approach is
substantially preferable to that reflected in the antidumping laws.
Although the antidumping laws are ill-equipped to promote
international competition-and actually have the effect of
retarding such competition-the antitrust laws are similarly ill-
equipped to influence the structure of, or the access to, foreign
markets. The Sherman Act8 cannot "regulate the competitive
conditions of other nations' economies," 9 and the Robinson-
Patman Act"0 does not apply to international price discrimina-
tion." Since these laws cannot be used to alter the market
structure of another country, and since the ability to dump
depends on a protected home market and the inability to engage
in international arbitrage, a dichotomy between antidumping and
antitrust remedies has naturally developed. 2 Moreover, because
antitrust models do not recognize the social, political, and
economic differences among nations, antidumping remedies have
become the mechanism for harmonizing and equalizing interna-
tional economic systems. 3
This dichotomy, however, increasingly has been aggravated by
the development of an antitrust regime that relies extensively on
Chicago School economic theory.4 Although aspects of this
b 1989); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Vertical Restraints and the "Efficiency" Influence -
oes Any Room Remain for More Traditional Antitrust Values and More
Innovative Antitrust Policies?, 24 AM. BUS. LJ. 483 (1986).
s See 15 U.S.C. SS 1, 2 (1994); see also supra note 3.
9 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582
(1986); see also supra note 3.
10 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21(a); see also supra note 3.
" See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 244,
248 (E.D. Pa. 1975), petition denied, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975) ('[B]oth
commodities involved in the alleged price discrimination must be sold for use,
consumption or resale within the United States.").
12 The Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. S 72 (1994), was designed to
serve as an international analogue to domestic price discrimination law."
Kessler, supra note 4, at 485. This Act is rarely applied, however, due to its
predatory intent requirement and imposition ofcriminal sanctions. See id at
485-91. Kessler notes that "[t]here have been fewer than a dozen reported cases
construing the 1916 Act ... ." Id. at 491 (citation omitted); see also S. REP.
No. 403, supra note 4, at 3 ("As early as 1919, it became clear to the act's
sponsors that the intent requirement made the new law unworkable. . .
13 See Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 445, 456.
14 Scholars of the Chicago School of Economics advocate the usage of the
Efficiency Model, which "posits that consumers benefit from a free, competitive
market that forces producers to make the most, at the least cost, sold at the
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theory are being challenged by Post-Chicago"5 and Industrial
Organization economics, 16 antitrust enforcement continues to
rely heavily on questionable assumptions arising out of a distinctly
U.S.-oriented view of 'rational' business behavior. These assump-
tions, although perhaps appropriate for the development of
domestic antitrust policy and enhancement of competition within
the United States, become problematic when applied to the
international setting. Moreover, a policy based on a passionate
belief in the self-correcting abilities of a free market,1 7 and
applied chiefly when market power is exercised within the United
States, barely considers the political, economic, and cultural forces
shaping the global market.
This policy leads to ironic results. By ignoring the realities of
international diversity and by limiting antitrust remedies to only
the most egregious conduct, the free market approach has
encouraged private parties to seek antidumping remedies that are
inherently anticompetitive in nature.
1.1. The Need for a New Design
Nowhere is this irony more apparent than in the area of
predatory pricing. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
lowest prices." Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline ofAntitrust and the Delusions
of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1545
(1984); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An
Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 586-89 (1994); Peter M. Gerhart,
The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago
School, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 319; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
15 Post-Chicago economists provide "a new theory of recoupment based on
the insight that if predation occurs in one market, recoupment can occur
rapidly and profitably in many other markets. Post-Chicago economics also
challenges the Chicago view that recoupment is never possible in the traditional
single-market predation story." Baker, supra note 14, at 589-90.
16 See INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
(Giacomo Bonanno & Dario Brandolini eds., 1990); 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989).
17 Chicago School theorists believe that the market possesses remarkable
self-correcting capacities. See Rowe, supra note 14, at 1547-53 (discussing such
features of the market). Chicago School theorists often view governmental
intervention with a deep distrust concerning both its appropriateness and
effectiveness. See Posner, supra note 14, at 948 n.67 (discussing the "deep
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Radio Corp.18 and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.,1 9 the Court refused to provide an antitrust
remedy for predatory pricing. In Matsushita, the Court in effect
examined the theoretical probability that the defendants engaged
in predatory activity and held that the purported predatory
behavior would have been implausible, nonsensical, and economi-
cally irrational.0 In doing so, however, the Court assumed that
all foreign and domestic businesses: (1) are rational profit-
maximizers; (2) have the same level of intensity regarding the
incentive to cheat; and (3) would refrain from predatory behavior
unless they could recoup their losses in the same market in which
those losses were incurred.21  By applying a U.S. perspective of
rationality, the Court refused to recognize that rational conduct
can be a function of both culture and managerial philosophy.
Similarly, the Court ignored factors such as: (1) the relative
importance of market share and return on investment; (2) the
emphasis on consensus and group decisionmaking; (3) the desire
for full or lifetime employment; (4) the existence of cultural
norms concerning cheating; and (5) the development of managerial
attitudes concerning recoupment within a particular market,
within a particular period of time, and in traditional monetary
terms.
In Brooke Group, a case involving domestic defendants, the
Court imposed an arguably impossible burden of proof for
predatory pricing allegations. 23 Despite the existence of both a
18 475 U.S. 574.
19 113 S. Ct. 2578.
20 See Matsusbita, 475 U.S. at 588-98.
21 See id. at 585-98.
' See USX Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 205, 211-12 (1988)
(noting that foreign exporters do not always act as rational profit maximizers);
JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 23-32 (1923)
(commenting on motives for dumping); Steven F. Benz, Note, Below-Cost Sales
and the Buying of Market Share, 42 STAN. L. REv. 695 (1990) (discussing the
motives and practices of foreign producers seeking to gain market share); Steven
Semeraro, Note, Distinguishing International from Domestic Predation: A New
Approach to Predatory Dumping, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 621 (1987) (discussing
motives for dumping).
For a general discussion of the Brooke Group case and its implications,
see Baker, supra note 14; Michael L. Denger & John A. Herfort, Predatory
Pricing Claims After Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 541 (1994); Kenneth G.
Elzinga & David E. Mills, Trumping the Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoupment
Standard in Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (1994); Kenneth L. Glazer,
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concentrated industry with declining demand and historically
supracompetitive prices, and sufficient evidence of both predatory
intent and below-cost sales,24 the Court denied antitrust relief.
In so holding, the Court indicated that because "unsuccessful
predation is in general a boon to consumers," predatory activity
is only unlawful under the Robinson-Patman Act and section 2 of
the Sherman Act when the predator has the ability to later recoup
its losses by exercising market power.25
This reluctance to provide relief in predatory pricing cases
exists because the lowering of prices to increase market share "is
the very essence of competition. ""2 6  A strategy involving a
decrease in prices, the elimination of competitors, and then a
subsequent increase in prices may represent either predatory
conduct or fair and vigorous competition on the part of a highly
efficient firm. Apparently, because lower prices enhance consum-
er welfare and because "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried,
and even more rarely successful,"' courts have decided to err on
the side of leniency. In the courts' view, to do otherwise would
discourage legitimate price competition.2"
Predatory Pricing and Beyond: Life After Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST LJ. 605
(1994).
24 See Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2582-92.
' Id. at 2588. More particularly, section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns
predatory pricing only when there is a "'dangerous probability of actual
monopolization'" and the Robinson-Patman Act will condemn such conduct
when there is "'a reasonable possibility'" of substantial injury to competition.
Id. at 2587 (quoting Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 434
(1983)).
26 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986).
Id. at 589 (citations omitted). The Brooke Group Court noted that "'low
prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set.'" Brooke Group,
113 S. Ct. at 2588 (quoting Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495
U.S. 328, 340 (1990)). Furthermore, without recoupment, "predatory pricing
produces lower aggregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is
enhanced." Id. See ORGANISATION FOR EcONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, PREDATORY PRicING 17-32 (1989) (discussing the frequency
of predatory pricing and comparing the various academic theories tiereof)
[hereinafter PREDATORY PRICING].
28 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 (discussing the chilling effect of mistaken
inferences of predation); see also Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2589 ("[T]he costs
of an erroneous finding of liability are high."); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993) ("[T]his Court ... [has] been careful to
avoid constructions of [the Sherman Act] which might chill competition....
'); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984)
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Although this approach has provided an administratively
convenient set of policies with which to dispose of predatory
pricing allegations, the validity of these policies must now be
questioned in light of the changes occurring in the global market.
Current predatory pricing policy is no longer adequate in its scope
and a broader, more innovative design for policy development
must be established. This design must reflect: (1) the rise of
developing and transition economies; (2) the increase in economic
integration; (3) the global proliferation of antidumping legislation;
and (4) the spirit of the new World Trade Organization ("WTO")
Agreement.29
Global trends toward deregulation, privatization, and a firm's
ability to protect unfairly its dominant position must also be
considered.3" Predatory pricing is more likely to occur in an
international setting where: (1) industrial policy blurs the
distinction between public and private conduct; (2) subsidies and
transfer pricing obscure the level of costs; (3) markets are more
easily segregated; and (4) differing social and political agendas are
established.31 New economic thinking, which challenges old
(discussing the dangers of overzealous enforcement of the Sherman Act);
Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (8th Cir. 1989) ('There is a real
danger in mislabeling such practices as predatory, because consumers generally
benefit... ."); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 235-36
(1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting plaintiff's complaint for fear of chilling desirable price
cutting).
29 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS OF THE
GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE AGREEMENT
ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED ON APRIL 15,
1994 5 (Office of the United States Trade Representative ed., 1994) [hereinafter
FINAL TEXTS].
3o See PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 7 (discussing such trends); see
also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
INTERIM REPORT ON CONVERGENCE OF COMPETITION POLICIES 11 (1994)
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]; ORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY,
REGULATORY REFORM, PRIVATIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY 36-38
(1992) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT] (discussing the monopolistic nature
of former state-run businesses and the steps that need to be taken to ensure
competitive markets).
31 For a general discussion of predatory pricing, see Barbara Epstein,
Foreign Predation Against U.S. Firms: Reconciling International and Domestic
Policies, in ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Barry
E. Hawk ed., 1985); Benz, supra note 22; Semeraro, supra note 22.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
conceptions regarding the difficulty of predatory pricing 2 must
also be employed. Recent insights into the effects of capital
imperfections, as well as the ability to recoup in different markets
by means of selective predation and intimidation33 appear to be
equally applicable to the international marketplace.
That predatory pricing may be more common than suggested
by the Chicago School, however, is an argument that addresses
only part of the issue. The question remains whether an attempt
to discover and punish firms that engage in price predation would
be beneficial.34
A policy providing more realistic remedies against predatory
conduct also may encourage nonprice predation in the form of
sham litigation.35 The costs involved in defending a meritless
lawsuit are substantial. Difficulties experienced in the discovery
process and the tacit collusion that can result from the exchange
of information also are matters for concern. 3' The harm to
consumer welfare resulting from either delays in instituting price
reductions or from an overly cautious reluctance to engage in
lawful price competition raises concerns that the chilling of
legitimate business conduct may become a reality.37
In weighing these concerns, however, it is important to
recognize the consequences of retaining the current predatory
pricing policy. Since no adequate antitrust remedy is available
against international predation, businesses increasingly have turned
to antidumping laws to obtain relief. Between 1980 and 1990,
there were 1,383 antidumping actions instituted worldwide, nearly
half of which were instituted on behalf of Canadian or U.S.
32 See Baker, supra note 14, at 589-92; Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, New
Theories of Predatory Pricing, in INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 112; Janusz A. Ordover & Garth
Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRI-
AL ORGANIZATION, supra note 16, at 537-96.
33 See Baker, supra note 14, at 589-92; Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32,
at 112; Ordover & Saloner, supra note 32, at 537-96.
31 See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 133-34.
" See Denger & Herfort, supra note 23, at 557; PREDATORY PRICING, supra
note 27, at 83; Baker, supra note 14, at 1149.
36 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 30, at 21 (discussing problems with
discovery); PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 23; Kaplan & Kuhbach,
supra note 4, at 450.
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industries.38 In 1993 alone, U.S. steel producers filed seventy-two
actions against flat-rolled steel products imported from various
nations. 9 These statistics are not surprising considering that the
antitrust and antidumping laws, while divergent in theory have a
common purpose. Both potentially provide relief when the price
of a foreign competitor's product is considered to be at too low
of a level, either by being priced below an appropriate measure of
cost,40 or by being priced at less than its fair value.
4 1
The already substantial number of antidumping actions will
increase exponentially in the future. "By the end of 1989, twenty-
eight countries had adopted antidumping laws,"42 and by the
spring of 1994 that number had increased to approximately
forty.43 Furthermore, all nations signing the WTO Agreement
will automatically adopt its antidumping code.44 The GATT
Tokyo Round codes will no longer be optional in nature. As a
result of the single undertaking approach adopted by the WTO,
nations that previously lacked antidumping legislation will adopt
these protectionist trade measures.45
Proponents of current predatory pricing policy should
consider that the increasing availability and use of antidumping
remedies also will have a substantial effect on competition. In this
regard, the threat of antidumping remedies will chill price
competition, discourage producers from entering foreign markets,
encourage the use of sham proceedings, and enhance the ability of
businesses to collude through both public and private settle-
ments.46  While these proponents may argue that the
11 See THOMAS M. BODDEZ & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, UNFINISHED
BUSINESS: REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAWS IN NORTH AMERICA 16 (1993);
see also Warner, supra note 4, at 794 ("Producer interests initiated nearly 1,200
antidumping actions in Australia, Canada, the European Community and the
United States between July 1980 and June 1988.").
"' See F. Amanda DeBusk, Dumping Laws Still Endanger the Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, April 17, 1994, at F13.
4) See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.
Ct. 2578, 2587 (1993).
41 See 19 U.S.C. S 1673 (1994).
42 Warner, supra note 4, at 794 (citation omitted).
41 See DeBusk, supra note 39, at F13.
44 See id.
45 See id.
41 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
at 239 (1994) (describing the chilling of price competition); PREDATORY
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antidumping laws should be repealed, such an action would be
impossible until the law of predatory pricing becomes capable of
filling the economic and political vacuum that would result.
1.2. The WTO, Global Interdependence, and the Needfor a New
Antitrust Remedy
The goals of the new WTO Agreement must be considered in
creating a new foundation on which to base predatory pricing
policy. This Agreement, which binds over 100 nations, estab-
lished the WTO, 47 .and was designed to enhance international
trade in goods and services by reducing tariff and nontariff
barriers and by providing improved dispute settlement proce-
dures.48
Encouraging free trade, however, merely is the means by
which to accomplish a more comprehensive result. The true spirit
of the WTO Agreement lies in its attempt to: (1) create addition-
al global wealth; (2) raise global standards of living; (3) encourage
the optimal use of resources; and (4) "ensure that developing coun-
tries, and especially the least developed among them" share in the
benefits resulting from the WTO Agreement.49 GATT Secretari-
at preliminary estimates indicate that the Uruguay Round Agree-
ment will result in a level of world merchandise trade that will be
approximately twelve percent higher by the year 2005 than it
would be in the absence of the Agreement."0 In monetary terms,
PRICING, supra note 27, at 13 (citation omitted) (describing sham proceedings);
Hoekman & Marvoidis, supra note 4, at 6-7 (describing private collusion);
Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust
Perspective, supra note 4, at 414-16 (describing public collusion).
" See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations Done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, reprinted in
FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 5.
48 See id.
41 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Pmbl., reprinted
in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 9.
50 See TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE, GROUP OF NEGOTIATIONS ON
GOODS (GATT), GATT SECRETARIAT, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ASPECTS
OF INTEREST TO DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 45 (Nov. 29, 1993). These
estimates are based upon the implementation of "the Uruguay Round market
access offers on the table as of" Nov. 19, 1993. Id. at 41. Changes in such
offers "could substantially affect estimates." Id. at 46.
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this represents an increase of approximately $745 billion. 1 With
respect to global income, the implementation of market access
provisions would add approximately $230 billion annually, 2 and
the GDP of developing nations could be increased by $80
billion. 3 These estimates tend to underestimate substantially the
impact of the WTO Agreement because they do not consider the
resulting stimulus to world trade in the services sector,54 or
reflect the more dynamic gains that will result from the dissemina-
tion of knowledge, the increase in innovation and productive
efficiency, and the reallocation of resources.5
By establishing these goals, the WTO Agreement emphasizes
the connection between increasing global economic efficiency and
enhancing the social well-being of nations. Thus, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") has indicated that the eradication of poverty, hunger,
disease, migration, and uncontrolled population growth is
intimately linked to the pursuit of sustainable economic develop-
ment.56 As a result, the OECD nations have agreed to "bear a
special responsibility for ensuring that sustainable economic
development and social progress are consolidated and extended"
and that "universally shared benefits" are pursued.7
This approach, however, depends upon the willingness of
governments to recognize the benefits of global specialization.
When nations are permitted to exploit their comparative advan-
tage in a free and open market, the levels of global productivity
and output are increased, investment and innovation are encour-
aged, and consumer prices are reduced." This exploitation
allows individual nations to reap the rewards of their comparative
51 See id. at 45. All monetary figures in this Article will be in U.S. dollars
unless otherwise stated.
52 See id. at 45 (citation omitted).
5 See id. at 46.
54 See id. at 4647.
55 See id.
" See ORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, MEETING OF THE OECD COUNCIL AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, COMMU-
NIQUE 9 (fune 8, 1994) [hereinafter OECD COUNCIL MEETING].
57 Id.
58 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS,
supra note 46, at 205, 234; Sylvia Nasar, GA Ti's Big Payofffor the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, at F7.
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advantage and thereby raise their standard of living.
A political problem arises, however, because comparative
advantage often is based on the availability of substantially lower
labor costs, and specialization may result in the migration of
domestic employment opportunities. Although the loss of
unskilled, low-paying jobs will be more than offset by new and
better paying opportunities,59 these new opportunities will not
necessarily accrue to the displaced individuals. Thus, the benefits
of such a macroeconomic approach are often undervalued by
many political constituencies.
Despite this effect, the movement toward global interde-
pendence cannot be reversed. Attempts to artificially preserve
"yesterday's jobs"' ° are doomed as international trade barriers are
eliminated. A policy allowing inefficient producers to survive will
only dampen future international competitiveness, 61 and decrease
employment opportunities.
If the'benefits of specialization are to be achieved, nations
cannot continue to rely on policies designed to protect domestic
producer or consumer welfare. Policies must focus instead on the
goal of increasing global consumer welfare, or, more accurately,
global total welfare. 62  This focus would not only be more
consistent with the philosophy of the WTO Agreement, but also
would recognize that the health of a domestic economy depends
on the strength of the international economy.
Examining this approach through a more nationalistic
perspective emphasizes that the benefits of specialization will
accrue to efficient domestic producers, to their employees, and to
domestic consumers. The creation of an open international
marketplace will permit producers to increase exports and hire
additional workers to meet increased demand. Furthermore, it
will allow producers who rely on foreign components to engage
in "global sourcing" and acquire needed components at lower
59 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS,
supra note 46, at 45-46, 234.
60 OECD COUNCIL MEETING, supra note 56, at 2.
61 See Victor, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An
Overview, supra note 4, at 399-400 (proposing that "[U.S.] international
competitiveness may be adversely affected" by trade restraints and other
protective measures).
62 Total welfare is defined as the sum of consumer and producer welfare.




costs,63 thereby increasing the international competitiveness of
the finished products. The open international marketplace will
offer domestic consumers a greater choice of products and will
ensure that those products are provided at lower prices. Addition-
ally, as developing countries increase their level of exports,
resulting in improved standards of living and increased access to
hard currency, they will become larger consumers of imported
goods and services.
Antidumping remedies, in conjunction with an inadequate
antitrust policy that encourages their use, substantially impede
global specialization and threaten to undermine the results of the
Uruguay Round. As GATT negotiations have lowered both tariff
and nontariff barriers, many developing nations claim that
producers are increasingly turning to antidumping legislation.
64
This legislation has been described as a form of "creeping
protectionism," 6 inappropriately invoked as a "safeguard," 66 and
functioning as "an oft invoked escape clause."67 Antidumping
laws, when used as weapons to counteract the success of GATT
negotiations, serve as "a powerful brake on international trade."
6
The imposition of an antidumping duty often represents nothing
more than an administratively sanctioned subsidy for inefficient
enterprises.
Some argue that unfair trade laws are justified on "the grounds
that they act to harmonize differing economic systems."69
Because of differing social and legal arrangements, such as those
dealing with employment and debt-equity structures, an industry
in one country may be more willing to engage in dumping than
63 See S. REP. NO. 403, supra note 4, at 19-20, 24-25.
" See GA TTParticipants Criticize New U.S. Antidumping Pro osal, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2004 (Dec. 1, 1993); see also Barcel6, supra note
4, at 332-33 (discussing short-run reliance on, and long-run resistance to,
antidumping measures); Barry E. Hawk, Antitrust In Tod-y' s World Economy,
9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (1988) (describing the U.S. antidumping response to
GATI).
65 GA TT Participants Criticize New U.S. Antidumping Proposal, supra note
64, at 2004.
66 Barcel6, supra note 4, at 332 (discussing the "safeguard-like" concept).
67 Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 4, at 6 (describing "an oft invoked
escape clause").
6S DeBusk, supra note 39, at F13.
69 Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 445.
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an industry located elsewhere.7° Additionally, "differences in
national business practices and laws" become more determinative
of trade outcomes as barriers to trade are reduced.71 In providing
sanctions against goods imported at less than their fair value, the
antidumping law "acts as an interface between the two economies,
equalizing or offsetting the differences between the two."72 The
antidumping laws thus attempt to weigh short-term gains to
domestic consumers against the long-term harm to potentially
efficient domestic producers. They also attempt to inhibit the
ability of foreign firms to use their protected market power at
home to increase their presence abroad. 3
As the international economy becomes more integrated,
however, nations become less tolerant of antidumping remedies. 74
When countries agree to open their borders to international
competitors, they expect that their trading partners will recipro-
cate. As nations attempt to increase free trade, they resort to
antitrust law, rather than antidumping law, to deal with issues
such as predatory pricing.
75
The problem, however, is that no adequate antitrust remedy
exists. Current antitrust policy does not address the argument
that antidumping laws are justified as a means to "harmonize
differing economic systems," 76 and antitrust models do not
account for differing social, political, and economic systems.
Thus, until the antitrust laws address these issues, antidumping
remedies will continue to act as the political justification for the
reduction of other trade barriers.'
Although current antitrust enforcement is inadequate, the
world is not ready for a universal antitrust code. Assistant
Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman recently noted that the
70 See id. at 456.
71 THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL-OF ECONOMIC ADvIsoRs,
supra note 46, at 239.
72 Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 456.
73 See Eckes, supra note 4, at 423; Ong, supra note 4, at 429-30.
74 See Barcel6, supra note 4, at 332.
71 See id.
76 Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 445.
, One commentator has noted that the presence of trade remedies act as
safety valves" which make it "possible for [the U.S.] government to reduce
tariff barriers to present low levels, and thus to open our economy to global
competitive forces." Eckes, supra note 4, at 424.
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problems of achieving any worldwide agreement are "so over-
whelming that it is hard to imagine this occurring in the near
term."78 There are substantial differences between the needs and
values of industrialized and developing nations, 9 and there is no
consensus concerning the basic purposes of antitrust law.
It is unlikely that any nation would unilaterally repeal its
antidumping legislation. National governments, confronted by a
variety of social, political, and foreign relations issues, often
promote public policy interests by imposing trade restrictions."
As a result, the pursuit of free competition sometimes can be set
aside "in the messy, pragmatic, contentious world of international
trade."81 Moreover, because producers seeking protection from
foreign competition are part of a stronger lobbying contingency
than that representing consumers, 82 the political pressure to
refrain from unilateral action is substantial.
Since a comprehensive international antitrust regime is not
currently possible, this Article proposes an antitrust-based
predatory pricing remedy to be considered during future WTO
negotiations. This remedy would act as a substitute for the
interfacing function of the antidumping laws and would provide
for the recovery of actual damages for international predatory
pricing. Pursuant to such a proposal, recoupment would be
approached with an appreciation for strategic behavior,
oligopolistic and multimarket relationships, 3 and the economic,
political, and cultural differences among nations. The concept of
market power would be redefined, concentrating less on potential
's Interview: Anne K Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, ANTITRUST, Fall 1993, at 8, 9.
"' See Witnesses Discuss Differing Paths of Antitrust and Antidumping
Schemes, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1571, at 852 Gune 25,
1992) (citing testimony of Professor Pitofsky before the Senate Judiciary
Committee discussing the differences between U.S. and foreign nations' com-
petition policies).
" See Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 4, at 8-9 (discussing public policy
reasons for restraints); Holmer, supra note 4, at 433 (noting the complex set of
agendas facing nations as they develop competition policy).
81 Holmer, supra note 4, at 433.
82 "[T]he only politically effective resistance to antidumping comes from
domestic industries that are negatively affected by the resulting impacts on
input prices and uncertainty." Hoekinan & Mavroidis, supra note 4, at 28
(citation omitted).
" See Baker, supra note 14, at 594-98.
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market share and more on the ability of a firm, using segregated
markets and nontraditional forms of recoupment, to discipline or
destroy a more efficient competitor. 4 In the spirit of the WTO
Agreement, this remedy would also be designed to recognize
preferences for developing nations and to adjust cost and pricing
criteria to meet those needs. Additionally, by providing relief
through a predation test rather than through the application of an
overly zealous antidumping standard, this approach would
encourage legitimate global specialization and a more equitable
division of wealth.
This antitrust remedy is politically defensible on several
grounds. First, it would provide domestic businesses with an
expanded, more realistic basis on which to recover for predatory
activities undertaken by foreign competitors. However, it would
link such an expanded basis of recovery to the abolition of the
antidumping laws or the imposition of substantial restrictions on
their use.8" Concerning this tradeoff, it may be emphasized that
a successful private cause of action for predatory conduct would
result in a compensatory award that accrues directly to the
individual business that has been harmed. Antidumping duties, in
contrast, are simply collected by the U.S. government, and no
direct compensation is awarded to the injured party.86  In
84 For a proposal creating a new definition of trade injury that protects
only efficient U.S. producers from foreign dumpers, and that balances consumer
and producer interests in light of probable efficiencies, see Wood, supra note 1.
[T]he injury that should be legally recognized is the injury suffered
because the practice in question causes lost market share or sales to a
competitively structured industry. If the competing foreign firm is
more efficient, adjusting for any advantage conferred by the unfair
trade practice, or if the U.S. industry does not conform roughly to the
modelof a competitive (and hence efficient) market, a closer look at
the injury suffered is required. Only the injury that corresponds to
the loss that a competitive industry would suffer should be recognized
Id. at 1173. For a discussion concerning the ability of a firm to harm an
equally or more efficient rival, see generally Epstein, supra note 31; Benz, supra
note 22.
85 Competition policy "should not rank very highly... unless an explicit
link is made with the abolition of antidumping provisions." Hoekman &
Mavroidis, supra note 4, at 7. "If a credible argument could be made that the
abolition of antidumping would follow the adoption of common competition
policies, this would greatly strengthen the case of those calling for international
competition rules." Id. at 28.
86 See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 498.
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addition, a foreign competitor subject to an antidumping charge
also may choose to eliminate the duty by lowering the price that
is being charged in its home market.17 In this case, the competi-
tive position of the domestic firm would not be enhanced by the
use of the antidumping remedy. Businesses, therefore, may
actually have more to gain by supporting a broader and more
realistic predatory pricing remedy capable of reflecting cultural,
political, and economic differences, than by supporting the use of
the antidumping laws.
Any political or economic justification for antidumping
legislation must be questioned in light of changes in international
trading patterns. The United States, for example, increased its
merchandise exports by 95% between 1985 and 1993, and over
16% of all U.S. manufacturing jobs are now directly or indirectly
related to exports.8 Furthermore, over 47% of U.S. exports are
now destined for nations other than Canada, Japan, and the
member states of the European Union, and almost 46% of U.S.
imports come from nations other than these traditional trading
partners. 9 Moreover, approximately 41% of U.S. exports are
bound for developing countries and more than 41% of U.S.
imports originate in these countries.' Mexico, for example, has
become the third largest U.S. trading partner.91 U.S. trans-Pacific
trade, already 50% higher than U.S. trans-Atlantic trade, is
expected to expand as China continues to increase its role in the
international market.92
As a result of these changes in trading patterns, antidumping
remedies should continue to decline as a source of political capital
in industrialized countries. As developing nations gain in
economic power, the ability to intimidate these countries through
the use of trade remedies will decrease.93 The Council of
Economic Advisors recently acknowledged such a fact when it
17 See id. at 515.
88 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIc ADVISORS,
supra note 46, at 206-07.
89 See Nasar, supra note 58, at F7.
90 See id.
91 See Peter Passell, Regional Trade Makes Global Deals Go Round, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1993, at E4 (citation omitted).
92 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS,
supra note 46, at 211.
1 See id. at 231.
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noted that "as long as the Asian countries grow faster than the
United States, they will become more important in our trade
while we will become less important in theirs. Therefore past
trade strategies based on threats of market closure are liable to
become less and less effective."
94
Moreover, because antidumping legislation has proliferated
throughout the world, industrial nations are as likely to be the
subjects of antidumping duties as the enforcers of those duties.
The political expediency that may have existed when relatively
few nations possessed antidumping remedies no longer exists.
Thus, when the political viability of antidumping legislation is
examined, the potential benefits to domestic producers competing
with foreign imports must be weighed against the potential harm
to domestic producers exporting to foreign markets. This trade-
off particularly affects the technology industry in the United
States because it is both the most import and export-intensive
industry"
Finally, as antidumping remedies become available globally, a
corresponding increase in the potential for abuse occurs. These
remedies can be used not only as disguised barriers to entry and
as mechanisms for retaliation, but also as tools for implementing
social agendas. For example, by imposing prohibitive duties on
imported products, a nation may coerce foreign producers to
establish production facilities within its boundaries in order to
avoid such duties.96 Rather than acting as a mechanism for
creating level playing fields, antidumping laws could transfer jobs
from one nation to another, regardless of efficiency rationales or
natural comparative advantage.
These considerations suggest that an expanded but economical-
ly justified antitrust remedy is preferable to current antidumping
remedies. This Article first examines the law surrounding
predatory pricing, antidumping, and the WTO Antidumping
Code. Next, the Article addresses whether the current foundation
of predatory pricing law is theoretically consistent with either the
existence of strategic behavior or the general dynamics of the
international marketplace. Finally, this Article proposes an
internationalization of the concept of recoupment, the redefinition
94 Id.
9s See id. at 210.
96 See DeBusk, supra note 39, at F13.
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of the market power prerequisite, and the creation of a new
antitrust remedy.
2. THE PREDATORY PRICING/LEss THAN FAIR VALUE
DICHOTOMY
2.1. Predatory Pricing. An Overview
Traditionally, predatory pricing occurs when a firm with a
dominant position in a relevant market lowers its price below
some appropriate level of cost in order to force an equally
efficient competitor out of the market.97 This strategy also may
be used to discipline a nonconforming rival or to deter potential
competitors from entering the market. 8 In either event, preda-
tory pricing involves a conscious decision to sacrifice present
revenues with the expectation that any current losses will be
recouped in the future through the exercise of market power.99
In order for this recoupment expectation to be reasonable, the
predator must remain in business and possess the ability to absorb
increasing demand as its victims are driven from the market."
Furthermore, barriers to entry that are sufficiently high to permit
the subsequent imposition and maintenance of monopoly prices
also must exist. 101
Some commentators argue that businesses, because they are
rational profit-maximizers, would rarely engage in predatory
behavior.10 2 Predatory pricing is self-deterring because short-run




101 See id. For similar definitions of predatory pricing, see Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2587 (1993f;
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117, 119 n.15 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 n.8, 589
(1986); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d. 1396, 1399
7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990); Northeastern Tel. Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 86, 86 n.11 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 943 (1982); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 698
(1975); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289, 293,
306 (1980).
102 See Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2589-90; Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121-22, 121
n.17; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89, 594-95; Areeda & Turner, supra note 101,
at 699, 718-19; McGee, supra note 101, at 294-300.
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losses are inevitable while long term gains are speculative at
best. 3 Expected gains must be substantially higher than in-
curred losses because of the risk that they will not be recovered,
the time value of money, and the uncertainty over whether the
predator's product will remain popular with consumers.' °4
Predation is often more costly to the predator than to the
victim."05 Not only may some victims choose to remain in
business or to shut down only temporarily, the predator's losses
will magnify as it absorbs increased demand and is forced to sell
additional units below cost.0 6  Moreover, future monopoly
pricing may simply encourage new entry. 7 If the expulsion of
the predator's rivals was relatively easy and inexpensive, then
entry into the market also will be relatively easy.0 ' These self-
deterring characteristics and the notion that lowering prices to
increase market share is the very essence of competition, have
made the courts reluctant to find the existence of predatory pric-
ing.10
9
Several approaches were suggested to develop a rule that can
both punish a predator and encourage legitimate price competi-
tion. Some of these proposals concentrate on either short-run or
long-run cost criteria, while others attempt to place limitations on
alleged post-predatory price or output activity. Still others are
based on a rule of reason analysis or on the determination of
relevant market structure characteristics.1 0
In their seminal article, Areeda and Turner argue that prices
at or above reasonably anticipated average variable cost- a
substitute for marginal cost-should be presumed lawful, and that
prices below reasonably anticipated average variable cost should
be presumed unlawful.1 Although the original Areeda/Turner
test has been modified or qualified in subsequent commentary,
including a recognition that a price above average total cost
103 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89, 594-95.
104 See Baker, supra note 14, at 586-87.
105 See McGee, supra note 101, at 295.
106 See id. at 295-96.
107 See id. at 296-97.
10I See id. at 298-99.
109 See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
10 For a discussion of these approaches, see PREDATORY PRICING, supra
note 27, at 23-32. See also McGee, supra note 101, at 304-20.
... See Areeda & Turner, supra note 101, at 732-33.
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conceivably could be predatory if substantially below marginal
cost,1 2 the basis for the test continues to be the relationship
between price and cost, with average variable cost or marginal cost
as the benchmark. Areeda and Turner also propose that any firm
selling at a short-run profit-maximizing or loss-minimizing price
is not a predator.
113
In establishing a line between lawful and unlawful pricing,
Areeda and Turner assert that a monopolist producing at a point
where price equals marginal cost would only be able to harm less
efficient and, theoretically, equally efficient rivals.114 As a result,
the creation of a price floor anywhere above marginal cost would
only protect inefficient producers."' Judge Posner, however,
contends that a less efficient producer can eliminate a more
efficient rival if that rival has lower long-term marginal costs, but
higher short-ran marginal costs, than the predator. 6 Areeda
and Turner's cost-based approach finds intent completely
irrelevant in determining whether a price is predatory.
The courts, in attempting to determine the appropriate
measure of cost for distinguishing predatory from nonpredatory
pricing, have had a mixed reaction to the Areeda/ Turner test. In
Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,"' the Second
Circuit adopted average variable cost as the proper predatory
pricing test, and held that prices below average variable cost are
presumed predatory, while those above average variable cost are
presumed lawful."' The court, therefore, accepted the Areeda
and Turner premise that creating a floor above average variable
cost would only harm efficiency and consumer welfare. 9 The
court also recognized that loss-minimizing would constitute a
12 For a discussion of the subsequent modifications and qualifications to
the Areeda/Turner test, see PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 25
(citations omitted); Terry Calvani & James M. Lynch, Predatory Pricing Under
the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts: An Introduction, 51 ANTITRUST L.J.
375, 380-98 (1982); McGee, supra note 101, at 304-05.
113 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 101, at 703.
114 See id. at 711.
"' See id. (Areeda & Turner recognized that this rule also could harm an
equally efficient producer); see also Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
116 See McGee, supra note 101, at 300-02, 306 n.41.
117 651 F.2d 76.
"I See id. at 88.
119 See id. at 87.
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defense for pricing below marginal cost. 2 ' Similarly, while
recognizing that even harming less efficient firms can damage
competition because their presence helps to limit price increases,
the First Circuit has reasoned that any attempt to protect less
efficient competitors or to apply any form of intent-based
standard would be too speculative. 21  As a result, the First
Circuit stated that any workable test must be based on the
price/cost relationship, and that because the defendant's prices
were above both average cost and marginal cost they could not be
anticompetitive."
Numerous courts have created standards that deviate in
varying degrees from the Areeda and Turner proposal. The
Eighth Circuit, for example, employs average variable cost as the
predatory benchmark, but then applies rebuttable presumptions
to prices falling above or below that benchmark.' 2  The Fifth
Circuit has held that prices above average variable cost can be
predatory where barriers to entry are high, and that the higher
the barriers to entry, the more prices can exceed average variable
cost and still be deemed predatory. 24 The Eleventh Circuit has
held that although prices above average total cost are lawful,
prices between average variable and average total cost can be
predatory if accompanied by predatory intent.125 In weighing
the element of intent, the court applies a sliding scale by which
the plaintiff's burden of proof increases as prices approach average
total cost. 126  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that tests
based solely on costs not only fail to consider intent, but also fail
to consider factors such as market power, market share, and long-
term behaviorIV As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that cost
should be used to allocate the burden of proof and that even
120 See id, at 91 n.24.
121 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232-34 (1st
Cir. 1983).
1 See id. at 234, 236.
123 See Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1360 (8th Cir. 1989).
124 See Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d
884, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
12 See McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1503-04
(11th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
126 See id. at 1503.
12 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,
698 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
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prices above average total cost could be predatory if clear and
convincing evidence indicated that they were below short-term
profit-maximizing levels. 28
Finally, the Seventh Circuit, in a clear reflection of the
Chicago School approach, held that the cost issue need not be
examined unless the relevant market structure would allow for the
recoupment of predatory losses. 29 Even prices that are below
cost and admittedly predatory can benefit consumers, and thus
should be lawful, unless the predator will have the opportunity to
reap monopoly profits at a later date.13 As a result, an exami-
nation of market structure and the future ability to recoup losses
incurred should serve as a preliminary filter or screening device in
all predatory pricing cases. 31
Although the approaches taken by the various circuits
differ, 32 there is general agreement that cost determinations are
difficult. In order to decide whether a price is at or above average
variable cost, for example, there must be a relatively clear
distinction between fixed and variable costs. This distinction is
not always apparent, however, because all costs become variable
over time, and the manner in which costs are defined may depend
on the duration of the activity under review. 33 The existence
of multiproduct firms, the use of common facilities to produce
joint products, and the potential for cross-subsidization, transfer
128 See id. at 1388. This decision has apparently lost much of its validity in
light of Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2578 (1993).
129 See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396,
1401 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
130 See id.
131 See id.; Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for
Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 243-45 (1979) (proposing
such a screening device). The Seventh Circuit, however, reluctantly recognizes
that intent might be relevant in Robinson-Patman Act cases, although it is not
required for Sherman Act cases. See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1406.
132 For a further discussion concerning the approaches taken by the various
courts, see McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1495 n.14,
1503 n.34, nn.36-37, 1504 n.39 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
13 See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1400; see also Adjusters Replace-A-
Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884, 891 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 86 n.12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982);
Areeda & Turner, supra note 101, at 701.
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pricing, and creative accounting, particularly in the international
setting, make it difficult to measure accurately the level of
costs. 3 4  Even when costs can be established adequately, the
courts must consider variables such as: (1) promotional pricing of
new products and new market entrants; (2) product obsolescence;
(3) declining industrial strength; and (4) expectations that costs
will fall as sales increase.
135
The U.S. Supreme Court has provided little guidance concern-
ing costs. On three separate occasions, the Court has specifically
declined to define the appropriate measure of cost for determining
predatory pricing. 13  The Court has indicated that predatory
pricing involves sales below some level of costs, but it has not
spoken on whether recovery could "'ever be available ... when
the pricing in question is above some measure of incremental
cost,'... or whether above-cost pricing coupled with predatory
intent is ever sufficient to state a claim of predation."
1 37
In Brooke Group, the Court stated that "only below-cost prices
should suffice" 131 to establish predation and that prices, "so long
as they are above predatory levels ... do not threaten competi-
tion."139  The Brooke Group Court favored this below-cost
standard for determining predation over, for example, the
standards employed by the Ninth Circuit.' 40 Nevertheless, the
Court failed to define below-cost beyond noting that prices are
legal provided they are above predatory levels. This reasoning is
circular because predatory levels have never been defined.
The Court's avoidance of cost issues results from a shift in the
analytical focus in predatory pricing cases. Although the
"' See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1400; Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d. 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983); Areeda & Turner, supra note
101, at 704; McGee, supra note 101, at 326.
135 See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1400; Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d. 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983); Areeda & Turner, supra note
101, at 704; McGee, supra note 101, at 326.
136 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.
Ct. 2578, 2587 n.1 (1993); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S.
104, 117 n.12 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 584 n.8 (1986).
137 Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117 n.12 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
131 Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
139 Id. (quoting Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,
340 (1990)).
140 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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price/cost relationship ultimately may prove relevant in a
particular case, all predatory pricing claims are now screened based
on their plausibility, their economic rationality, their potential for
harming consumers, and their arguable motive. If an allegation
does not meet these initial prerequisites, summary judgment will
be entered and the issue of costs will not be reached.
In Matsushita, the Court examined the theoretical probability
that the defendants had engaged in a predatory pricing scheme.
Matsushita involved a Sherman Act section 1 claim alleging that
the defendants conspired to fix artificially high prices in Japan and
used those monopoly profits to fund a predatory pricing conspira-
cy in the United States. 141 In stating that the plaintiff's claim
was implausible and that the defendants had no rational motive
for engaging in such conduct,142 the Court held that rational
predatory pricing schemes require a reasonable expectation for
recouping losses. 143 Because over two decades had elapsed since
the alleged predation commenced and the scheme still had not
become successful, recoupment of the incurred losses would
require many years of monopoly pricing. 44 Since the ability to
engage in such pricing was unlikely, and since businesses are
presumed to be rational profit-maximizers, such a fact represented
strong evidence that a conspiracy did not exist.145  Moreover,
because the activity was allegedly carried out by a conspiracy
rather than by a single firm, the conduct was even more specula-
tive in nature because the conspirators had to agree on an
allocation of losses and later profits, and because the incentives to
cheat would be substantial. 46  The available evidence failed to
exclude the possibility that the conduct merely represented
competitive pricing.' 47
The Court indicated that despite the supracompetitive profits
in Japan, which possibly represented a means to sustain losses in
the United States, the petitioners had no motive to sustain such
141 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
577-78 (1986).
142 See id. at 596-97.
143 See id. at 590-93.
144 See id. at 592.
145 See id. at 594-95.
146 See id. at 590.
147 See id. at 597.
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losses absent a strong likelihood of recoupment.148 Similarly,
the existence of any excess production capacity in the Japanese
facilities merely indicated that the petitioners had the ability to
export their products abroad and not that they had a motive for
selling those products at a loss. 49 Excess production capacity
could not explain why the petitioners would be willing to forfeit
revenue without some reasonable expectation for recouping that
investment.150  Considering the substantial impediments to
success, neither the ability to reap supracompetitive profits at
home nor the existence of excess capacity increased the likelihood
that the petitioners would have engaged in a predatory scheme.
Because U.S. antitrust laws cannot regulate the competitive
conditions of another nation,51 and "a conspiracy to increase
profits in one market does not [demonstrate] a conspiracy to
sustain losses in another,"52 the respondent's evidence was not
adequate to survive summary judgment.
In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,153 the Supreme Court placed additional restrictions, far
surpassing those contemplated in Matsushita, on the ability to
recover for predatory pricing. In this case, Brooke Group, a
cigarette manufacturer (formerly named Liggett), charged Brown
& Williamson with anticompetitive conduct. After Brown &
Williamson introduced a line of generic cigarettes into the market,
the respondent alleged that Brown & Williamson engaged in price-
cutting practices that would force Liggett to raise its own prices
to remain profitable and would encourage oligopolistic pricing in
the cigarette market." 4  The Court held that regardless of
whether an injury results from primary-line discrimination under
the Robinson-Patman Act or from predatory pricing under section
2 of the Sherman Act, the two basic prerequisites for recovery are:
(1) pricing below an appropriate measure of cost; and (2) a
"reasonable prospect" or a "dangerous probability" that the losses
148 See id. at 593.
149 See id. at 593 n.18.
150 See id.
... See id. at 582 (citations omitted).
152 Id. at 596.
13 113 S. Ct. 2578.
154 See id. at 2582.
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would be recouped by the predator."' Although the Court in
Matsushita used the recoupment criteria to judge the probability
of whether the petitioners engaged in an unlawful act, the Court
in Brooke Group held that the act of predatory pricing itself is
lawful, unless the predator is likely to recoup its investment. The
Court stated that a victim's "painful losses" are of no consequence
to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured because an
unsuccessful predatory pricing scheme produces lower prices in
the marketplace and generally is "a boon to consumers."156
The Court relied on Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum
Co.,"'7 which held that "[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless
of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above
predatory levels, they do not threaten competition."1"8 The
Court's reliance on this language to support its position is
problematic. The pricing policy in Brooke Group was admittedly
below the predatory level and therefore beyond the scope of the
Atlantic Richfield holding. Moreover, although the antitrust laws
are designed to protect "competition, not competitors, "159 predato-
ry pricing is aimed specifically at eliminating competition and thus
"harms both competitors and competition."16  As a result,
predatory pricing has been described as "inimical to the purposes
of [the antitrust] laws" 161 and thus "capable of inflicting antitrust
injury."162
The Court described the relevant factors in determining the
likelihood of recoupment. In order for recoupment to occur, the
predatory scheme must be capable of producing its intended
results, either by actually driving a rival from the market or by
causing a rival to increase prices to a supracompetitive level. 63
The Court will examine "the extent and duration of the alleged
155 Id. at 2587-88. In an attempted monopolization case under § 2 of the
Sherman Act, a plaintiff must also prove "a specific intent to monopolize."
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993).
156 Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
157 Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 328.
18 Id. at 340.
1 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
160 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118 (1986).
161 Id. (citation omitted).
162 Id.
163 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.
Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993).
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predation, the relative financial strength of the predator and its
intended victim, and their respective incentives and will."'" If
the predatory behavior is capable of producing its intended effect,
the ability to recoup then will be analyzed in terms of the
defendant's market power and capacity to set and maintain
monopoly prices, as evidenced by the market structure, the
existence of barriers to entry, and the presence of excess capacity
to absorb rivals' market shares.
1 65
The Brooke Group Court recognized that cigarette manufac-
turing was a concentrated industry, and that the lack of competi-
tion enabled the oligopolists to reap supracompetitive profits. 66
The industry was experiencing an overall decline in demand and
a resulting rise in excess capacity. Brown & Williamson was the
oligopoly member who suffered most from the competitive
presence of generic cigarettes,16 and there was sufficient evi-
dence from which a jury could conclude that Brown & William-
son had intended to carry out the predatory scheme. 6 Finally,
the Court acknowledged that Brown & Williamson had actually
lowered its prices below its production cost for an eighteen month
period and that their scheme was successful. 169 Liggett had
succumbed, the prices on generic cigarettes had been raised, and
the percentage gap between the prices of generics and branded
cigarettes had narrowed. 70
Despite these findings, the Court held that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to submit their case to the jury because Brown &
Williamson did not possess a reasonable prospect of recouping its
losses by either slowing the growth of generic cigarettes or by
charging supracompetitive prices in the generic market.171  The
plaintiff's argument was based, in part, on the belief that Brown
& Williamson, in tacit collusion with the other oligopolists, could
exert market power over generics."7 The Court held that any
16 Id.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 2595.
167 See id. at 2583.
161 See id. at 2592.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 2585.
171 See id. at 2592-93.
172 See id. at 2593.
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plan based on tacit collusion would be extremely difficult to
implement, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the
claim of collusion in this case.173 The Court demonstrated that
while supracompetitive pricing requires a restriction on output,
generic market production had actually increased. 4  Price
increases, therefore, simply may reflect growing consumer
demand, and a jury should not infer competitive injury under
such circumstances. Thus, because oligopolistic price coordination
was extremely unlikely, supracompetitive prices could not result,
thereby precluding recoupment or competitive injury.1 5
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of both the Matsushita and
Brooke Group decisions was the Court's willingness to usurp the
function of the jury and to disregard fact, or reasonable inferences
of fact, in favor of economic theory. In Matsushita, for example,
the Court remarked that "the expert opinion evidence of below-
cost pricing has little probative value in comparison with the
economic factors ... that suggest that such conduct is irratio-
nal." 176 As the dissenting opinion indicated, however, the issue
was not whether the Court found the plaintiff's experts persua-
sive, but whether a jury reasonably could have found them
persuasive.'77
Although the Matsushita Court used economic theory to
determine the rationality of the defendant's behavior and the
likelihood that the defendants engaged in such behavior, the Court
in Brooke Group employed economic theory to legitimize
predatory pricing, absent the ability to recoup. The Brooke Group
Court noted that the plaintiff's expert believed that the predatory
pricing plan created a reasonable possibility that Brown &
Williamson could recoup its losses and injure competition.
178
The expert based his opinion on'the relevant pricing structure, a
variety of corporate documents indicating intent, and evidence of
below-cost pricing.17 9  Nevertheless, the Court, in substituting
its own judgment, held that a reasonable jury could not have
173 See id. at 2596.
174 See id. at 2593.
175 See id. at 2598.
176 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 n.19.
177 See id. at 606 (White, J., dissenting.
171 See Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2597-98.
179 See id. at 2598.
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concluded that the pricing structure would eliminate the risks
involved in tacit collusion.8 It also determined that there was
no real prospect of slowing the growth of generics.8 Thus
when an expert opinion is not validated "in the eyes of the law
... it cannot support a jury's verdict."
1 12
In applying economic theory, the Court not only substituted
its view of the facts for those of the expert witnesses and the jury,
it also substituted its judgment about recoupment for that of
Brown & Williamson's corporate executives. A rational, profit-
maximizing business normally would not sell below cost unless it
believed that it had the ability to recoup at a later date. A
conscious business decision to sell below cost and incur monetary
losses with no hope of recovery makes no economic sense.
Where, as in Brooke Group, below-cost pricing is established, and
the defendant does not invoke defenses such as promotion or
obsolescence, the Court should be more reluctant to replace the
experienced judgment of business decisionmakers with the Court's
questionable economic expertise. As Justice Stevens indicated in
his dissent, the willingness of Brown & Williamson's executives
to accept losses of such a substantial magnitude was "powerful
evidence of their belief" that the predatory scheme would
succeed." 3 If this plan was as unfeasible as the Court seemed to
believe, these executives would not have been willing "to invest
millions of company dollars in its outcome. "184
Finally, it should be noted that the requirement of proving a
reasonable prospect or a dangerous probability of recoupment
arguably does not apply to section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Allegations brought pursuant to section 1 of the Sherman Act
should not be affected because section 1 is directed towards
contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade.185 A plaintiff need
not prove an injury to competition or consumer welfare in order
to prevail because concerted activity is itself "fraught with
180 See id. at 2597.
181 See id.
182 Id. at 2598.
1 Id. at 2601 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184 See id. at 2603 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Glazer, supra note 23, at
625-28.
185 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1994).
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anticompetitive risk."18 6 Instead, in order to recover for injuries
caused by a predatory pricing conspiracy, a plaintiff must only
prove the existence of the conspiracy and a resulting antitrust
injury to that particular plaintiff. 1 7  Since predatory pricing
constitutes an antitrust injury,' the ability to recoup, or to
adversely affect consumer welfare, would not be a prerequisite for
recovery. The issue of recoupment would only be considered in
determining the rationality of the plaintiff's argument and the
likelihood that the defendants engaged in the alleged conduct.
Furthermore, in the event that the defendants admit to below-cost
pricing, recoupment should not be an issue at all. Irrational
conduct by an individual firm does not threaten competitive
injury, but "an irrational conspiracy is still a conspiracy" under
section 19
The price level leading to a right of recovery arguably may
vary depending on whether the case involves a section 1 or section
2 allegation. In Matsushita, the Court indicated that predatory
pricing usually involves conduct by a single firm, and that "in
such cases" predation clearly involves "pricing below some
appropriate measure of cost." '90 The Court did not need to
determine the appropriate cost level because Matsushita involved
a section 1 allegation. Instead, an antitrust injury would exist if
there was a conspiracy to drive the plaintiffs from the market
either by "pricing below some appropriate measure of cost" or by
"pricing below the level necessary to sell ... [a firm's] prod-
ucts."1 91 This distinction arguably is consistent with the fact
that section 1 does not require proof of an injury to competition
when per se violations are involved, but rather requires only proof
of a conspiracy and an antitrust injury to the complainant.
186 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993) (quoting
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69 (1984)).
117 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
1986); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334
1990) (stating that a private plaintiff may not recover damages under S 4 of the
Clayton Act unless the existence of an antitrust injury has been proved).
18 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 ("Except for the alleged conspiracy to
monopolize the [U.S.] market through predatory pricing, these alleged
conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suffer an 'antitrust injury.").
19 Glazer, supra note 23, at 628.
190 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584-85 n.8.
191 Id.
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Despite these section 1 reservations, the Matsushita and Brooke
Group decisions have placed severe restrictions on the ability to
recover for injuries resulting from predatory pricing. Considering
that the Robinson-Patman Act cannot be used to inhibit interna-
tional price discrimination, and that the Sherman Act cannot be
used to alter the economic conditions of sovereign nations, 1 2 the
severity of these restrictions may not only serve to extinguish
predatory pricing as a legitimate cause of action, but also may
eliminate the role of antitrust law in providing relief to injured
domestic producers. The Assistant Attorney General appropriate-
ly has warned that "there is a danger that theoretical constructs
will be used to deny the existence of real world phenomena" at
the expense of factual analysis.193
In order to establish a better balance between theory and fact,
the courts must consider the effects of strategic behavior. This
was demonstrated in the Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Serv., Inc. decision,'94 and by the results of the Brooke Group
decision, which although based on more traditional economics
than Kodak, did not derail the Kodak approach.19 In Brooke
Group, for example, the Court specifically recognized that tacit
coordination or interdependent pricing among oligopolists could
conceivably provide the means for achieving recoupment 9
Additionally, whether purposefully or not, the Court indicated
that recoupment must be examined in light of the respective
"incentives and will" of the predator and the victim. 1 7 Both the
incentives and wills of foreign producers may be substantially
different from those of the typical U.S. firm, whose characteristics
form the basis of current economic assumptions. It remains to be
seen whether the Court will explore these incentives in light of a
more thorough examination of strategic behavior and a more
thoughtful analysis of the predatory motives that eluded the Court
192 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
193 Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman, Address to ABA's
Antitrust Section, [July-Jan.] 65 Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1627, at
250 (Aug. 12, 1993) (regarding the withdrawal of the Department of Justice
Vertical Restraints Guidelines).
194 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451
(1992).
'" See Baker, supra note 14, at 586.
196 See Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2590-91.
197 Id. at 2589.
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in Matsushita.
Similarly, the courts must resist the temptation to rely on
westernized economic theory to systematically deny the existence
of predation in the international setting. Because obvious
predation presents less of a threat to intended victims, successful
predatory pricing is inherently difficult to identify or to distin-
guish from simple competitive pricing" Difficulties in detec-
tion, however, should not be equated with a lack of occurrence.
Moreover, even if predatory pricing is rare within the United
States, the likelihood of predation may be a function of social,
political, and economic conditions. "The frequency with which
predation occurs in one country may be a poor indicator of its
frequency elsewhere."' 99
Finally, other nations may not be so reluctant to identify
predatory pricing activity. Most nations regulate this behavior
through abuse of a dominant position, monopolization, or price
discrimination statutes.2" Market structure and the ability to
exercise market power play substantial roles in the judicial
decisionmaking process. The OECD has recently endorsed a two-
tier approach that would initially screen predatory pricing
allegations in light of the market's susceptibility to successful
predation.2"' Nevertheless, nations may differ substantially in
their interpretation and enforcement of these statutes. A foreign
firm may be viewed as possessing market power or market
dominance with a considerably smaller market share than would
be required in the United States. Some nations, therefore, choose
to supplement their antitrust statutes with unfair competition laws
that prohibit sales below some level of cost without regard to
market power, efficiencies, or competitive injury.02 Nations
also may adopt different positions concerning the relevance of
intent, the effects of a shared monopoly, the existence of
multimarkets, and the ability to engage in selective pricing and
cross-subsidization. Moreover, in their examination of the
competitive effects of alleged predation, national tribunals will
often differ over the appropriate time references to be applied.
198 See PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 17, 20-21.
199 Id. at 17.
200 See id. at 7-8, 3348.
201 See id. at 82.
202 See id. at 7-8, 47-48.
19961
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These variations will alter judicial views regarding the appropriate
measure of costs.0 3
3. ANTIDUMPING LAW: AN OVERVIEW
3.1. The Statutory Provisions"
° I
While the antitrust laws are designed to protect competition
and promote consumer welfare, the antidumping laws primarily
are aimed at protecting domestic industries from unfairly priced
imports resulting from international price discrimination."5 As
a result, antidumping enforcement is based on economic assump-
tions that differ substantially from the assumptions of current
competitive models. These assumptions reflect a belief that
"Congress has made a judgment" that injuries to domestic
producers may justify relief despite the fact that the economy
might be better served in the absence of protection.2 6 Thus, the
antidumping laws can be violated even though there has been no
below-cost pricing or any intent to engage in predatory or
dumping activity. Similarly, recognizing that cultural forces may
cause exporters to sell at irrational prices, antidumping enforce-
ment has relied less on the concept of rational business behavior
and less on cost-based rules which measure injuries to competition
but ignore injuries to producers.' 7
In carrying out this congressional judgment, an antidumping
duty will be imposed on foreign merchandise when the Interna-
tional Trade Administration (ITA) determines that the merchan-
dise "is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less
than its fair value," and the International Trade Commission
(ITC) determines that a domestic industry is being materially
203 See id. at 49-79 (comparing and contrasting the enforcement procedures
of OECD member countries).
204 For a discussion of the history of the antidumping statutes, see USX
Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 205, 209-10 (1988); Barcelo, supra
note 4, at 312-19.
205 The Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988), was an antitrust
statute aimed at international predatory pricing. This statute, however, has
proved to be both untenable and is rarely used. See supra note 12; see also
Barcelo, supra note 4, at 314; Davidow, supra note 4, at 40; Kaplan & Kuhbach,
supra note 4, at 451.
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injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establish-
ment of an industry is being materially retarded "by reason of"
the import or sale of such merchandise.0 8 If this duty is im-
posed, the duty will be "equal to the amount by which the
[foreign market] value exceeds the [U.S.] price for the merchan-
dise."2 9
The ITA may commence an antidumping investigation on its
own initiative or in response to a petition filed on behalf of an
affected industry.210 During the course of an investigation, the
ITC will make a preliminary determination about whether there
is a "reasonable indication" of material injury2 1 and the ITA
will determine whether there is a "reasonable basis to believe" that
merchandise is being sold at less than fair value.212 In the event
that affirmative determinations are made, the ITA will order the
suspension of liquidation of all entries subject to those determina-
tions and the posting of a cash deposit or a bond for each of the
entries in an amount equal to the estimated average dumping
margin.213 Assuming that the investigation is not terminated or
suspended by a withdrawal or agreement, both the ITC and ITA
will then make their final determinations. If these final determi-
nations affirm the earlier findings, the ITA will issue an
antidumping order that directs customs officials to assess the duty
and requires the offending party to deposit the estimated
antidumping duties pending liquidation.214 An antidumping
order may be reviewed annually to redetermine the foreign
market value, the U.S. price, and the margin between the two.
215
During this review process, importers have the opportunity to
demonstrate that the imported merchandise has not been dumped
and that they are entitled to a refund of the cash deposit.2
16
20 19 U.S.C. S 1673 (1994).
209 Id.
210 See id. S 1673a.
211 Id. § 1673b(a)(1).212 Id. S 1673b0b)(1)(A).
213 See id. S 1673b(d).
214 See id. S 1673e.
215 See id. S 1675(a)(1).
216 See Victor, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An
Overview, supra note 4, at 403.
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3.1.1. ITA/ITC Antidumping Investigation
Antidumping investigations focus on three issues: (1) whether
there is a material injury or threat thereof; (2) whether there is a
causal connection between the material injury and the importation
of the merchandise; and (3) whether the merchandise is being sold
at less than fair value.2 1 ' The first element, material injury, is
defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or
unimportant." 218 In determining whether such an injury exists,
the ITC considers whether the volume of imports, or any increase
in that volume, is significant in either absolute or relative
terms.219 It also examines whether there has been a substantial
price underselling of the imported merchandise.2 Additionally,
the ITC considers whether the imports depress domestic prices or
prevent price increases which would have otherwise occurred.?12
The ITC also must examine the impact of the imports on the
domestic producers themselves. The Commission considers a
wide variety of factors including: (1) decreases in output, market
share, profits, sales, and capacity utilization;m (2) negative
effects on cash flows, inventories, employment, wages, and
growth;m and (3) limitations on both present and future
product development. 4  When the ITC examines a threat of
material injury, it will pay particular attention to such factors as:
(1) increases in production capacity in the exporting country;2
(2) rapid increases in U.S. market penetration;226 (3) the proba-
bility that imports will depress domestic prices;'m and (4) any
217 See 19 U.S.C. S 1673 (1994); see also Victor, The Interface of
Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Overview, supra note 4, at 402.
218 See id. S 1677(7)(A).
219 See id. § 1677(7)(C)(i).
220 See id. § 1677(7)(C)(ii)(1.
221 See id. § 1677(7)(C)(ii)(¢.
m See id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(i).
223 See id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(Rl.
22 See id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(TV). Additionally, in evaluating the volume of
imports and the effect of those imports on domestic prices, the ITG shall
cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports..." from two or more
countries of like products subject to investigation. Id. S 1677(7)(G)(i).
m See id. S 1677(7)(F)(i)(ll).
226 See id. § 1677(7)()(i)(ll.
U7 See id. S 1677(7)(F)(i)([).
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other demonstrable trends indicating an adverse effect on domestic
industries."2
If it appears that a domestic industry is being materially
injured,29 the ITC must investigate whether that injury is
causally linked to the importation of the foreign merchandise.
This requirement is easily established. First, causation is deter-
mined by an "injury to industry" standard rather than by an
"injury to competition" standard. 20 Second, the imports "need
not be the sole or even principal cause" of the material injury.2 11
Instead, the imports need only be a contributing cause, and the
statutory prerequisite will be satisfied if those imports contribute,
even minimally, to the woes of the domestic industry.232 As a
result, when a variety of both foreign and domestic factors
combine to create adverse industry conditions, the ITC is
"precluded from weighing" one factor against another.23'
Finally, the ITA must determine whether the merchandise is
being sold in the United States at less than its fair value and, if so,
the amount of the duty that should be imposed. In order to make
these determinations, the ITA must compare the U.S. price with
the "normal value." 234  In doing so, the U.S. price will be
designated as either the "export price,"23s or the "constructed
export price." 6  Whichever is chosen, the price will be in-
228 See id. S 1677(7)(F)(i)(IX); see also id. S 1677(7)"HI (noting that the
"Commission may cumulatively assess the volume and price effects of imports
... from all countries...").
229 See id. SS 1677(4)(A), 1677(4)(D), 1677(10).
2 USX Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 205, 209 (1988).
23i British Steel Corp. v. United States, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 86, 97 (1984).
232 See id. at 96.
233 Id.
234 19 U.S.C. S 1677b(a) (1994). The "normal value" is "the price at which
the foreign like product is first sold (or, in the absence of a sale, offered for
sale) for consumption in the exporting country, in the usual commercial
quantities and in the ordinary course of trade and, to the extent practicable, at
the same level of trade as the export price or constructed export price ... 
Id. S 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i).
235 "The term 'export price' means the price at which the subject merchan-
dise is first sold (or agreed to be sold) before the date of importation by the
producer or exporter of the subject merchandise outside of the United States
... to an unaffiliated purchaser for exportation to the United States.. . ." Id.
S 1677a(a).
236 "The term 'constructed export price' means the price at which the
subject merchandise is first sold (6r agreed to be sold) in the United States
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creased to reflect: (1) any costs and expenses involved in readying
the merchandise for shipment;217 (2) the amount of any taxes or
import duties that have been rebated or not collected by the
exporting country;28 and (3) "the amount of any countervailing
duty imposed ... to offset an export subsidy. .. ."23' Similar-
ly, this price will be decreased to reflect: (1) any costs, expenses,
export taxes, or U.S. import duties incident to bringing the
merchandise to the United States; 24° (2) any sales commissions
or other selling costs incurred in the United States;241 and (3)
any value, such as labor or material costs, added in the United
States before the merchandise is sold.242
The export price must then be compared with the "normal
value".243 If the merchandise is not sold for home consumption,
or if the quantity of sales is inadequate to form a valid compari-
son, then the normal value may be deemed to be the price at
which the merchandise is sold for exportation to countries other
than the United States.2 4 In either of these cases, however, if
the ITA finds that the merchandise was sold at prices that did not
permit the recovery of all costs, then those sales will be disregard-
ed in determining the normal value.245
In the event that the merchandise is not sold for domestic
consumption, and as a general rule, if the information regarding
third-country sales is inadequate, the ITA may construct the
normal value.246 This "constructed value" will also be used
when there are inadequate sales due to the fact that below-cost
before or after the date of importation by or for the account of the producer
or exporter of such merchandise or by a seller affiliated with the producer or
exporter, to a purchaser not affiliated with the producer or exporter...." Id.
S 1677a(b).
21 See id. § 1677a(c)(1)(A).
23 See i. 1677a(c)(1)(B).
239 Id. S 1677a(c)(1)(C).
240 See id. § 1677a(c)(2)(A)-(B).
241 See id. 5 1677a(d)(1).
242 See id. S 1677a(d)(2).
243 See supra note 234.
244 See id. S 1677b(a)(1)(B)-(.
245 See id. S 1677b(b)(1).
246 See id. 5 1677b(a)(4); see also Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 504
(discussing generally the implications "and elements of constructed value").
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sales were excluded.24  The constructed value reflects: (1) "the
cost of materials and fabrication or other processing.. ." used to
produce the merchandise;24 (2) the actual amounts incurred and
earned for selling and other expenses, and for profits;249 and (3)
the cost of placing the merchandise in a condition to ship to the
United States. 250
The ITA then compares the resulting normal value to the
export or constructed export price. In examining the difference
between the two values, the ITA is authorized to make adjust-
ments to account for differences in quantities sold or other
differences in the circumstances of sale.2s In arriving at its final
determination, the ITA is directed to verify the information upon
which it has relied, 2 2 but if it is unable to do so, it is authorized
to use the facts otherwise available, including those submitted in
the original petition.' If the ITA finds that the merchandise
has been sold at less than its fair value, and the ITC finds there
was an actual or threatened material injury and that a causal
connection exists between the injury and the importation of the
merchandise, an antidumping order will be issued. 25
Before critiquing these statutory provisions, some of the
arguments in their support may be noted. First, while the
promotion of consumer welfare is the cornerstone of antitrust
policy, this purpose must compete with a variety of other national
interests and social values for political attention. For example,
certain provisions of the antidumping statute might favor the
protection of domestic manufacturers and their employees over
consumer welfare, whether economically justifiable or not. Any
criticism of the statute on these grounds, therefore, should be
viewed in light of the fact that Congress may be balancing a
variety of competing domestic interests.
Second, dumping may be considered anticompetitive, even
247 19 U.S.C. S 1677b(b)(1) (1994).
248 Id. S 1677b(e)(1).
249 See id. S 1677b(e)(2)(A). If the "actual amounts" cannot be obtained, the
statute provides for an alternative method of expense and profit computation.
See id. 5 1677e(2)(B).
250 See id. S 1677b(e)(3).
251 See id. S 1677b(a)(7)(A)-(B).
252 See id. S 1677f(i)(1).
21 See id. S 1677e(a).
254 See id. S 1673; see also supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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when viewed from a consumer welfare perspective. Dumping
represents a means by which a foreign producer can exploit its
market power at home to enhance its presence abroad."
Therefore, it is a practice that can be used to drive domestic
producers from the market and to deter the profits and cash flow
necessary to stimulate domestic growth and innovation."'
Although consumers may initially benefit from the dumping of
low-priced goods, the consequences of dumping ultimately will
have a negative effect on the long-term welfare of consumers." 7
Moreover, when dumping and government subsidies are com-
bined, inefficient foreign firms may be capable of destroying more
efficient domestic producers, thereby resulting in a misallocation
of global resources and a decline in consumer welfare. 2'
Finally, it is often argued that the antidumping laws are
necessary to neutralize artificially created competitive advantag-
es,2 9 or to offset foreign practices that cause distortions in the
market.260 By providing an interface between differing econom-
ic, social, and political systems, which often provide various incen-
tives to dump,261 the antidumping laws can ensure a level play-
ing field in the international marketplace.262
3.2. A Myriad of Problems
The antidumping statutes, designed to achieve objectives
substantially different than those of the antitrust laws, are based
more on political realities than on modern economic theory.
These statutes may have deleterious effects, such as protecting
inefficient producers, legitimizing supracompetitive prices, and
preventing consumers from reaping the benefits of global
competition. This antidumping approach has led to a substantial
body of critical commentary that focuses on the discriminatory
255 See Barcel6, supra note 4, at 313; Eckes, supra note 4, at 423.
256 See Eckes, supra note 4, at 423.
257 See Ong, supra note 4, at 430.
255 See Eckes, supra note 4, at 423 (recognizing that dumping hurts
consumers located in the exporting country); Ong, supra note 4, at 430-31.
2" See Wood, supra note 1, at 1167-73, 1183-92 (discussing artificial
advantages).
260 See Ong, supra note 4, at 432.
261 See Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 456.
262 See Eckes, supra note 4, at 424 (noting that trade remedies, acting as
safety valves, allow barriers to be reduced).
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treatment of foreign producers, the lack of a meaningful injury
requirement, the adverse effects to efficiency and consumer
welfare, and a variety of procedural problems that cause arbitrary
application and business uncertainty.
The antidumping laws discriminate against foreign producers
by denying them the opportunity to engage in pricing policies
that would be lawful if undertaken by domestic producers. While
international price discrimination is illegal per se, domestic price
discrimination is unlawful only when a producer does not have
any relevant defenses and a plaintiff can demonstrate a substantial
competitive injury. The Robinson-Patman Act, for example,
provides that a producer can engage in price discrimination if the
lower price was offered "in good faith to meet an equally low
price of a competitor .. . .263 This defense is not available
under the antidumping laws. A foreign producer selling at lower
prices in the United States solely to meet the equally low prices
of its U.S. competitors, therefore, would be guilty of dumping.
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, a domestic firm selling its
product in New York for $20 would be allowed to reduce its
price in California to $18 if its competitors in that market were
selling at that lower price. A foreign producer, however, selling
a like product in its home country for $20, would not be entitled
to lower its price in order to compete in California. While
Congress has indicated that such "technical dumping" should not
be of substantial concern, any attempt at leniency has not had
much support in subsequent years.&4
This unfairness is magnified by the method of establishing
dumping margins. For example, dumping margins may exist
despite the fact that the average price charged in the United States
actually meets, or even exceeds, the average price charged in the
exporter's home market.2 6' This anomaly results from ignoring
"negative margins," where the foreign market value is actually less
263 15 U.S.C. S 13(b) (1994).
264 See Davidow, supra note 4, at 43; Wood, supra note 1, at 1189-90 n.122.
For a discussion concerning the lack of a "meeting competition" defense, see
Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust
Perspective, supra note 4, at 410; Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 509-10;
Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 447; Victor, Task Force Report on the
Interface Between International Trade Law and Policy and Competition Law and
Policy: Introduction, supra note 4, at 465.
265 See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 507.
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than the U.S. price when computing the total dollar value of the
dumping margins. 66
Applebaum and Grace demonstrate this result using a
hypothetical involving a firm selling thirty units of a product in
the United States.26' The firm sells ten units at $75 each, ten
units at $100 each, and ten units at $125 each. If the foreign
market value was $100 per unit, then the average U.S. sale would
equal that value. Since negative margins, or sales at $125 are
excluded, however, a weighted-average dumping margin of 8.34%
would be imposed.268  Moreover, even if the price actually
charged in the United States was exactly the same as, or perhaps
even above, the price charged in the home market, an
antidumping margin would still exist once the actual U.S. price
was adjusted downward to reflect transportation costs, selling
expenses, and U.S. import duties.269  As a result, even where
there is no actual price discrimination between the two markets,
the ITA may find that discrimination exists. 27°
The Robinson-Patman Act also provides a cost justification
defense that allows price differentials based on "differences in the
cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are.., sold or
delivered. "2 'l The antidumping laws, in determining foreign
market value, make a similar allowance for price differentials
resulting from the sale of differing commercial quantities or from
other differences in the circumstances of sale. 2  Although
adjustments for selling and delivery costs will be made, "adjust-
ments for variations in production costs are only granted where
the merchandise sold in the United States is different from that
sold in the home market, or, in extremely rare circumstances,
where the goods are sold in different quantities in the two
markets. " 3  Considering that the size of the U.S. market may
266 Id. at 506.
267 See id.
261 See id. This margin equals the total dollar value of margins ($250),
divided by the total dollar value of U.S. sales ($3,000). See id.
269 See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
270 See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 508.
271 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994).
272 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(6)(C) (1994).
273 Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 511 (citations omitted).
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be much larger than that of the exporting country, the need for
providing a more complete cost-justification defense becomes
apparent.
An injury standard that is substantially different from the one
applied to domestic firms also perpetuates discrimination against
foreign producers. The Robinson-Patman Act, applicable solely
to domestic cases, prohibits price discrimination only where its
effect may substantially hinder competition or tend to establish a
monopoly.24 The legality of domestic price discrimination,
therefore, will be determined by an injury-to-competition
standard, rather than by an injury-to-competing-industry standard.
The severe restrictions outlined in Brooke Group will apply, and
recovery will be denied, absent proof of a substantial market share
and a reasonable probability of recoupment.7
The antidumping laws do not require any injury to competi-
tion. Rather, an injury results if the imports cause harm that is
not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant to a domestic
industry.27 6  Other contributing causes, including domestic
conditions, will be deemed irrelevant.m Moreover, by focusing
on the effects to competitors, rather than to competition, and
thereby dismissing the importance of market structure, the
antidumping laws impose liability on foreign producers who have
substantially less market share than that required by the antitrust
laws that apply to domestic producers. A dumping margin can be
imposed, therefore, on a small foreign producer who has merely
kept the prices of its larger U.S. competitors below
supracompetitive levels.2 8
Similarly, the less-than-fair-value criteria must not be equated
with the concept of predatory pricing. Since less-than-fair value
is determined by comparing the export or constructed export
274 See 15 U.S.C. S 13(a) (1994).
275 See supra notes 153-75 and accompanying text.
276 See 19 U.S.C. S 1673 (listing "material injury" as an element of
antidumping violations); Id. S 1677(7)(A) (defining "material injury").
2 See 19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(B) (1994); British Steel Corp. v. United States,
8 Ct. Int'l Trade 88, 96-97 (1984).
278 See Davidow, supra note 4, at 44 (noting that "foreign firms can be
found to be dumping and to have caused injury when, for instance, a foreign
seller with three per cent of the United States' market gains an additional one
per cent at the expense of an American rival with more than twenty per cent
of the market"); see also id. at 43 (stating that "injury has been found where
foreign pricing held domestic pricing at relatively low levels ... ").
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price to the normal value, sales in the United States that are above
marginal cost, or even above total cost, may nevertheless be
subject to an antidumping order.
A foreign producer, for example, selling its product for $25
per unit in the exporting country and for $20 per unit in the
United States may be subject to an antidumping order even
though the total cost per unit is only $15. Costs and expenses,
while often relevant in determining the export and constructed
export price and normal value, are not a benchmark for legality.
Additionally, the effects of the dual standard-which holds
domestic producers liable only for truly anticompetitive behavior,
while holding foreign competitors liable for mere price discrimina-
tion-are magnified because the "anti-dumping measures have
almost exclusively burdened nonpredatory dumping."279
The issue of costs becomes relevant in two situations. First,
the ITA will disregard those sales made at a price below-cost in
determining normal value by examining home or third-market
sales.28' The ITA will not apply the average variable cost
standard generally employed in antitrust cases, but will instead
apply the cost standard described by the statute.281  Disregarding
below-cost sales raises the normal value, thereby increasing both
the size of the margin that will be imposed and the likelihood of
a dumping violation.
Second, cost analysis will be employed when the ITA
compares the U.S. price to the constructed value of the imported
merchandise. The constructed value is based on the costs of
materials, fabrication and other processing, general expenses,
profit, and the expenses necessary to ready the merchandise for
shipment.282 The constructed value, however, will not be based
on average variable costs but rather on fully allocated costs
279 Barcel6, supra note 4, at 313-14; see also Applebaum, The Interface of
Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, supra note 4, at 412
(noting that the "garden variety dumping case is a price-to-price comparison...
that does not consider cost at all"); Warner, supra note 4, at 830 (reporting that
"[i]n thirty Canadian cases since 1984 in which antidumping duties were
imposed, none could be supported on the grounds of a concern over predatory
pricing" (citation omitted)).
210 See 19 U.S.C. S 1677b(b)(1) (1994).
281 See id. S 1677b(b)(1).
282 See id. S 1677b(e).
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including a profit margin."3 Applying a constructed value as
the appropriate measure further discriminates against foreign
producers. In effect, domestic producers are permitted to set
prices as low as their average variable cost without incurring
antitrust complications. In attempting to compete, however,
foreign producers are compelled to offer their products at a price
equal to fully allocated costs because any lower price would be
construed as dumping. This approach not only punishes nonpred-
atory behavior, but also penalizes sellers who are willing to price
their goods between average variable cost and average total cost,
or who are willing to earn a smaller profit.8 4 Not surprisingly,
U.S. producers often allege below-cost home-market sales in their
dumping complaints.8 5
In addition to discriminating against foreign producers, the
antidumping laws also reduce both efficiency and consumer
welfare. First, in examining the issue of material injury, the ITC
considers: (1) whether the volume of imports is significant; (2)
whether the imports depress domestic prices or prevent price
increases; and (3) whether the imports have had an adverse impact
on domestic producers.286 Both higher volume and lower prices
increase the likelihood of finding a material injury. From a
consumer welfare perspective, however, increased volume, lower
prices, and injury to inefficient producers are beneficial.
Besides encouraging wealth transfers from consumers to
283 For discussions concerning the distinction between average variable cost
and the fully allocated cost basis under the antidumping statutes, see
Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust
Perspective, supra note 4, at 411, 412; Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 513-
514; Davidow, supra note 4, at 43-44; Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 448;
Warner, supra note 4, at 801-02.
284 See Warner, supra note 4, at 802, 828.
285 See id. at 802; see also Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 508 (observ-
ing that "in recent years, more than half of the antidumping petitions filed by
U.S. producers have contained allegations of below-cost sales in the foreign
home market").
286 See 19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(B)-(C) (1994). A similar reduction of efficiency
and consumer welfare encompasses the test for a "threat of material injury."
Id. S 1677(7)(F). This analysis also demonstrates substantial concern for: (1)"any existing unused production capacity or imminent, substantial increase in
production capacity in the exporting country;" (2) increases in U.S. market
penetration; (3) depressing effects on prices; and (4) under utilized capacity in
the exporting country. Id. , 1677(7))(i).
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producers17 through higher prices and lower consumer choice,
antidumping policy often subsidizes inefficient domestic industries
by insulating them from more competitive foreign rivals. One
commentator has noted that "[t]rade policy consistently bets on
the wrong horse" by rewarding rent-seekers who cannot win in
open-market competition."' This trend undermines the ability
of U.S. businesses to compete in the future. Antidumping laws
not only harm producers who rely on foreign components for
their finished product, but also tend to reduce the incentives for
inefficient firms to rebuild their facilities or engage in product
innovation. Moreover, because businesses are denied the right to
fail, domestic assets are not redeployed to more fruitful and
competitive uses.
The antidumping laws also frustrate the efficient allocation of
global resources. Dumping margins are based on price compari-
sons rather than on the existence of below-cost predation. Thus,
a dumping determination is in no way related to the relative
efficiencies of the foreign and domestic firms. If a foreign
producer sells its product at a lower price in the United States
than in the home market, a dumping margin will be imposed. It
is irrelevant that the U.S. price was above the producer's costs and
that the producer's costs were substantially below those of the
complaining industry. The antidumping laws, therefore, often
discourage the growth of global specialization by artificially
increasing a foreign competitor's costs to a level above those of
less efficient domestic producers.8 9
Finally, the antidumping laws present a variety of procedural
problems. One commentator has indicated that the ITC has not
287 See id. S 1677(7)(F). See generally Lande, supra note 7 (discussing the
efficiency aspects of wealth transfers in antitrust law). For a discussion
concerning antidumping law's encouragement of higher prices, see Morris, supra
note 4, at 945-53; Victor, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An
Overview, supra note 4, at 399-400.
288 Elzinga, supra note 4, at 444. "A crude definition of rent-seeking is
usin the power of the state to increase one person's wealth at the expense of
anothier's." Id. at 439.
289 See Victor, Task Force Report on the Interface Between International Trade
Law and Policy and Competition Lawl and Policy: Introduction, supra note 4, at
465 (concerning the injurious effects to more efficient foreign producers);
-Warner, supra note 4, at 802 (stating that a foreign producer who has an
overhead of less than ten percent or a profit margin of less than eight percent
"will be found to be dumping").
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developed a coherent or predictable approach to defining the
allegedly injured industry.'9  The injury determination will
substantially depend on the manner in which "like products" are
defined, much in the same way that an antitrust finding depends
on the definition of the relevant product and geographic markets.
Professor Wood suggests that the ITC could improve the accuracy
and predictability of its decisions by adjusting its market defini-
tion process.291 Additionally, because problems in obtaining
accurate information render demand elasticity and supply
substitution difficult to determine, Professor Wood believes the
Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines provide the best
available test.292
Other commentators also have concluded that antidumping
proceedings create a number of antitrust problems. In addition to
providing a source of sham litigation, the antidumping laws are
structured so that competing domestic firms act collectively when
pursuing an antidumping case.293 This feature raises concerns
about the exchange of sensitive pricing and market information
required to institute and prosecute the petition.294 Furthermore,
serious issues surround the use of informal settlements between
competing domestic parties.295
Other procedural inadequacies include: (1) the lack of
discovery rights; (2) the leniency in evidentiary requirements; (3)
the use of inflated and unreliable information pursuant to the
"best evidence available" rule; and (4) the use of arbitrary and
irrelevant statistics in determining less than fair value.296  This
list is far from exhaustive. For example, it has become increasing-
ly difficult to identify a U.S. product for the purpose of protect-
ing domestic employers. With the growth of multinational
2W See Wood, supra note 1, at 1175.
291 See id. at 1178.
292 See id. at 1178-80.
293 See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 517; see also Davidow, supra
note 4, at 46; Pierre F. de Raver d'Esclapon, Non-Price Predation and the
Improper Use of U.S. Unfair Trade Laws, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 543, 552-53 (1987).
29' See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 517.
295 See id.
296 See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 512 (reporting on the lack of
discovery rights, the inapplicability of the Administrative Procedure Act, and
lax evidentiary standards); Davidow, supra note 4, at 44 (describing inflated and
unreliable information); Elzinga, supra note 4, at 44243 (noting the concoction
of statistical information).
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corporations, many U.S. companies are manufacturing their
products abroad and many foreign firms are establishing produc-
tion facilities in the United States.29 These multinational
corporations accounted for over seventy-five percent of all U.S.
merchandise trade and approximately forty percent of intrafirm
trade.
298
The procedural issues surrounding antidumping determinations
create a disrupted and uncertain international business environ-
ment.299 This uncertainty extends beyond the initial imposition
of the antidumping order because the size of the dumping margin
will fluctuate constantly over the course of subsequent administra-
tive reviews.3°°  This environment, when coupled with the
discriminatory treatment of foreign producers and a total disregard
for efficiency considerations, frustrates both international trade
and the exploitation of comparative advantage.
4. THE WTO ANTIDUMPING CODE
The WTO Antidumping Code, embodied in "GATT
1994, ""31 closely resembles the antidumping laws of the United
States. As a GATT signatory the United States should establish
domestic laws consistent with its international obligations.
Otherwise, U.S. domestic laws that do not conform to interna-
tional obligations might nullify or impair the benefits accorded to
other signatories.
The WTO Code, however, also substantially reflects the
political influence of the United States. Because the United States
refused to sign any agreement that reduced the effectiveness of its
297 One commentator has noted that "Texas Instruments has its home office
in Dallas but assembles and produces most of its DRAM chips in the Far East.
Mitsubishi has its headquarters in Japan, but it employs 250 people at a $20 mil-
lion DRAM assembly plant in North Carolina." -lzinga, supra note 4, at 443.
298 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF TE COUNCIL OF EcoNoMIc ADvISoRS,
supra note 46, at 207.
299 See Victor, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An
Overview, supra note 4, at 403.
310 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675; Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 507
("Because the administrative reviews cover different time periods than the
original investigation, the resulting margins usually differ from the cash deposits
required in the antidumping duty order."); Warner, supra note 4, at 813.
301 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 2.1, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra
note 29, at 145.
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trade remedies, most of the proposals submitted by the United
States were incorporated into the Code.
4.1. The Basic Code Provisions
The Antidumping Code defines dumping, material injury, and
causal relationship in a manner similar to U.S. antidumping
statutes. Dumping, for example, is defined as the introduction of
merchandise "into the commerce of another country at less than
its normal value ... ."'02 A dumping violation is determined by
comparing the export price of the product with its home-market
price or, where necessary, with either third-country prices or
constructed values. 33 Sales that do not cover both fixed and
variable costs are disregarded when determining the home-market
or third-country price 4  If a constructed value is used, it is
defined to include all production costs as well as a reasonable
amount for profits and for administrative, selling, and general
expenses.305  The profit amount chosen is based on the
exporter's actual data, but when this is unavailable, alternative
measures are provided to determine the actual amounts of both
profit and expenses."" The ultimate test for dumping under the
Antidumping Code is based on the price-to-price relationship
outlined in U.S. law.3"7 The Code, therefore, ignores competi-
tive and efficiency considerations and finds international price
discrimination a per se violation of international law.
The Code focuses on injuries to producers rather than to
consumers. The existence of an injury is determined in light of:
(1) the volume of the imports; (2) the depression of domestic
prices; (3) the prevention of price increases; and (4) the impact to
domestic producers in terms of sales, profits, market share, and
employment.0 8  These effects may be cumulatively assessed
302 Id. (art. 2.1).
303 See id. (art. 2.2).
304 See id.
305 See id. at 146 (art. 2.2.2).
306 See id. at 14647 (art. 2.2.2(i)-(iii)).
307 See id. at 147 (art. 2.4).
311 See id. at 14849 (arts. 3.1-3.2, 3.4) (describing the determination of
injury); id. at 149 (art. 3.7) (governing the "determination of a threat of material
injury" by examining sucl factors as the increasing rate of imports, excess
capacity of the exporter, effects on prices, and the size of inventories).
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when imports from more than one country are being investigat-
ed.3
09
In determining whether a causal relationship exists between
dumped imports and material injury, the Code clearly requires
that domestic authorities consider all "known factors other than
the dumped imports" that might conceivably be injuring the
industry.3 °  These factors would include: (1) the volume and
prices of nondumped imports; (2) contraction in demand; (3)
changes in consumption patterns; (4) developments in technology;
(5) current levels of industrial productivity; and (6) competition
between foreign and domestic producers.3 Injuries caused by
these factors "must not be attributed to the dumped imports."
3 12
Although this provision could be viewed as placing substantial
restraints on the material injury determination, the scope of this
provision is limited. Domestic authorities, even after eliminating
the effects of these factors, can find that dumped imports are at
least one of the contributing causes of the injury.3 13 Moreover,
this provision is limited to the injury determination and is
irrelevant when determining the size of the dumping margin to be
imposed. Once a material injury is established and a contributing
causal link is found, the authorities can enter an antidumping
order equal to the entire difference between the adjusted export
price and the product's normal value.314 In other words, once
the minimum requisite injury has been established, the magnitude
of that injury has no bearing on the magnitude of the
antidumping margin. The fact that a domestic industry also has
been injured by its own inefficiency need not be considered in the
margin computation.
While the dumping, material injury, and causation provisions
are the central concerns of the WTO Antidumping Code,
substantial emphasis also is placed on the methodology employed
in domestic antidumping proceedings, the requirements of
transparency and due process, and the use of international dispute
309 See itd. at 148 (art. 3.3).
310 Id. at 149 (art. 3.5).
311 See id.
312 Id.
313 See id. (arts. 3.5, 3.6).
314 See id. at 158-59 (art. 9.4).
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settlement procedures.3 "5  A provision of the Code requires that
an antidumping investigation be terminated whenever the margin
of dumping is de minimis, or the volume of the dumped import
is negligible.316  A margin is considered de minimis when it is
less than two percent of the export price and the volume of a
dumped import is considered negligible when it represents less
than three percent of the total import of like products.317
In addressing domestic proceedings, the Antidumping Code
also: (1) imposes time limitations on antidumping investiga-
tions;318 (2) creates criteria for the imposition of provisional
remedies and the use of settlement agreements; 319 (3) recognizes
that employee unions will have standing to institute antidumping
proceedings;32 and (4) requires the maintenance of an indepen-
dent domestic tribunal for purposes of judicial review.3 2' The
Code also recognizes that when an interested party fails to provide
requested information or impedes an investigation, preliminary
and final orders may be based on the best evidence available,
including that presented in the complainant's petition.3 2 While
the WTO Code instructs courts to view such evidence with
"special circumspection," it also recognizes that a party's lack of
cooperation "could lead to a result which is less favourable" to
that party.323  Finally, in limiting the duration of an
antidumping order, the Code provides that an order shall remain
in effect only for as long as it is necessary to counteract the
injurious dumping.324 The Code mandates that an antidumping
order "shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from
its imposition," or most recent review, unless the domestic
authorities determine that the expiration of the duty "would be
likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and
315 See id. at 162-65 (arts. 13, 16-17).
316 See id. at 152 (art. 5.8).
317 See id.
318 See id. (art. 5.10).
319 See id. at 156 (art. 7).
320 See id. at 152 (art. 5.4 n.14). This provision was inserted at the
insistence of the United States.
321 See id. at 162 (art. 13).
311 See id. at 154 (art. 6.8).
3 Id. at 168 (Annex II, 7).
324 See id. at 160 (art. 11.1).
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injury." 325
The Antidumping Code provides that all interested parties
must be notified of the initiation of antidumping proceedings and
further requires public notice of the basis for all dumping and
injury allegations.3 26 All parties must be given ample opportuni-
ty to submit evidence on their own behalf and be adequately
notified of all the information that the authorities will require in
preparation of the case.3" Similarly, notice sufficient in scope
to explain all conclusions of law and fact must be supplied to all
parties.32 Finally, the Code establishes a Committee on Anti-
Dumping Practices, composed of representatives of each WTO
member, to which all antidumping actions must be reported.
3 29
Members also are obliged to inform the Committee about the
competency of the domestic authority to conduct investigations,
the procedures governing those investigations, and any changes in
domestic antidumping law or regulation.33
With regard to the international resolution of antidumping
disputes, the Antidumping Code provides that any WTO member
who believes its benefits under the Agreement are being "nullified
or impaired" because of an antidumping order may seek consulta-
tion with the offending member.331 If this consultation does not
result in a satisfactory resolution, the matter may be referred to
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, which will establish a panel
to hear the dispute.332 The panel will determine whether the
establishment of the facts by the domestic authority was proper
and whether the evaluation of these facts was unbiased and
objective.3 33 As long as these basic fairness requirements have
been met, however, the panel will not overturn the order even if
the panel might have reached a different factual conclusion.334
Moreover, when interpreting the actual provisions of the WTO
35 Id. at 160-61 (art. 11.3).
326 See id. at 161 (art. 12.1).
327 See id. at 153 (arts. 6.1, 6.2).
328 See id. at 161 (art. 12.2).
329 See id. at 163-64 (arts. 16.1, 16.4).
330 See id. at 163-64 (arts. 16.1, 16.4, 16.5).
331 Id. at 164 (art. 17.3).
332 See id. at 164 (arts. 17.4, 17.5).
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Agreement, if the panel finds that a relevant provision "admits of
more than one permissible interpretation," the antidumping
measure shall be found "to be in conformity with the Agreement
if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations."
335
Once the panel has rendered its decision, its report will be
adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body and will become binding
on the parties. The Dispute Settlement Body may reject the
panel's decision by a unanimous consensus.336
In the event that the offending party does not comply with
the recommendations and rulings of an adopted report, the
complainant will be authorized to suspend concessions or other
obligations otherwise due to the offending party under the terms
of the WTO Agreement.337  Moreover, if the complainant
believes that it would not be effective to suspend concessions only
in the trading sector giving rise to the dispute, the complainant
may be authorized to suspend concessions in other trading sectors
as well. 3
38
4.2. The U.S. Influence
The Antidumping Code creates a detailed procedure for
determining the existence of dumping and material injury. It is
designed to encourage openness, to ensure due process in the
domestic setting, and to provide an international arbiter to
promote fairness and uniformity in the application of domestic
regulation. Despite these goals, the practical effect of the Code is
to institutionalize the use of domestic trade remedies and to
permit the insulation of domestic industries from international
competition.
The United States was largely isolated in its antidumping
negotiations because "[v]irtually all the other 115 participants in
the Uruguay Round" believed that antidumping laws were "a
31 Id. at 165 (art. 17.6(ii)).
336 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Annex 2, art. 16.4, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at
363; see also id. at 365 (art. 17.14). The DSB shall be deemed to have decided
by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member,
present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects
to the proposed decision." Id. at 354 (art. 2.4 n.1) (emphasis added).
117 See id. at 367-68 (arts. 22.1-22.3).
338 See id.
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form of creeping protectionism."339 The Uruguay Round of
negotiations, however, must be viewed as a package, involving
substantial compromises in areas such as agriculture, textiles, tariff
reduction, subsidies, the protection of intellectual property,
market access for services, and the powers of the WTO. In
negotiating this package, it became clear to the participants that
they would have to concede to a variety of antidumping provi-
sions to appease the United States if the WTO was to be estab-
lished. The U.S. Trade Representative, as well as numerous
Congressional leaders, had indicated strongly that the Uruguay
Round Agreement would not be passed by Congress if it weak-
ened any U.S. trade remedy.34°  The final text of the
Antidumping Code, therefore, resembles a U.S. wish list more
than it does an international consensus. This is readily apparent
in light of proposals made by the United States near the end of
the Uruguay Round negotiations.
The most significant of these proposals dealt with the standard
of review that would used by WTO panels in their evaluation of
domestic antidumping measures. The United States was con-
cerned that the new WTO dispute settlement procedures would
enable international panels to easily overturn domestic measures
and to substitute their opinions for those of U.S. administrative
authorities. This concern was at least partially based on the
change that would occur in the consensus requirement. Prior to
the new Agreement, a panel report could be adopted only by a
unanimous consensus. A report, therefore, would be adopted
unless any GATT member objected to its adoption. Under the
new WTO Agreement, this process is reversed and a report is
adopted unless there is a unanimous consensus not to adopt it.
341
In November 1993, the United States presented a proposal that
limits the scope of panel review and "restrict[s] the ability of
dispute settlement panels ... to overturn U.S. antidumping
decisions." 42 In the explanation accompanying the proposal, the
United States indicated that:
"I GA TT Participants Criticize New U.S. Antidumping Proposal, supra note
64, at 2004.
340 See U.S. Seen Gaining in Bid to Avert Any Weakening of U.S.
Antidumping Rules, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2040 Dec. 8, 1993).
341 See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
342 U.S. Seen Gaining in Bid to Avert Any Weakening of U.S. Antidumping
Rules, supra note 340, at 2040.
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[A] panel's proper role should be to determine whether the
action of the investigating authority falls within the range
of actions that would reasonably implement the obligation
to be performed, and not to determine whether the
authority has developed what that particular panel would
consider to be the "best" possible means of implementing
the obligation.3 43
The language incorporated in the final draft of the Antidumping
Code is consistent with this demand. The panel's review of
factual issues is limited to due process questions concerning the
proper establishment of facts and their unbiased evaluation.
44
Where the Agreement is susceptible to more than one interpreta-
tion, a panel must defer to a domestic measure that is based on
one of those competing interpretations. 4 In the Executive
Summary submitted to Congress, indicating the President's
intention to enter the Uruguay Agreement, this standard of
review was described as "the most important aspect of the new
antidumping agreement."3 46  By acknowledging that there may
be more than one permissible interpretation of the Agreement and
the facts involved in a dispute, and by requiring panels to defer to
permissible interpretations by WTO members, this standard "will
enable the United States to continue enforcing U.S. antidumping
laws."347 Although more authority has been delegated to the
Dispute Settlement Body concerning the resolution of internation-
al disputes, this authority, in the area of antidumping remedies, is
considerably weakened by the adoption of the standard of review
established in Article 17.6.
A variety of other U.S. concerns were raised by a preliminary
draft suggested by former GATT Director General Arthur
Dunkel. Some suspected that the Dunkel draft text would: (1)
deny unions the right to institute antidumping petitions; (2)
141 Id. (citing to the explanation accompanying the proposal).
34 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 17.6, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS,
supra note 29, at 165.
345 See id.
346 Executive Summary, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,268, 67,277 (1993).
347 Id.
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prohibit the cumulation of imports when determining the effects
of dumping; (3) eliminate antidumping duties after five years
through its sunset provision unless an affected industry could
prove injury again; and (4) apply an inadequate approach to anti-
circumvention.38
In response to these concerns, the Dunkel draft was further
amended at the insistence of the United States. First, a footnote
was added to Article Five indicating that the WTO Members were
on notice that in some Member countries employees or their
representatives have the right to file antidumping applications. 349
Second, the final draft specifically provides that "investigating
authorities may cumulatively assess the effects" of imports where
the imports from more than one country are being investigated
and where it is appropriate to do so in light of competitive condi-
tions.35" Furthermore, countries that individually account for
less than three percent of the volume of dumped imports may be
included in the investigation if those countries collectively account
for more than seven percent of the volume of dumped im-
ports.351  Third, the Dunkel draft sunset provision was revised
to indicate that an antidumping duty will be eliminated after five
years unless the domestic authorities determine, on the basis of a
review that was either self-initiated or requested by the industry,
that the termination would probably lead to a continuation or
recurrence of the dumping or injury.3 2  Finally, the
Antidumping Code does not "limit U.S. discretion to discipline
diversionary dumping" or "inhibit the application of current U.S.
anti-circumvention provisions." 313 Although the final text of the
Code contains no reference to circumvention, a Ministerial
Decision attached to the text recognizes that the issue of circum-
vention was discussed in the negotiations and that uniform rules
311 See GA TT Participants Criticize New U.S. Antidumping Proposal, supra
note 64, at 2004; U.S. Seen Gaining in Bid to Avert Any Weakening of U.S.
Antidumping Rules, supra note 340, at 2040.
34' Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariff and Trade 1994, art. 5.4 n.14, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note
29, at 152.
350 Id. at 148 (art. 3.3).
351 See id. at 152 (art. 5.8).
352 See id. at 160-61 (art. 11.3).
... Executive Summary, supra note 346, at 67,276.
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addressing this problem would be desirable.3"' As a result, the
Decision states that the problem of circumvention will be referred
to the Committee on Antidumping Practices for resolution.355
In addressing the final draft of the Antidumping Code, the
President's Executive Summary emphasized that although the new
agreement would require some changes in existing U.S. law, it
would not in any way weaken U.S. trade remedies. The new
agreement will incorporate "important aspects of U.S.
antidumping practice not previously recognized," thereby making
these practices "immune from GATT challenge."
3 6
Overall, the United States was successful in achieving its
antidumping objectives and in protecting the interests of its more
vocal political constituencies. Rather than amending U.S. law to
conform to the international consensus, it appears that the
Antidumping Code was amended substantially to conform to U.S.
law. This, however, will not be without substantial costs. In
light of the single undertaking concept of the WTO Agreement,
whereby signatories must accept the Agreement "as a whole,"
37
the U.S. approach to dumping now will be adopted by other
nations. This approach discriminates against foreign producers by:
(1) providing a less demanding injury to competitors standard; (2)
failing to provide defenses to foreign producers that are available
to domestic producers; and (3) measuring legality through the use
311 See id.; Decision on Anti-Circumvention, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS,
supra note 29, at 401.
... See Decision on Anti-Circumvention, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra
note 29, at 401.
356 Executive Summary, supra note 346, at 67,276 (offering as examples the
ITC's provisions regarding cumulation of injury and the Department of
Commerce's practice of disregarding below-cost sales in determining the fair
value of export sales).
117 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, 4, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 7 ("The
representatives agree that the WTO Agreement shall be open for acceptance as
a whole.. . ."); see also Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
art. 11.2, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 9 ("The agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 ... are integral
parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members."); id. at 17 (art. XIV.1)
("[A]cceptance shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements annexed hereto."). The only exceptions to the single undertaking
concept involve the Plurilateral Trade Agreements regarding civil aircraft,
government procurement, dairy, and bovine meat. See Plurilateral Trade
Agreements, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 383.
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of differing cost standards.3"' By dismissing the relevance of
efficiency and consumer welfare, and by applying fair trade
concepts rather than antitrust theory to foreign entities, this
approach fundamentally favors domestic producers. Thus while
political accolades may be bestowed on U.S. negotiators, their
success will be a mixed blessing at best.
5. CREATING A NEW APPROACH
Previous articles have questioned whether the pursuit of
economic efficiency should be the sole goal of domestic antitrust
policy.3"9 The positioning of efficiency within the hierarchy of
social values inherently involves a subjective decision-making
process, based on the visions and biases of antitrust caretakers.
Although the value of efficiency is universally recognized, its
importance relative to other values is subject to some dispute.
In the international context, however, the pursuit of efficiency
takes on additional social and distributive qualities. Because the
social well-being of a nation, whether in terms of education,
health care, housing, or political stability, depends on its economic
well-being, nations must not create artificial barriers that protect
one nation at the expense of another. These barriers do not make
economic sense because the health of the domestic economy
increasingly is dependent on the health of the international
economy. Moreover, these barriers inhibit the ability of undevel-
oped nations to use their comparative advantages to reverse the
tide of poverty. Whether based on sound economic principles or
on more humanistic pursuits, the efficiency criteria must deter-mine the validity of business conduct in the area of international
trade.
The antidumping laws have no legitimate role in the applica-
tion of an efficiency benchmark. In recognizing this fact, several
commentators have argued that the antidumping laws should be
repealed and that domestic producers should rely on predatory
358 See supra sections 1, 3.
.. See Cann, Toward the Depoliticization of Takeover Theory: Creation of an
innovation Factor, supra note 7; Cann, Vertical Restraints and the "Efficiency"
influence - Does Any Room Remain for More Traditional Antitrust Values and
More Innovative Antitrust Policies?, supra note 7; Cann, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act and the Pursuit of Economic 'Objectivity": Is There Any Role for Social and
Political Values in Merger Policy?, supra note 7.
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pricing laws for their remedies.'w The problem with such an
argument, however, is that the predatory pricing remedy has
become an oxymoron. In light of the narrow recoupment
standard applied in predatory pricing determinations, recovery for
predatory pricing is extremely rare.361 In the international
setting, when a producer alleges predatory activity by a foreign
firm in the U.S. market, the market power component will make
recovery almost impossible. As a result, in order to repeal the
antidumping laws, the predatory pricing remedy must be revised
to afford some form of realistic recovery to domestic victims.
The courts, in examining the likelihood or rationality of
predatory activity, must not only consider the new theories based
on strategic corporate behavior, but they also must recognize the
motivational distinctions that exist between domestic and
international price predation. Although this Article acknowledges
that unsuccessful predatory schemes can increase the welfare of
U.S. consumers, it will propose a new approach to both recoup-
ment and market power. This approach will examine recoupment
in terms of a rewards system362 within a diversified international
marketplace, and will define market power in terms of the ability
of less efficient firms to influence negatively the behavior of more
efficient rivals.
The definitions of recoupment and market power used in this
Article are designed to implement the goals of the WTO.3 63
First, the definitions recognize both that there is a distinction
between U.S. and global consumer welfare and that protecting the
interests of U.S. consumers may encourage global inefficiency.
Second, in recognizing that dumping is viable only where
segregated markets exist, these definitions may spur the opening
of foreign markets by adjusting predatory benchmarks to reflect
closed-market industrial policies. After developing this proposed
new approach to the concepts of market power and recoupment,
the definitions will be analyzed in light of a variety of issues such
as: (1) refraining from chilling price competition or encouraging
360 See Warner, supra note 4.
361 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
362 The term "rewards system" was suggested by Professor Jeffrey Gale of
Loyola Marymount University during discussions with the author.
363 The proposed definition of recoupment is developed infra sections 5.2,
5.3. A proposed meaning of market power is set forth infra section 5.4.
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sham litigation; (2) being consistent with national treatment
requirements; and (3) establishing a workable and enforceable set
of standards. Finally this proposal will submit a series of valid
resolutions to each of these concerns.
5.1. The Need To Consider Strategic Behavior
5.1.1. The Basic Theories
Modern industrial organization theory suggests that predatory
pricing might be more common than previously believed. New
research indicates that predatory pricing policies "can make
excellent theoretical sense,"3 ' and that because recoupment has
a variety of different forms, predatory conduct is not necessarily
more costly to the predator than to the victim.36 By acknowl-
edging that predatory pricing policies can encompass different
time periods, and by recognizing that information and financial
resources can be asymmetric among competitors and potential
competitors, these strategic models explore the profitability and
the feasibility of anticompetitive conduct.366  Some commen-
tators note that the arguments concerning the rarity of predatory
pricing are based on the false assumption that when prices are
raised during the period of recoupment, new firms may simply
enter the market on an equal basis with the incumbent preda-
tor.367 This assumption, according to Milgrom and Roberts,
ignores the fact that product sales and an actual presence within
the market during one time period may have a direct impact on
both future costs and demand.368 When consumers incur sub-
stantial switching costs in changing from the incumbent predator's
brand to the brand of a new competitor, any new entrant is at a
disadvantage because it must compensate its customers for those
additional costs. 69 Similarly, where strong experience curves are
involved, new entrants are often at a decided disadvantage with
respect to their initial costs of production. 70
3" Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 115.
365 See Ordover & Saloner, supra note 32, at 590.
36 See id. at 545-62, 591.
367 See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 115-16.
368 See id.
369 See id.
370 See id. at 116.
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Recognizing that strategic behavior during one time period
may affect market conditions in a later time period, and question-
ing the assumption of parity between incumbents and new
entrants, experts argue that the sacrifice of current revenues may
result in future rewards.371  For example, it might be rational for
a predator to reduce its price in order to deter the adoption of
new technology being offered by a competitor.3 2 Although this
strategy might sacrifice current revenues, it could also lead to a
larger customer base.37 3 Furthermore, since the compatibility of
components is often an important purchasing determinant, and
securing a large customer base might increase the value of the
predator's product to potential buyers, the predator might
rationally lower its prices below cost in order to secure a large
clientele. 37 4  Additionally, market participation is often crucial
for product development. A company forced out of the market
by a competitor during the early stages of product development
will find later re-entry prohibitive because of the costs in-
volved. 75
Milgrom and Roberts divide predatory strategies into two
major categories: those dealing with differences in the ability to
sustain losses, and those dealing with attempts to influence the
expectations of rivals. The former consists of a deep-pocket
strategy in which a firm with substantial resources lowers its price
to a level that cannot be sustained by its rivals. Imposing losses
on the rival by forcing a reduction in its limited capital assets and
a lower profit level, the predator also inhibits the rival's ability to
borrow capital and to ride out the predatory episode.3 6  To
succeed, the predator need not lower its price below marginal
cost; rather, to force the rival from the market, prices need be
lowered only to a level below the rival's costs. 3" The fact that
such a practice could be labeled predatory even when the victim's
costs were higher than those of the predator, thus indicating a
371 See id. at 116-17.
372 See id. at 117.
373 See id.
374 See id.
375 See Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 452.
376 See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 118-23; Ordover & Saloner,
supra note 32, at 548-50.
3' See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 123; Ordover & Saloner, supra
note 32, at 548.
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lower level of efficiency, will be addressed later in this Article.
The second category of strategic predation is based on the
assumption that corporate decisions, including those to enter or
exit a market, are based on expectations of profit. A predator can
affect those expectations, and thus alter entry or exit decisions, by
imposing artificially low prices.37 The existence of low prices
in a market may act as a signal to potential entrants that market
demand is weak, that the incumbent is willing to engage in
predatory behavior, or that the incumbent is a highly efficient
firm with substantially lower costs than the potential entrant.3 79
Although none of these market conditions may be present, the
existence of imperfect information may result in distorted or
mistaken judgments concerning potential profitability. Addition-
ally, the potential entrant's lack of an experience curve and the
presence of multiproduct lines and economies of scale may further
reduce the ability of a potential entrant to accurately judge market
conditions or to identify a predator's actual costs.8 A potential
competitor may therefore decide not to enter a market although
it might have been profitable to do so. These prices need only be
below the potential rival's long-run average costs and not below
the predator's marginal cost.38 In addition to engaging in such
signaling, a predator might also attempt to build a reputation for
toughness by preying on existing rivals.382 The purpose of this
strategy may be to deter entry by potential competitors or to
reduce the aggressiveness of existing competitors. Although this
strategy might not be profitable vis-a-vis a particular victim, it
represents an investment in a less competitive, and thus more
profitable, future market. This attempt to build a predatory
reputation is especially relevant where the predator operates in
multiproduct or multigeographic markets because the gains from
the predation are not limited to the market in which the preda-
tion actually occurs.383 Even when the predator cannot recoup
its losses in the predated market, it may recoup in other non-
... See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 123.
379 See id. at 123-25.
310 See PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 12.
311 See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 129 (applying Post-Chicago
economics to multimarket recoupment).
32 See id. at 131.
311 See id. at 132.
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predated markets unburdened by predatory costs. The possibility
for multimarket recoupment provides a rational basis for predato-
ry activity that should not be dismissed by Chicago School
theory.
384
These pricing strategies may also be accompanied by a variety
of nonpricing strategies. A predator, for example, might develop
substantial excess capacity in an attempt to deter market en-
try.38 The predator would thus demonstrate both its capacity
to increase output and its willingness to engage in vicious competi-
tion.386 Additionally, a predator might: (1) choose to increase
its rival's costs through the use of sham proceedings or through
the misuse of the regulatory process; (2) engage in excessive
product creation, product redesign, or product promotion; (3)
promote the adoption of specialized product standards; or (4)
encourage vertical foreclosure through the use of agreements
restricting the supply of inputs or the availability of distribution
channels.387
The term predatory pricing is defined by organizational
theorists in a manner that is quite different than that used by
antitrust enforcers. Under organizational theory, a price may be
predatory even though it is above any measure of the predator's
costs. Predation is defined as the intentional harm or discipline
of a rival, or potential rival, by charging a price, below a profit-
maximizing level, which is sufficiently low compared to the rival's
costs to achieve the desired result.388 The Brooke Group Court,
however, indicated that predatory pricing involves pricing below
some measure of the predator's costs, and that above-cost prices
that are lower than the costs of the predator's competitors do not
inflict an injury to competition recognized under the antitrust
11 See generally PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 9-13 (discussing the
economics of predation); Ordover & Salloner, supra note 32, at 550-56
(comparing predation models); Baker, supra note 14, at 589-92; Jonathan B.
Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views,
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 64849 (1989) [hereinafter Recent Developments]
(explaining the "new economics" of predatory pricing).
385 See PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 9.
386 See id. at 9, 26; INTERIM REPORT, supra note 30, at 13.
31 See PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 13-15; Recent Developments,
supra note 384, at 647-52; Ordover & Saloner, supra note 32, at 562-79.
388 See Baker, supra note 14, at 591; see also Milgrom & Roberts, supra note
32, at 117, 129, 130, 132-33.
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laws.3"9 The ability to charge a low, but above-cost, price is
possible because the predator is more efficient than the prey.
Even below-cost pricing, however, can be pro-competitive if: (1)
new products or new entrants are involved; (2) experience curves
or forward pricing will result in lower costs in the future; (3)
obsolescence or changing consumer patterns are present; or (4)
excess capacity or a need to engage in loss-minimizing are in-
volved.
390
Despite this conflict in definition, antitrust enforcers must
recognize that many truisms of the Chicago school have now
come under fire. Predatory strategies may make rational econom-
ic sense and recoupment may be achieved in ways not contemplat-
ed by older economic models. While these strategies do not
require it, below-cost pricing may be consistent with the goals of
these predatory schemes. By charging below-cost prices, rather
than prices merely below a rival's cost, a predator may hasten the
effects of its chosen strategy. Factors such as the time value of
money and a predator's lack of perfect information about the
prey's costs or access to capital markets could influence whether
below-cost pricing would be used. Moreover, if the predator is
less efficient than the prey, below-cost pricing is necessary for the
strategy to succeed.
While this proposal is aimed solely at below-cost pricing
strategies that are designed to injure more efficient producers,
these insights must be considered when determining the probabili-
ty that predation has occurred. Furthermore, antitrust enforcers
must acknowledge that certain pricing policies can both enhance
welfare and frustrate market entry, thereby reducing future
competition.391
5.1.2. The Judicial Posture
The lower courts have demonstrated a general reluctance to
analyze strategic pricing behavior. Although courts have consid-
389 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113
S.Ct. 2578, 2587-88 (1993).
390 See S. REP. No. 403, supra note 4, at 24; PREDATORY PRICING, supra
note 27, at 82.
3'1 See generally Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 117-18 (discussing the




1996] THE ANTIDUMPING/ANTITRUST DICHOTOMY 135
ered nonprice predatory strategies such as excessive advertising,
new product introduction, product redesign, and the use of
foreclosure,392 they have basically ignored arguments concerning
pricing policies. In recognizing the relationship among vigorous
price competition, consumer welfare, and the rewarding of
efficiencies, the courts generally are reluctant to look beyond the
predator's price/cost correlation. 393  Although the lower courts
differ in their approach to average variable cost and average total
cost benchmarks and disagree over the relevance of barriers to
entry when prices fall between these two benchmarks, they
consistently look to the costs of the predator and not of the rival
when making their decisions.394 Furthermore, these courts often
declare predatory intent irrelevant or at least subject to substantial
suspicion, ignore the effects of operating in multiple markets, and
do not consider the consequences to long-term consumer wel-
fare.
3 95
Additionally, the concept of limit pricing, which involves
setting prices above cost but below short-term profit maximizing
levels to discourage new entry, has generally been dismissed. In
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,39 the First Circuit
held that the courts are not equipped to distinguish between
392 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,
698 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); Barry
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230-39 (1st Cir. 1983);
Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 93-95 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
193 See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co., 651 F.2d at 88-91; Transamerica Computer
Co., 698 F.2d at 1384-89; Barry Wright Corp., 724 F.2d at 235-236.
114 See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co., 651 F.2d at 88-91; Transamerica Computer
Co., 698 F.2d at 1384-89; Barry Wright Corp., 724 F.2d at 235-236.
... See supra notes 117-135 and accompanying text (discussing the approach-
es taken by the various circuit courts); see also Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d
1355, 1362-63 (8th Cir. 1989) (describing the effects of operating in multiple
markets); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396,
1401-02 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990) (holding that "intent
plays no useful role"); McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487,
1503 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989) (noting that intent is
irrelevant when price is above average total costs); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d at 232-33 (reporting that intent is too speculative to
be reliable); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d at
87 n.15, 88-89 (noting that while long-term consumer welfare should be given
greater emphasis than short-run considerations, the courts do not have
"workable criteria for reaching this goal").
'9' 724 F.2d 227.
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disciplinary price cuts and legitimate price reductions aimed at
increasing a firm's ability to compete. 7 In order to determine
whether a price reduction was profit maximizing in the short-
term, a court would have to assess not only the relevant costs
involved, but also the elasticity of demand, the response of
competitors to shifts in price, and the changes in unit costs
resulting from increases in the volume of production.39 By
entertaining limit pricing allegations, therefore, the courts would
allow disgruntled competitors to use antitrust laws to raise prices
and stimulate tacit cartels. The ultimate effect would be to force
producers to forego legitimate business activity and to penalize
procompetitive price reductions.399
A notable exception to this approach, and one that has been
substantially criticized, is the decision rendered in Transamerica
Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp.4' The Ninth
Circuit held that prices above total cost could be predatory, and
thus refused to apply conclusive presumptions based solely on the
relationship between price and cost.4°1 Recognizing the impor-
tance of intent, the court noted that producers may sometimes
lower their prices for strategic reasons, thereby harming consumer
welfare in the long-run.4°2 The court recognized that by tempo-
rarily reducing prices to a level above average total cost but below
the level of short-term profit maximization whenever a potential
competitor appeared ready to enter the market, a predator could
discourage entry and establish a reputation for toughness. The
court also recognized that limit-pricing may constitute a predatory
practice prohibited by the antitrust laws and that the courts have
the right to examine long-run consequences when evaluating the
competitive impact of a pricing strategy. 3  In light of recent
Supreme Court decisions, however, it is arguable that strategic
pricing analysis has no basis in existing law. The Court in Brooke
Group indicated that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the prices
were below some appropriate measure of the predator's costs in
3 See id. at 234.
398 See id. at 235.
3" See id. at 234-35.
100 698 F.2d at 1377.
401 See id. at 1387-89.
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order to prevail in a predatory pricing action.' Prices that are
above-cost, even when they are below general market levels or
below a rival's costs, do not inflict an antitrust injury to competi-
tion.4°' Even where an oligopolist lowers its price to a competi-
tive level in order "to demonstrate to a maverick the
unprofitability of straying from the group,"406 or even where the
reduction in price is designed "to induce or reestablish
supracompetitive pricing," it is illogical for the antitrust laws to
condemn such a practice.' 7 Any intent to signal other market
participants, or potential participants, or to build a reputation for
toughness is irrelevant in the absence of a price below the
predator's cost.
While the Court in Brooke Group expanded the recoupment
requirement, its position concerning above-cost pricing was
consistent with its previous decisions. In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort
of Colo., Inc.,4°8 for example, the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant, after completing the challenged merger, would lower
its prices to some level at or slightly above its costs in order to
increase its market share at the expense of its smaller rivals.'
The Court held that the antitrust laws were not designed to
protect small businesses from competition, and that attempts to
increase market share through price reductions are not strategies
that should be prohibited.410
Similarly, in confronting allegations concerning limit pricing
and below-normal profits, the Court held in Atlantic Richfield Co.
v. USA Petroleum Co. that low prices, as long as they are above
predatory levels, do not threaten competition.411  Thus, a
plaintiff's losses resulting from a defendant's acts of pricing below
41 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113
S.Ct. 2578, 2587 (1993).
405 See id. at 2588.
406 Id.
407 Id.
408 479 U.S. 104.
409 See id. at 114.
410 See id. at 116.
411 See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340
(1990). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's holding,
stating that a limit-pricing strategy could gradually force competitors from the
market, thus dampening competition. See id. at 347, 347 n.2.
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general market levels or below a rival's costs are not recover-
able.
412
Despite this powerful language, an argument may be made that
the Supreme Court has not completely forbidden the use of
strategic pricing analysis. In Matsushita, the Court indicated that
reducing prices in order to increase business is often "the very
essence of competition"4 3 and that to prevail on a conspiracy
allegation the plaintiff must show that the defendants "conspired
to price predatorialy in the American market."4 14 In addressing
the issue of what constitutes predatory pricing, however, the
Court indicated that while "it may be that only direct evidence of
below-cost pricing" 41 will be sufficient, the Court would refrain
from considering "whether recovery should ever be available ...
when the pricing in question is above some measure of incremen-
tal cost."4 16  The Court defined predatory pricing as "pricing
below some appropriate measure of CoSt"417 or "pricing below
the level necessary to sell their products ....-"41' The Court has
consistently discussed predation in terms of "below-market
prices,"419 pricing "below the competitive level,"420 and selling
at prices "lower than necessary to obtain sales." 421
While it is true that many commentators have equated the
term predatory pricing with below-cost sales, the Court did not
do so in Matsushita. Instead, it provided two alternative defini-
tions for this term. While it is correct to rely on Matsushita to
support the contention that only predatory pricing is prohibited
by the antitrust laws, it is incorrect to rely on Matsushita to
support the fact that only below-cost pricing is, prohibited. The
term predatory, at least as used in Matsushita, must be read only
as it was explained within that case.
The Supreme Court consistently has reserved the issue
412 See id. at 340 (citations omitted).
413 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986).
414 Id. at 584 n.7.
415 Id. at 585 n.9.
416 Id.
417 Id. at 584 n.8.
418 Id.
419 Id. at 596.
420 Id. at 588.
421 Id. at 593 n.18.
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concerning the proper definition of predatory pricing. Despite its
strong language in support of a below-cost definition, the Court
in Atlantic Richfield admitted that it was not determining whether
the dictum in Matsushita was "an accurate statement of the
law."4" Similarly, the Court in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo.,
Inc. specifically noted that it was not deciding whether recovery
should ever be available when the price is above incremental cost
or "whether above-cost pricing coupled with predatory intent is
ever sufficient to state a claim of predation."4'
The Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to
entertain Post-Chicago arguments. The most notable example of
this is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 24 In
response to a growing number of independent service organiza-
tions ("ISOs") competing with Kodak for the servicing of its
equipment, Kodak instituted a policy of tying service to the sale
of its replacement parts.4 5 While Kodak had a monopoly share
of the market of its replacement parts, it did not have market
power in the interbrand market of photocopying and micrograph-
ic equipment.426
In response to claims that it had unlawfully tied the sale of
services to the sale of replacement parts and that it had monopo-
lized, or attempted to monopolize, the services market, Kodak
argued that because it did not have market power in the
interbrand equipment market, any finding of market power in the
derivative aftermarket for services was precluded as a matter of
law.V This argument was based on the theory that if Kodak
raised its prices for parts and services to a point that was above
the competitive level, potential equipment purchasers would stop
buying Kodak equipment and would switch to a competing
producer offering a more attractive product package.428 Any
increase in profits resulting from market power in the services
422 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 341 n.10
(1990).
423 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 n.12 (1986); see
also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.Ct.
2578, 2587 n.1 (1993).
424 504 U.S. at 451.
425 See id. at 457-58.
426 See id. at 456-58, 464-65, 465 n.10.
427 See id. at 465-66.
42S See id.
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market would be offset by a reduction in profits in the interbrand
equipment market.429
Contrary to Matsushita and its progeny, the Court in Kodak
demonstrated a willingness to base its determination on actual
market behavior rather than solely on economic theory. The
Court not only expressed approval of the appellate court's
observation that "'market imperfections can keep economic
theories about how consumers will act from mirroring reali-
ty, '  it proposed that "[1]egal presumptions that rest on
formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities" should
not be favored by the antitrust laws.43'
In addressing Kodak's argument, the Court indicated that it
would not accept a theory "on faith,"432 and that the existence
of significant information and switching costs could create a less
responsive connection between the prices for services and parts
and the volume of equipment sales.433 Consumers, therefore,
would have to know the total price of the package of equipment,
parts, and service at the time they purchased the product.434 In
order to do so, consumers would have to engage in a sophisticat-
ed, difficult, and expensive analysis of the life cycle of the product,
which may vary among purchasers and which may be impossible
to determine at the time of initial purchase. 435 In light of the
high information costs, the Court would not assume that
customers would engage in such an analysis.436 Moreover, even
if larger consumers would be willing and able to do so, Kodak
could conceivably price discriminate between those consumers
who were sophisticated and those who were not.
In questioning the theoretical link between service prices and
equipment sales, the Court also considered the costs to current
owners of switching to a different brand of product.438  If
429 See id. at 466.
430 Id. at 460 (quoting Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
903 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1990)).
431 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466.
432 Id. at 481 n.29.
433 See id. at 473.
434 See id.
43s See id. at 473-74.
436 See id. at 475-76.
417 See id. at 475.
438 See id. at 476-77.
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switching costs were high, current owners who were locked-in to
the product would be willing to tolerate some measure of higher
prices before turning to a competitor.439 The higher the switch-
ing costs, and the larger the installed base of existing users, the
higher that tolerance would be.40 The Court held that it was
conceivable that Kodak possessed market power in the derivative
markets because of the substantial initial outlay involved in
purchasing the product"1 and the fact that a relevant market
may consist of a single product brand.442
The seemingly conflicting approaches taken in Brooke Group
and Kodak are explainable. One commentator has argued that the
Court in Kodak was receptive to the Post-Chicago theories that
were presented by the parties and accorded with the facts under
review. 3  In Brooke Group, Post-Chicago theories were not
argued before the Court. As a result, the Court naturally relied
on the Chicago school economic model with which it was most
familiar. 4  The notion that a predator can recoup its losses in
a market separate from that in which the predation occurred, for
example, was not presented to the Court in Brooke Group because
the parties stipulated that branded and generic cigarettes were
different segments of the same market.445
The Court in Brooke Group refused "to create a per se rule of
nonliability for predatory price discrimination" if recoupment was
possible by means of "supracompetitive oligopoly pricing." 446
Although a concerted predatory pricing scheme would be
unlikely, especially where there is no express coordination and the
parties must rely on uncertain signals to achieve tacit concerted
action, the Court recognized that a predatory pricing scheme
designed to create or preserve an oligopoly can injure consumers
in the same way as one designed to create a monopoly.447 As a
result, despite the unlikelihood that such a practice would be
411 See id. at 476.
44 See id.
411 See id. at 477.
442 See id. at 481.
4 See Baker, supra note 14, at 602-03.
1 See id. at 603.
441 See id. at 595.
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attempted, "when the realities of the market ... indicate that it
has occurred ... theory will not stand in the way of liabili-
ty."448 This holding not only extends the relevance of recoup-
ment beyond the traditional bounds of monopoly models,449 but
it also demonstrates a willingness to allow facts to overcome
economic theory.
The antitrust laws have expanded and contracted to reflect the
social, political, and economic conditions of a particular time.4 0
In light of the changing international marketplace, and because
foreign courts have exhibited some willingness to explore a variety
of strategic issues, such as those surrounding multiple markets,
selective predation, cross-subsidization, shared dominant position,
rival perception, and long-term competitive effect,45' further
antitrust adjustment is now necessary.
5.2. The Need to Internationalize the Concept of Recoupment
The current approach to predatory pricing is based on the
assumption that such a practice is "rarely tried, and even more
rarely successful."452 This assumption is based on the belief that
predatory pricing schemes involve substantial risk because short-
term losses are inevitable while long-term gains, which depend on
changing consumer patterns and the predator's ability to outlast
its victim and absorb increasing demand, are merely speculative.
In light of these risks and the assumption that businesses always
act as rational profit-maximizers, predatory pricing has been
viewed as inherently self-deterring. As a result, antitrust enforce-
ment has adhered to the policy that it is better to allow some
predatory practices to go undetected than to mistakenly punish or
inhibit legitimate pricing activities.453  These assumptions,
however, are not applicable to the international marketplace. 4s4
448 See id.
44' See Baker, supra note 14, at 594.
41 See Cann, Vertical Restraints and the "Efficiency" Influence - Does Any
Room Remain for More Traditional Antitrust Values and More Innovative
Antitrust Policies?, supra note 7, at 483.
45' See, e.g., PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 49-79 (discussing
international predatory pricing enforcement actions).
412 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589
(1986).
... See supra notes 26-28, 97-109 and accompanying text.
454 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 46; Semeraro, supra note 22, at 623, 640-43.
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5.2.1. Segregated Markets and the Likelihood of
Predation
While the U.S. market is far from perfectly competitive, U.S.
antitrust enforcement is based on a free-market ideology.
Businesses are granted the opportunity to succeed or fail and the
market exploits its self-correcting capabilities. In terms of the
Chicago School, "consumer welfare will be the greatest.., when
the market is free (both from governmental interference and
monopolistic output restrictions) to direct or allocate society's
resources to those locations most responsive to consumer wishes,
and when businesses are permitted to pursue productive efficien-
cies in order to satisfy those wishes."455 The mixture of these
two forms of efficiency determines the overall wealth of soci-
ety,456 and the market will naturally gravitate toward an optimal
efficiency mixture.457
The success of the free-market approach, however, depends on
the ability of goods and services to move freely throughout the
entire U.S. market, thereby providing suppliers of those goods and
services with the opportunity to compete. It is this competitive
opportunity, for example, that deters price discrimination, since
discriminatory activity would only invite arbitrage. The U.S.
antitrust laws, which attempt to provide a federal umbrella or an
equal playing field for all market participants, must be viewed in
conjunction with the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.458 This provision has been interpreted to prohibit the
States from discriminating against interstate commerce, from
placing undue burdens on interstate commerce, and from engaging
in economic protectionism in order to promote state interests.45 9
. See Cann, Vertical Restraints and the "Efficiency" Influence -Does Any
Room Remain for More Traditional Antitrust Values and More Innovative
Antitrust Policies?, supra note 7, at 488-89.
456 See BORK, supra note 7, at 91.
4 See Rowe, supra note 14, at 1548 ("[T]he Efficiency Model posits that
consumers benefit from a free, competitive market that forces producers to
make the most, at the least cost, sold at the lowest prices."); id. at 1549 ("The
market ensures efficiency and cures inefficiency . . .
451 See U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3.
459 See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988)
(invalidating an Ohio statute that discriminated against products manufactured
out of state); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573 (1986) (finding unconstitutional a New York statute that set
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By prohibiting state-created barriers to entry; the Commerce
Clause provides the requisite competitive environment on which
free-market theories and antitrust enforcement are based.
There is no international analogue to the Commerce Clause.
While the new WTO Agreement is aimed at reducing both tariff
and non-tariff barriers,460 it does not eliminate the ability of
nations to insulate their domestic industries from the rigors of
competition. While barriers to trade are less conspicuous, often
taking the form of product standards, testing and certification,
closed corporate cultures, sociopolitical distribution systems, and
intentionally passive antitrust enforcement, they may be effective
in protecting domestic markets.
When a producer operates in a domestic market that is
protected from outside competition and that is based on a
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure, it has the ability
to price discriminate between domestic and foreign consum-
ers.461 Assuming that a producer has a motive for predation, the
ability to segregate domestic and foreign markets increases the
likelihood that the producer will engage in predatory pricing
activity.462 Predatory pricing is believed to be both rare and self-
deterring because of the substantial risks involved.463 If these
risks can be reduced, therefore, the likelihood of predation would
increase.4 64
The existence and use of segregated markets can reduce the
risks ordinarily associated with predatory pricing. First, the
existence of segregated markets eliminates the ability of competi-
ceiling limits on liquor prices offered by wholesalers); Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (finding violative of the Commerce Clause a
Wisconsin statute that barred the operation of trucks exceeding a certain
length); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)
(hoIding unconstitutional an Arizona law limiting the length of railroad trains).
460 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in
FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 9; see also supra notes 47-57 and accompanying
text.
461 See Warner, supra note 4, at 819-20, 839.
462 See id.
463 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 155 (suggesting that predatory price
cutting is unlikely to exist).
464 See generally Epstein, supra note 31, at 43-46 (discussing the prerequisites
for international predation); Benz, supra note 22 (discussing how companies
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tors or potential competitors to engage in the practice of arbi-
trage.465 When there is free movement of goods, any attempt at
price discrimination will be met by either competitive entry into
the higher-priced market or by a series of transactions between
buyers and sellers across the two markets until a price equilibrium
is established.4" In the international setting, however, a produc-
er in a protected domestic market has the ability to charge
monopolistic prices in that market and predatorialy low prices in
the export market simultaneously, without the risk that exported
goods will reappear domestically at more competitive prices.4 6
Any pricing equilibrium will be precluded and home monopoly
profits will be protected because the products may move only in
one direction.468
Second, when markets cannot be adequately segregated, a
potential predator considering below-cost sales will be facing
substantially greater losses, which must be recouped later, than a
predator who has the ability to sell some of its production at
above-cost prices. As the Court indicated in Matsushita, the
success of a predatory strategy depends on the ability to depress
the market price "for all buyers" in the relevant market. 469  If
the predator cannot offer its predatory price to all consumers, the
victim can continue to sell at a higher price to satisfy the
remaining demand.70 Similarly, commentators have noted that
a predator who lowers prices only in a segment of the market
cannot succeed, because this practice would merely induce the
victim to direct its sales elsewhere.41 The predator must there-
fore lower its price throughout the market in order to either
exclude its rivals or to deter future entry.4 2 Moreover, these
market-wide losses will continue to increase when the predator is
forced to absorb the unsatisfied demand resulting from the
465 See Warner, supra note 4, at 839.
466 See Semeraro, supra note 22, at 625-26.
467 See id.
468 See id. at 624-26; Warner, supra note 4, at 839.
469 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590
(1986).
470 See id.
47 See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 23, at 572.
472 See id.
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victim's reduction in output.4 3
In light of a predator's ability to restrict its losses to only a
portion of its total sales when segregated markets are involved,
several commentators have recognized that the existence *of
segregated markets can increase the likelihood of predation. 44
Areeda and Turner, for example, have recognized that:
Price discrimination might be thought to increase the
likelihood of predation by risking only a portion of the
[predator's] business while threatening the entire business
of smaller rivals who are confined to the geographic area
in which the selective price cut was made or who serve
primarily those customers who will benefit from the price
reduction. 475
Similarly, Semeraro provides a summary of this argument in
noting that predation is more likely to occur internationally than
domestically, because a domestic predator must reduce its price on
all of the units that it sells, while a foreign predator needs to
lower its price only on that portion of its output sold in the
United States.476  Because the predation costs to the foreign
predator are lower, its accompanying risks are lower as well.
47
As a result, not only is predation more apt to occur, but the
threat of predation by a foreign competitor becomes more
credible, and thereby more capable of influencing the behavior of
domestic firms. 48
The aforementioned arguments do not imply that domestic
markets are incapable of segregation. Foreign producers may not
always face lower predation costs and domestic firms may not
always face higher predation costs. Producers located in countries
" See McGee, supra note 101, at 296; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593 n.17.
474 See, e.g., VINER, supra note 22; Areeda & Turner, supra note 101;
Epstein, supra note 31; Semeraro, supra note 22.
475 Areeda & Turner, supra note 101, at 724; see also id. at 724-28 (recom-
mending that any recovery for price discrimination be limited to the situation
where the lower price was below marginal cost).
476 See Semeraro, supra note 22, at 627-29, 643; see also Epstein, supra note
31, at 4445.
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with substantial barriers to entry, however, have the ability to
price discriminate, and thereby limit their predatory investment
to non-domestic markets.47 9
A third argument is founded upon the Vinerian dumping
hypothetical. Viner demonstrated that dumping480  may be
employed for a variety of reasons including the disposal of excess
inventory; the development of trade connections in a new market,
and the elimination or frustration of competition in the market
where the dumping occurs.481 Viner also indicated that dumping
may be used to maintain full production in existing plant facilities
without inviting cutthroat price competition within the domestic
market.
482
Central to Viner's analysis is the proposition that dumping can
be profitable not only when the export price is below the home
market price, but also when the export price is below the average
cost of production.483 Viner argued that:
If an increase in the volume of output brings a decrease in
the average cost of production, what is lost in the sale of
a portion of the output at less than the average cost may
be more than made up by the reduction in the average cost
for the remainder of the output.
48 4
As a result, where costs decline as output is increased, it is
profitable for a firm to increase output-even when it is necessary
to dump any excess at prices below the average cost of produc-
tion-whenever the losses incurred in the export market are less
than the additional profits earned through cost savings in the
home market.4 5
In his example,486 Viner hypothesizes a producer selling its
total output of 100,000 units in its home market at $4.75 per unit.
411 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 44.
480See VINER, supra note 22, at 3 (defining dumping as "price-discrimination
between national markets").
481 See id. at 23-31.
482 See id. at 23, 27-28, 94-95.
411 See id. at 113-14, 123-24.
411 Id. at 123.
411 See id. at 113-14, 124.
486 See id. at 124-25.
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If the average cost of production is $4.50 per unit, the producer
realizes a profit of $25,000. If output is increased to 200,000 units,
however, costs are reduced to $3.60 per unit. If 100,000 units are
then sold abroad at below cost for $3.50 and the other 100,000 are
sold domestically for $4.75, the producer realizes $105,000 in
profits.8 7 This strategy is rational when a producer can only
sell part of its maximum output domestically at prices above the
competitive level.4"' Dumping enables producers to both
increase their output, thereby achieving economies of scale, and
maintain their supracompetitive pricing structures at home.48 9
Viner's arguments are directed primarily towards dumping, not
predatory pricing. Although Viner discusses "predatory dumping"
as a means for eliminating or frustrating the development of
competition,40 this term is used to describe the dumper's
motivation, rather than below cost sales.491  Nevertheless,
Viner's argument supports the proposition that predatory pricing
is more likely in the international setting.
First, if international predatory pricing were to be defined in
terms of selling below average total cost,4 2 Viner's analysis
would be directly applicable. Even if predatory pricing is defined
as sales below marginal cost, the actual losses of such sales could
487 See id. at 125 ($115,000 home-market profit, minus $10,000 export-
market loss).
488 See id. at 27-28 (discussing the domestic price in such a situation).
411 See id. at 27-28, 131. Viner notes that an essential ingredient of such a
strategy is the existence of a monopoly in the home market. See id. at 94.
Viner states that "dumping on other than a sporadic basis was typically, if not
invariably, confined to monopolistic producers' combinations." Id. Viner
continues:
If there is competition in the domestic market, the concern which
dumps a portion of its output in foreign markets in order to reduce
the supply and maintain or raise the prices in the domestic market
must bear by itself all the sacrifice involved in the export at reduced
prices and must share with all its domestic competitors the advantage
accruing from the reduction in the domestic supply.... It is only to
a monopoly that export dumping has attractions greater than those of
moderate domestic price-cutting.
Id. at 95. See Benz, supra note 22, at 711-13, 73940 (discussing Viner's
approach).
" See VINER, supra note 22, at 26-27, 120-22.
491 See id. at 23.
492 See generally, Epstein, supra note 31, at 42 (discussing average total cost
as the predatory pricing standard).
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be partially offset by increased revenues obtained in the protected
home market.49 3  These increased revenues result from lower
average costs and the maintenance of a supracompetitive price
unaffected by the additional output.494 As a result, even when
the predatory practice results in an overall loss, it is lower than
the loss incurred by a producer predating in a competitive market.
As the costs, and thus the risks, of predation are reduced,
predatory pricing becomes a more rational strategy in terms of the
risk/reward continuum.45  The relationship between risks and
rewards is neither static nor universal, but varies depending on the
market environment.
Viner's observations also shed light on other controversial
predatory pricing issues such as simultaneous recoupment, 496
staying power,497  and cross-subsidization. 49' Simultaneous
recoupment means that in some cases a predator, instead of
defeating its victim and then recouping its losses, may recoup
during the predatory episode itself.499  In their analysis of the
Brooke Group decision, for example, Elzinga and Mills examined
the allegation that Brown & Williamson could simultaneously
recoup its losses by reaping monopoly profits for full-revenue
branded cigarettes.500 Elzinga and Mills concluded that the
reasoning behind this scheme was flawed unless there was some
factor, lacking in this case, preventing consumers from switching
to the lower priced segment. 01
In the international setting, however, consumers in the higher-
priced domestic market may be prevented from switching to the
lower-priced export market because barriers to entry prohibit
arbitrage.' 2  The foreign producer, therefore, simultaneously
may recoup some of its loss. This recoupment equals the
493 See Benz, supra note 22, at 711-13 (discussing these strategies).
494 See id.; VINER, supra note 22, at 124-25.
491 See Benz, supra note 22, at 711-13.
411 See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 23, at 569-70 (discussing simultaneous
recoupment).
497 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 44 (discussing staying power).
411 See Benz, supra note 22, at 708-09 (discussing cross-subsidization).
499 See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 23, at 569-70.
11o See id. at 569-70, 575-76.
"I See id. at 569-70.
502 See id. at 573-74 (noting that under Brooke Group, entry conditions
constitute one variable impacting recoupment potential).
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difference between the average total cost before the output
increase and this cost after the output increase, as the home
market price remains unchanged.0 3 That simultaneous recoup-
ment was not established in Brooke Group, therefore, does not
inhibit the application of this doctrine to international predatory
pricing.
Increased staying power and cross-subsidization explain why
some producers are better able to engage in predatory pricing
activity than their rivals. Staying power, or the capacity of a
predator to outlast its prey, is necessary for successful predatory
activity. °4 Monopoly profits in the protected home market and
both domestic and export subsidies by a foreign government
substantially enhance a foreign predator's ability to defeat
rivals.05 Moreover, because domestic consumers and govern-
ments can share predatory losses, a foreign firm's ability to
increase market share persists for a substantially longer time
period than that afforded domestic firms in unprotected and
unsubsidized markets. 6
Cross-subsidization, or the use of monopoly profits in one
market to fund a predatory campaign in another,"' has been
subjected to substantial criticism. In Matsushita, the Court held
that while the ability to obtain supracompetitive profits in Japan
might indicate the ability to sustain great losses in the United
States over a substantial period of time, the defendants would have
no motive for incurring such losses absent a strong likelihood that
their conspiracy would succeed.08 Similarly, production capaci-
ty exceeding domestic demand would not explain why the
defendants "would be willing to lose money in the United States
... without some reasonable prospect of recouping their invest-
ment.",
09
As a result, monopolistic domestic markets have been viewed
only as a means for staving off bankruptcy, not for reducing
501 See supra notes 487-88 and accompanying text (describing an example of
this tactic).
" See Epstein, supra note 31, at 44.
505 See id.; see also Benz, supra note 22, at 696-701.
0 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 44-46.
507 See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584;
Wood, supra note 1, at 1168 n.59; Benz, supra note 22, at 696, 708-09.
508 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593.
119 Id. at 593 n.18.
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predation costs.510  As indicated in Northeastern Tel. Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., lost profits and unremunerative prices
are equally expensive for both monopolists and non-monopo-
lists.1  The idea of a foreign firm increasing its domestic
market price to subsidize losses abroad is irrational because a
monopolist is always charging the highest possible price at home
regardless of its predatory activities abroad.512
A monopolist can not raise its home market price in order to
subsidize overseas predation because that price is already set at its
optimal level. Nevertheless, when price is insulated from the
effects of increased output because output is both exported and
denied re-entry into the protected market, a monopolist can
increase its profit by reducing production costs.' Thus, al-
though predatory pricing may lead to an overall loss, a monopolis-
tic market's existence may enable the predator to cross-subsidize
some of the predatory episode.1 4 The concept of cross-subsidi-
zation, therefore, should be viewed in terms of the ability to
increase domestic revenues, not domestic prices.15 Although
these increased revenues may not equal the losses incurred, they
may be a direct result of encouraging sales through a predatory
campaign. If increased domestic revenues are a direct result of
intentional losses in a foreign market, some degree of cross-
subsidization arguably exists.
Second, substantial resources, derived from both monopolistic
profits and governmental subsidies, not only increase a firm's
ability to engage in traditional forms of predation, but also
increase the firm's ability to engage in strategic behavior. 16 For
example, the ability to outlast a rival allows predators to develop
larger customer bases and to increase consumer switching costs.
A large purse helps predators lower a rival's profits, inhibit a
510 See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 89
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
511 See id.
512 See KENNETH DAM, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 169 (1970) (cited in Wood, supra note 1, at 1168
n.59).
513 See supra notes 486-89 and accompanying text (discussing such tactics).
514 See id.
515 See id.
516 See supra notes 374-75 and accompanying text; see also Benz, supra note
22, at 713-14.
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rival's borrowing ability, and affects expectations concerning
consumer demand and potential market rewards.17 A substan-
tial war chest and a substantial excess capacity can also aid in the
development of a reputation for toughness and recoupment in
several non-predated international markets.18
Finally, arguments undermining the relevance of monopolistic
foreign markets, and the resulting ability to fund predatory
campaigns, are based on the mistaken belief that the structure of
a foreign market has no causal relationship to the reasonable
expectation of recoupment. This belief is misplaced on two
accounts. First, a foreign market's structure may allow for the
partial recoupment or cross-subsidization of predatory losses.5 19
More importantly, however, the failure to recognize the relation-
ship between foreign market conditions and predation is based on
a very limited view of recoupment. The concept of recoupment
must no longer be limited to the simple recovery of financial
losses directly attributable to a particular predatory episode.
Instead, recoupment must be defined in terms of a substantially
broader system of rewards. When viewed in this light, the direct
relationship between foreign market structure and culture, and the
ability to recoup will become substantially more apparent.
Predatory pricing in the United States generally has been
viewed as pricing below marginal or average variable cost.5 20 As
a result, a firm capable of lowering its marginal costs, even if this
increases fixed costs, is less likely to be found liable for predation
because the pricing floor also would be lowered. Two firms,
therefore, having identical total costs would be treated differently
under U.S. law if their marginal costs differed. Although it could
be argued that differential treatment merely reflects recognition of
differential efficiency,21 this argument loses credibility when
considered in an international environment.
Epstein has argued that using marginal cost as the benchmark
for international predation is unreliable and inadequate for
-17 See supra notes 367-70 and accompanying text.
518 See id.
519 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 46-56 (discussing foreign market struc-
tures).
520 See id. at 41-42 ("using a marginal cost standard for defining predatory
prices, as is used within the United States ... ).
521 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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measuring relative efficiency.522 Not only are there differences
in accounting practices among nations, but substantial differences
in cost structures also prohibit the assumption that firms with
higher fixed costs and lower variable costs are necessarily more
efficient.52 In the United States, for example, wages are general-
ly a variable cost, thus raising the predatory pricing floor. 24 In
nations where tradition or governmental policy provides for life-
time employment, however, labor costs are more often fixed.25
Thus, although the variable costs of firms in such nations may be
lower than those in the United States, these firms are not
necessarily more efficient. 6 Similarly, cost structures may vary
according to the degree of vertical integration and the manner of
product distribution."
Reliance upon a fixed/variable cost distinction thus may lead
to unusual results. Political and cultural factors may influence a
nation's views toward employment, organizational structure, and
product distribution, thus leading to lower marginal costs in
foreign firms than in their U.S. competitors. 28 These firms are
less likely to be found liable under U.S. law since they will be
entitled to set prices at levels below those permitted for equally
efficient U.S. firms. 29 The building of a production facility,
with high fixed and low variable costs, is a case in point.
Although these facilities may lower marginal costs, and thus lower
the price at which the product may be lawfully sold in the United
States, they do not necessarily reflect the need to meet consumer
demand. Instead, these facilities may be constructed for social
purposes such as increasing employment or avoiding lay-offs
during economic downturns. This creates chronic and structural
over-capacity that often is encouraged by the existence of both
cartels and national industrial policies. 3'
522 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 61 ("[S]hort-run marginal cost should not
be used in such comparisons...
121 See id. at 52-53.
514 See id. at 53-54.
12s See id. at 54.
126 See id. ("It would be far from obvious... that these foreign plants are
economically more efficient.").
527 See id.
528 See Benz, supra note 22, at 698-704.
529 See id. at 700.
530 See id. at 697-98 n.10, 703, 703-04 n.38, 729 n.143.
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Moreover, when employment is ensured by means of excess
capacity, fixed costs tend to rise.531 This cost structure, in turn,
provides incentives to reduce average total costs by increasing
production to maximum capacity and selling excess output
overseas. 532  Cost reductions are generally viewed as socially
beneficial, but if not accompanied by lower prices in the protected
home market, they may be used to partially offset or subsidize
predatory losses. As a result, U.S. predatory pricing law, with its
emphasis on marginal costs, may be rewarding artificially created
cost structures. By doing so, these laws may be merely condoning
social idiosyncrasies unrelated to efficiency gains, and leading to
both overproduction and predatory pricing practices consistent
with the Viner rationale.33
These effects are further magnified because antitrust laws do
not consider the presence of government subsidies when determin-
ing an alleged predator's costs. Relief from the adverse impact of
foreign subsidies instead must be sought under countervailing duty
statutes.534  In a perfect world, it seems appropriate to consider
the level of public assistance when determining actual costs of
production. For example, if marginal costs were lowered by
government-supported research and development, or by sophisti-
cated government-subsidized equipment, the marginal cost
benchmark should be adjusted upward to reflect such enterprise-
specific assistance.535 By adjusting the level at which predatory
and nonpredatory prices are distinguished, antitrust enforcers
could better protect the interests of efficient competitors. U.S.
trade legislation, and the WTO provisions on which it is based,
apparently precludes using antitrust mechanisms to counteract a
subsidy's effect.
Although both subsidies and segregated markets affect the
likelihood of predatory conduct, the fundamental question posed
53 See id. (discussing chronic overcapacity and its results) (citation omitted);
see also VINER, supra note 22, at 27-28, 94, 117-120; Epstein, supra note 31, at
47-48; Warner, supra note 4, at 830-33.
532 See VINER, supra note 22, at 94.
533 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 48-50.
134 See 19 U.S.C. % 1671-1671h (1994).
See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 2,
reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 229; Barcel6, supra note 4, at 319-30
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in Matsushita remains to be addressed. Despite the existence of the
ability to predate and recoup a portion of predatory losses, no
firm intentionally incurs losses without rational reasons. This
Article will now discuss why foreign producers might find
predatory pricing rewarding. By examining the prospect of non-
universal rationality, it will become apparent that recoupment is
often quite achievable.
5.2.2. The Lack Of Universal Rationality
In Matsushita, the Court did not consider recoupment as a
prerequisite for conspiratorial liability. The Court, however, did
look to recoupment as the primary determinant of the likelihood
of a conspiracy attempt and whether the inference of a conspiracy,
as opposed to one of independent conduct, is reasonable in light
of the economic circumstances. 36 After examining prevailing
economic conditions, the Court concluded that the alleged
conspiracy would have been "implausible," "irrational," and
"economically senseless," 37 and thus held that a conspiracy did
not exist.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court overlooked the
complexities of the international market. After noting that
conspiracies are inherently speculative and substantially more
difficult to accomplish than single-firm predation, the Court
indicated that a conspiracy would depend on the continued
cooperation of the conspirators, that each conspirator would have
a strong incentive to cheat, and that decades of apparent failure
was strong evidence against the conspiracy's existence. 3
By adhering to this Chicago School rhetoric, the Court
perpetuated three fundamental fallacies. First, the Court assumed
that the concept of rationality is internationally uniform and that
all businesses, despite their origin, share common values and
corporate goals. Second, the Court assumed that the concept of
recoupment is defined solely in terms of the achievement and
" See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986) (announcing that to survive summary Judgment, a plaintiff "must show
that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing
inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed
respondents").
s7 Id. at 587, 593-98.
"I See id. at 588-93.
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maintenance of market power and the recovery of financial losses
through the acquisition of monopoly profits within the predated
market. 39  Finally, the Court assumed that the ability to
cooperate, the incentive to cheat, and the creation of time
horizons are universal axioms that remain unaltered by corporate
culture.
5.3. The Effects of Cultural Differences
5.3.1. The Hofstede Study
One of the world's leading authorities on international
organizational culture has proposed that "there are no such things
as universal management theories."54° Because the management
function cannot be isolated from other societal forces, managerial
processes, goals, and philosophies only can be understood by
examining a nation's historical and cultural characteristics.5-4
The concept of management may vary substantially from country
to country, and any attempt by one nation to apply its manage-
ment theories to another must be questioned.m 2
In attempting to identify cultural differences between nations
and to develop theories concerning the management process,
Hofstede applies a series of bipolar dimensions to explain basic
societal characteristics.T43 One dimension, individualism versus
collectivism, refers to "the degree to which people ... prefer to
act as individuals rather than as members of [particular] groups.
... In collectivist societies a child learns to respect the group to
which it belongs, usually the family," to remain loyal to that
group throughout his or her lifetime, and "to differentiate
between in-group members and out-group members (that is, all
other people)."544 Another dimension, uncertainty avoidance,
describes the degree to which people prefer structured situations
539 See id. at 588-89.
540 Geert Hofstede, Cultural Constraints in Management Theories, EXECU-
TIvE, Feb. 1993, at 81, 81.
541 See id. at 88-89.
542 See id. at 89.
-4 Although Hofstede describes five dimensions, this discussion describes
only three.
144 Id. at 89-90.
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and clear rules establishing acceptable conduct. 5 Nations that
demonstrate a high preference for uncertainty avoidance are more
rigid and less willing to accept change or differences among its
members. 4 6  A third dimension, long-term versus short-term
orientation, is based on a study performed by Michael Harris
Bond. 4' This dimension differentiates between long-term
"values oriented towards the future, like thrift (saving) and
persistence," and short-term "values ... oriented towards the past
and present, like respect for tradition and fulfilling social obliga-
tions."' 8
Hofstede's study highlights several critical distinctions between
nations. First, the United States scored extremely high in the
individualism dimension- 9 This score reflects a low reliance
on, and loyalty to, the group, and a lower degree of differentia-
tion between group and non-group members. It also represents
a strong belief in the merits of markets as well as competition
between individuals.5 s In other nations, such as Indonesia and
China, individualism scores were extremely low.5 ' While the
United States demonstrated a low uncertainty avoidance score,
Japan, France, and Russia prefer a more structured society and
encourage homogeneity and risk avoidance.5 2 Finally, the study
determined that while the United States is short-term oriented,
China and Japan are extremely long-term oriented.553
These important cultural distinctions demonstrate that
assumptions based on the U.S. view towards predatory pricing
may not apply to firms located outside of the United States.
Cultural differences may affect the manner in which a firm
compares the benefits of open competition to the benefits of more
limited or structured competition. These differences may affect
the willingness of a firm to place national or group interests, such
as employment stability and economic development, above those
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of either the individual or the single corporate enterprise. Finally,
divergent perspectives may affect: (1) the willingness and the
ability to engage in group activity, such as conspiracies; (2) the
desire for consensus and harmony; (3) the degree to which social
and business obligations are respected; (4) the likelihood of
cheating or undertaking maverick activity; (5) the time horizons
for traditional recoupment; and (6) the desirability of pursuing
short-term profit maximization as opposed to long-term market
growth.
To better understand these differences and the effects they
have on corporate conduct, this Article will now examine the
cultural characteristics of Japan and China. These countries have
been selected for analysis because they represent present or future
powers within the international market and because their cultures
contrast starkly with that of the United States.
5.3.2. Japan and the Group Orientation
Japanese society has developed from a self-contained, homoge-
neous population, whose thinking has been shaped by a combina-
tion of Shintoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.sm The teach-
ings of Confucianism are of primary interest because they
exemplify the rationality of Japanese business conduct. Confu-
cianism emphasizes the importance of maintaining social order
and of exhibiting unquestioned obedience to the family, whether
the natural family, the corporate family, or the nation itself.
555
The desire for social order has produced a group identity that: (1)
enhances conformity;5 6 (2) values harmony and loyalty;557 (3)
encourages nationalism;55 and (4) permits substantial coordina-
tion within broad business networks (keiretsu) and between these
networks and the Japanese government.559  Moreover, the
pursuit of social order may be observed in a variety of national
s54 See Richard G. Linowes, The Japanese Manager's Traumatic Entry into the
United States: Understanding theAmerican-Japanese CulturalDivide, ExEcUTIVE,
Nov. 1993, at 21, 23-24.
1s5 See id. at 24, 32; ARTHUR WHITEHILL, JAPANESE MANAGEMENT:
TRADITION AND TRANSITION 6-7 (1991).
556 See Linowes, supra note 554, at 24.
517 See id. at 27.
55' See WHITEHILL, supra note 555, at 99.
559 See id. at 30.
[17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/8
1996] THE ANTIDUMP1-NG/ANTITRUSTDICHOTOMY 159
policies, such as lifetime employment and the pursuit of long-term
economic growth rather than short-term profit maximization."
Many of these issues have been addressed by commentators
attempting to demonstrate the links between Japanese culture and
Japanese business conduct.5 6' Groupism "has been a fact of life
existing from the earliest periods of Japanese history"562 and is
one of the most significant differences between the value systems
of Japan and the United States. 63 Japanese culture respects a
strong sense of loyalty and shared obligation, and encourages
conformity and a consensus-building mentality.564  The success
of any individual is measured by the group's success, regardless of
whether the group is defined in terms of a work-group, a
company, a network of companies, or the nation of Japan. 65
The Japanese value system is consistent with the development
of the keiretsu, which are large networks of companies that are
horizontally and vertically linked.5 66  The pursuit of harmony,
consensus, and group welfare supports extensive cooperation
between cartel members based on long-established and trusted
business relationships. 6 As a result, "[t]he Japanese have no
fear whatever of cartelization and, in fact, see cartels as an element
of competitive strength." 68  Similarly, although substantial
abuses are now the subject of increasing criticism in Japan,
individual ethics or principles historically have been set aside
when necessary to "maintain the group," preserve "interfirm
560 See Hofstede, supra note 540, at 83-84.
561 See generally WHrTEHLL, supra note 555 (depicting Japanese management
styles and corporate culture).
562 Id. at 8.
s61 Id. at 52.
56 See id. at 47-48, 54-55, 88, 160-61. A popular Japanese expression notes
that "the nail that stands up gets hammered down." Linowes, supra note 554,
at 24.
565 See WHITEHILL, supra note 555, at 117-18. A proposal is circulated to
all affected individuals for final approval or veto. "The Japanese decision-
making process ... is one of diffusion rather than outright delegation. Japan's
top managers can be, and often are, as autocratic as any in the world." Id. at
160. "In this sense, the system may best be thought of as a confirmation-
authorization process." Id. at 160-61.
566 See Linowes, supra note 554, at 30; Whitehill, supra note 555, at 94-98.
567 See Linowes, supra note 554, at 30.
562 WHITEHILL, supra note 555, at 92.
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harmony," or protect the nation. 69 As a result of centuries of
collective traditions, and despite recent elections which reflect a
growing degree of consumer unrest, the keiretsu remain the
dominant market force within the Japanese industrial struc-
ture.5 70  Moreover, interfirm cooperation will continue to exert
a substantial influence on both the domestic Japanese market and
the export strategies of keiretsu members.
The close working relationship between the business commu-
nity and the Japanese government 71 also supports the group
orientation of the keiretsu system,5 72 the open communication
that exists among keiretsu members,5 73 and the pursuit of social
order. A "survival mentality" or a "national mission" has long
been a substantial part of Japanese ideology, and as a result, a
powerful and effective consensus concerning national goals has
often emerged.574 This strong national purpose reinforces the
idea that what is beneficial for Japan is also in the best individual
interest of each citizen.575 The pursuit of these unitary interests
has resulted in a system of capitalism that is quite different from
that envisioned by Adam Smith. The private sector, the political
system, and the professional government bureaucracy are united
in a dose and "incestuous relationship."5 76 The keiretsu and the
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry cooperate
to create industrial policy through a system of administrative
guidance, preempting formal law by means of a private decision-
making process. 577 Administrative guidance may also reward or
punish enterprises through over-regulation or deregulation, or
through funneling capital to companies whose "goals conform to
national policy."
7
In order to understand the rationality of Japanese business
569 Linowes, supra note 554, at 30.
57 0See WHITEHILL, supra note 555, at 100 (noting that the Mitsui Group
is made up of almost 2,000 companies).
571 See id. at 92.
572 See id. at 8.
573 See id. at 213-19.
174 Id. at 15-16, 99.
571 See id. at 51, 99.
576 Id. at 21 (citing S. PRAKASH SETHI ET AL., THE FALSE PROMISE OF THE
JAPANESE MIRACLE 16 (1984)).
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conduct and its relationship to U.S. predatory pricing assump-
tions, two traditional and interrelated Japanese policies must be
examined. First, the core of Japanese business enterprise is the
permanent worker group, where workers are "for all practical
purposes tenured."7 9 Although changing economic conditions
may no longer permit companies to guarantee all workers lifetime
employment, the aspiration remains.8 0 As a result, it appears
that the concept of lifetime employment will endure in the
Japanese economy for a substantial period of time. 81
The aspiration of lifetime employment has a profound effect
on the goals, motives, and allegiances of Japanese management. 82
Assuming that managers feel a greater loyalty to their workers
than to their stockholders, decisions concerning variables such as
capacity level, productivity level, the relative importance of
expanded market share and increased return-on-investment, and
even the desirability of incurring losses will assume a significantly
different dimension. Japanese managers have historically viewed
their responsibilities to their employees as more important than
their responsibilities to provide dividends for capital suppliers;
therefore, the pressures to demonstrate short-term profits or to
engage in short-term strategies have been reduced consider-
ably.
58 3
A second policy reflected in Japanese corporate conduct
concerns the fervent pursuit of economic growth. Two character-
istics of Japanese corporations "[are] their unrelenting focus on
competitive position"584 and their preoccupation with market
share rather than the Westernized objective of return-on-invest-
ment.585 When capital or expense investments must be made to
maintain or increase market share they are made "with little
regard for the short-term returns" of the project.586 Japanese
'" Hofstede, supra note 540, at 83-84.
5"0 See WHITEHILL, supra note 555, at 52, 97.
581 See id. at 125, 131-33.
582 See id. at 128-33.
583 See id. at 151, 279 (citations omitted).
514 Benz, supra note 22, at 704-05 n.41 (citing JAMES C. ABEGGLEN &
GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION, 276-77 (1985)).
585 See id.
586 Id. at 708-09 n.55 (citing JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR.,
KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION, 177-78 (1985)); see also Semeraro, supra
note 22, at 644 n.124.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. f Int'l Econ. L.
managers are not beholden to shareholder pressures, and thus they
are more able to pursue long-term interests than their U.S.
counterparts.587 Japanese managers exhibit both "a commend-
able patience" and "a willingness to accept ambiguity, uncertainty,
and imperfection in the short run to achieve success in the longer-
term."
5 88
By emphasizing market share rather than immediate profit-
maximization, by aspiring to provide lifetime employment for
their workers, and by honoring and conforming to the goals of
their corporate network and the nation, Japanese managers have
naturally developed a rewards system and a resulting view of
rational business conduct that are far removed from the Chicago
School ideal. Although it is difficult to interpret the effects of
these cultural differences, especially in the context of developing
an antitrust policy, the failure to do so will inevitably lead to an
erroneous understanding of pricing activity.
5.3.3. China and the Socialist Market Economy
Because of the rapid changes occurring in the People's
Republic of China, it is difficult to present an accurate character-
ization of the Chinese business enterprise. Any attempt to
understand China's business climate is further complicated under
the new market socialism, as businesses may take a wide variety
of forms ranging from private entities to state-owned enterpris-
es. 89 These businesses will be subject to differing degrees of
state control,"' and the degree of autonomy will affect the
motives, goals, and anticipated rewards of corporate managers.
Whether a particular activity represents rational business conduct
depends on, and should be evaluated in light of, the type of
business enterprise involved.
The Chinese government, in attempting to develop a hybrid
economic system known as market socialism, has introduced a
variety of reforms and market freedoms designed to: (1) promote
growth and productivity; (2) provide increased rewards and
587 See WHITEHILL, supra note 555, at 88-89.
5"8 Id. at 151.
589 See Ruth L. Wang et al., Enterprise Autonomy and Market Structures in
China, in ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 1979-1990, 23, 24
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incentives to managers; and (3) introduce some performance
criteria by de-emphasizing the guarantee of job security 9 '
Nevertheless, many important Chinese industrial enterprises are
still influenced by the central planning tendencies of the Chinese
Communist Party and by a socialist society that has, at least
historically, viewed all organizations as instruments of the
state. 92 This paradox encourages the central bureaucracy to
attempt to plan and coordinate economic development while it
simultaneously captures the benefits of a more open market-
place. 93
In addressing this paradox, commentators have described the
traditional Chinese industrial enterprise as a system that possesses
a "'parallel' authority structure" under which "administrative" and
"party" authority co-exist.594 By maintaining a presence within
the authority structure, the Communist Party has reserved an
active, integrated, and influential role in most of the enterprise's
decisions, including those concerning employee compensation, the
appointment of company administrators, and the assurance that
party policies are followed.95 Few decisions made within the
context of the traditional industrial enterprise are based solely on
business considerations familiar to the Western manager. Instead,
most traditional Chinese business enterprise decisions are influ-
enced by political or ideological tenets. This generalization does
not apply to all Chinese enterprises, however, since smaller firms
may possess a higher degree of autonomy than traditional
industrial enterprises. Moreover, as privatization becomes more
widespread in China and enterprises become more profit-motivat-
591 See Lee A. Graf et al., Perceptions of Desirable Organizational Reforms in
Chinese Enterprises, in ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 1979-
1990, supra note 589, at 47, 4748; John R. Schermerhorn & Mee-Kau Nyaw,
Managerial Leadership in Chinese Industrial Enterprises, in ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 1979-1990, supra note 589, at 9, 10.
'92 See Schermerhorn & Nyaw, supra note 591, at 10-11.
'9' See Michael Minor & B. Curtis Hamm, The "Little Dragons" as Role
Models, in ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 1979-1990, supra
note 589, at 85, 91.
591 Schermerhorn & Nyaw, supra note 591, at 12. The administrative
authority includes the Workers' Congress, the factory director, the management
cadre, work group leaders, and the workers. See id. at 14. The party authority
consists of the enterrise party committee, the first secretary, the party cadre,
the party group leaders, and the members of the workers holding party. See
id.
s9- See id. at 13.
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ed, political and ideological policies may become less important.
The existence of a substantial state influence has also affected
the willingness of managers to make any decisions at all.
Generations of strict controls have produced managers who often
are incapable or unwilling to make any real decisions or to accept
responsibility for them. 96 The Chinese economic and political
environment has fostered a "learned helplessness" among the
leadership of large industrial enterprises. 97
The rationality behind Chinese conduct is further complicated
because large Chinese business enterprises often have many
sociopolitical characteristics. There is a general lack of separation
among the "the business entity, the government, and the soci-
ety."598 The traditional Chinese industrial enterprise consists of
three interrelated systems, "life support," "sociopolitical support,"
and "business and operations." 99 A large portion of the firm's
daily operations revolve around the "life support" or social
assistance system, through which the employer assists the worker's
family in meeting housing, health care, child care, educational, and
recreational needs.0 The "sociopolitical support" system is
designed to provide spiritual guidance, to advance the socialist
ideology, and to provide the Communist Party with a political
presence in the enterprise. 6°' The "business and operations"
system involves the actual production of goods, and represents the
portion of the enterprise with which U.S. produces are more
familiar602 These three support systems extend the responsibili-
ties of Chinese managers far beyond those of their U.S. counter-
parts.60 3
Finally, as with any new entrant to the international market,
596 See Oded Shenkar, Introduction to ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
IN CHINA 1979-1990, supra note 589, at 1, 2-3.
Schermerhorn & Nyaw, supra note 591, at 16-17 (defining "learned
helplessness" as the tendency of persons who have been subject to strict control
to lose confidence in their ability to succeed).
598 Inga S. Baird et al., Joint Venture Success: A Sino-U.S. Perspective, in
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 1979-1990, supra note 589, at
126.
'9' Schermerhorn & Nyaw, supra note 591, at 11-12.
600 Id. at 12.
601 See id. at 11.
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short-term profit-maximization cannot be the primary goal of
Chinese enterprises. Instead, Chinese businesses must first aim to
establish product recognition and a reputation for dependability
concerning the fulfillment of business obligations and the timely
shipment of ordered merchandise."
The Chinese government recently has instituted a number of
economic and developmental reforms. For example, some
enterprises have incorporated the concept of performance-based
pay, the linking of compensation to enterprise profitability,605
and motivational bonuses into their managerial structure. 1 6 The
government also has attempted to: (1) grant more autonomy to
enterprise directors; (2) increase privatization efforts; (3) reduce
the burdens of licensing and increase transparency where licensing
is required; (4) increase the level of foreign trade and investment
in order to acquire technology and information; and (5) relax the
control of foreign trade corporations.w°  Moreover, China and
the United States have entered into understandings and agreements
concerning prison labor, the protection of intellectual property,
and market access. 8
Despite these advances, China remains a nation in transition.
Its history of central planning will continue to retard the
development of a profit-maximization mentality. Although
entrepreneurship has increased, especially in the small business
sector, the state will continue to exert substantial influence over
China's industrial sector. Individual leadership initiative will
continue to be restricted by the Chinese government, especially
after the events at Tiananmen Square.' A tradition of unity
between the employer and state and the imposition of nonprofit
and sociopolitical responsibilities on the management cadre cannot
be eliminated overnight. Similarly, an evaluation and rewards
604 See Shenkar, supra note 596, at 4 (indicating that one of the Chinese
leadership's primary objectives is to "enhance reputation and market recogni-
tion for Chinese products").
60 See id. at 1, 4.
606 See Graf et al., supra note 591, at 53.
607 See Shenkar, supra note 596, at 4; Heidi Vernon-Wortzel et al., The
People's Republic of China as an Exporter, in ORGANIZATION AND MANAGE-
MENT IN CHINA 1979-1990, supra note 589, at 161, 166-67.
608 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS,
supra note 46, at 221-22.
609 See Schermerhorn & Nyaw, supra note 591, at 16.
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system tied to merit and profitability cannot immediately replace
a system that traditionally has been based on "good 'citizen-
ship, ' """ seniority,"' and job security. 12  As a result, al-
though China has been moving from a command economy to a
socialist market economy and although its anticipated entry to the
WTO will re-enforce China's movements toward economic
reform, it will still be some time before U.S. business assumptions
can be applied to Chinese managers.
5.3.4. A Summary: Recoupment as a Rewards System
The issue concerning the ability to recoup arises in two
contexts. First, as in Matsushita, the ability to recoup can be
examined to determine the rationality of the alleged conduct and
whether it was likely or probable that the defendants had engaged
in a predatory conspiracy. 13 Second, as demonstrated by Brooke
Group, the ability to recoup can be viewed as a prerequisite for
recovery even if predatory pricing has actually occurred.614 In
both cases, recoupment is defined in terms of the ability to reap
subsequent monopoly profits in the predated market.615
When determining the rationality of business conduct, the
courts must consider the potential use of strategic behavior, the
ability to segregate international markets, and the effects of
political and cultural diversity. In summarizing the observations
previously presented, this subsection examines recoupment in
terms of a rewards system, and proposes that the availability of a
variety of rewards, including subsequent monopoly profits, can
provide a rational basis for predatory pricing activity.
Defining recoupment in terms of a rewards system may aid
antitrust enforcers in applying the insights of industrial organiza-
tion theory. For example, a substantial presence within a market
at a particular period of time may constitute a predatory reward
if it is recognized that a predatory pricing strategy may encompass
610 Id.
611 See Graf et al., supra note 591, at 53.
612 See Mee-Kau Nyaw, The Significance and Managerial Roles of Trade
Unions in Joint Ventures with China, in ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
IN CHINA 1979-1990, supra note 589, at 114.
613 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-95.
614 See Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2587-88.
615 See id. at 2588; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89.
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different time periods and that both information and financial
resources can be asymmetric among competitors and potential
competitors.1 6 The theoretical parity between market incum-
bents and, either new or potential, entrants has been seriously
questioned, and it has been recognized that a market presence
during one time period may have a direct impact on both future
demand and future costs. 67  Similarly, the exercise of strategic
behavior during one time period can affect competitive conditions
in another. As a result, the sacrifice of current revenues in order
to deter entry by a potential competitor can lead to a variety of
strategic rewards.1
The ability to alter future market conditions or future market
perceptions may be used to: (1) establish a consumer tolerance for
higher prices by increasing or solidifying a consumer base;619 (2)
increase switching and information costs;62 (3) deter the adop-
tion of newer but less widely used technology; 621 (4) inhibit
competition at a critical stage of product development; 622 and (5)
increase the costs associated with the acquisition of experience. 623
Moreover, where information is imperfect, it may be used to alter
the potential entrants' perceptions about market profitability,
market demand, the incumbent's willingness to predate, or the
incumbent's level of efficiency. 624 Similarly, a substantial market
presence may also allow for the creation of a reputation for
toughness whereby predatory losses can be recouped in markets
other than that in which the predation occurred. 621 The result-
ing rewards are based on the advantages which market participants
have over those firms outside of the market. Traditional notions
of equality between incumbents and potential entrants must no
longer be assumed.626
616 See Ordover & Saloner, supra note 32, at 591.
617 See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 116.
611 See supra section 5.1.
619 See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 117.
620 See id. at 116.
621 See id. at 117.
See Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 451-52.
623 See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 32, at 116.
624 See id. at 123-25.
625 See id. at 131-33.
66 See supra section 5.1.
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In addition to the rewards achievable through the use of
strategic behavior, the existence of segregated international
markets and the ability to price discriminate between domestic
and foreign consumers provides the opportunity to recoup at least
a portion of predatory losses.6 v' By increasing the volume of
output, a foreign producer could lower the average cost of
production for all units produced, including those sold domestical-
ly and abroad.628 The revenues lost on the sale of a portion of
the increased output at prices below average cost could be offset
by the cost savings enjoyed on the remainder of the units.629
Even if some units were sold abroad at less than average variable
cost, the losses incurred would be partially offset by the increased
revenues obtained in the protected domestic market.630  As a
result, even where predatory pricing would lead to an overall loss,
this loss would be less than that incurred by producers selling in
nonsegregated markets.631  A foreign producer is capable of
simultaneously recouping or cross-subsidizing predatory losses
equal to the difference between the average total cost before the
increase in output and the average total cost after the increase in
output on all sales taking place within the protected market.
63 2
While an increase in home-market revenues would only constitute
a partial reward for incurring losses overseas, this reward may be
sufficient to justify predatory activity when combined with one
or more other rewards.
Considering the effects of cultural diversity, it also becomes
clear that predatory rewards may include substantially more than
the subsequent recovery of monopoly profits. A national culture
that strongly emphasizes economic growth and development, for
example, may be reflected in a corporate culture that views
increased market share as a more important reward than return-
on-investment.633 The likelihood that this corporate culture
exists is enhanced when: (1) individual success is measured by the







633 See Benz, supra note 22, at 704-05 n.41, 708 n.55.
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success of the group;6 4 (2) corporate success is measured by
world share;65 (3) nationalism and a survival mentality are
strong;616 and (4) managers are able to engage in long-term
strategies free from the profit-oriented pressures of corporate
shareholders. 6" The relative importance of market share and
return-on-investment may depend on factors such as: (1) the stage
of a nation's economic development; (2) the need to establish a
market presence; (3) the need to acquire hard currency; (4) the
degree of governmental ownership or influence;638 (5) the rela-
tionship between performance and evaluation; 639 and (6) the
degree to which non-business or sociological responsibilities are
imposed on managers. 64°
Despite the preoccupation" 1 with market share that exists
within segments of the international market, antitrust enforcers
continue to assume that all market participants value profit-
maximization over growth." 2  Unfortunately, the consequences
of this assumption have been painfully clear to U.S. producers
who have lost substantial market share. 643
Closely related to the goal of increased market share is the
pursuit of stable or secure domestic employment. Historical and
cultural obligations existing between employers and workers are
(3' See supra note 565 and accompanying text.
635 See Benz, supra note 22, at 704-05 n.41 (citing JAMES C. ABEGGLEN &
GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 276-77 (1985)).
636 See WHITEHILL, supra note 555, at 99.
637 See id. at 695, 697 n.9, 704-05 n.41, 705 n.42, 708-09 n.55, 729 n.143, 738-
39 n.193, 740-41.
638 See supra section 5.3.2.
639 See id.
64 See id.
641 See Benz, supra note 22, at 704-05 n.41 (citing JAMS C. ABEGGLEN &
GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 276-77 (1985)).
642 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 604
(1985) (White, J., dissenting).
63 See Matsusbita, 475 U.S. at 591 (noting that while the shares of RCA and
Zenith in the retail television market "did not decline appreciably during the
1970's," the defendants' share rose from 20% or less to cose to 50%); see also
Benz, supra note 22, at 697 n.9 ("In 1976 U.S. producers held 95.1% and
Japanese producers held 3.7% of the U.S. market [in machine tools], but by
1981 the U.S. share of the market had fallen to 48.7% while the Japanese share
had risen to 50.1%." (citing Richard D. Copaken, The Houdaille Petition: A New
Weapon Against Unfair Industry Targeting Practices, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 211, 214 (1983)).
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substantially stronger in some nations than in others. 64  Al-
though the adoption of the downsizing approach by many market
participants may eventually mandate adjustments in ideology, the
reward of employment security, whether defined in terms of
actual lifetime employment or merely the aspiration thereof, will
continue to be pursued for some time to come." 5
The goal of employment security, however, results in an
unusual effect upon the laws of supply and demand. In order to
increase or secure employment opportunities, firms overproduce,
and prices are set at whatever level is necessary to dispose of the
oversupply.646  The societal goal of employment stability has
been made an integral part of the business decision-making
process. While this mixture of social and business criteria may be
foreign to the U.S. manager, the financial losses resulting from
such a policy may be more than outweighed by the accompanying
social gains.647
By implementing societal goals, whether in the form of
increased economic development, increased exports and market
share, enhanced employment security, or the advancement of a
political ideology, foreign producers may also be rewarded by
means of accruing governmental favor.64 The reward of gov-
ernmental favor, while certainly beyond the scope of traditional
notions of recoupment or rational profit-maximization models,
may be a major determinant in business decision-making when
there is a close relationship between the business community and
the government. Governmental favor may take the form of
investment incentives, tax relief, subsidies, public/private joint
ventures, deregulation, or the condoning of monopolization or
64 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 54.
6" See WHITEHILL, supra note 555, at 125, 131-33.
' See Benz, supra note 22, at 738-39 n. 193 (citing JAMES C. ABEGGLEN &
GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 6 (1985)) ("Prices
are set not at the level that the market will bear but as low as necessary to
expand the market to fit the available capacity."). For a discussion on the
issues of employment and excess capacity, including the market power
ramifications of excess capacity, see Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479
U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593 n.18; PREDATORY
PRICING, supra note 27, at 9, 26, 92 n.35; Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at
455-56; Benz, supra note 22, at 697 n.10, 708 n.55, 738 n.193; Warner, supra
note 4, at 830-33.
17 See supra section 5.3.2.
68 See Benz, supra note 22, at 697-707.
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cartelization through the lax enforcement of antitrust laws." 9
Although the discussion above indicates that not all businesses
are rational short-term profit-maximizers, it may be assumed that
all businesses are rational. When predatory pricing activity can
achieve corporate goals, as defined not only by the corporation,
but by the societal and governmental structures in which it
operates, there are a variety of rewards that can be used to
counterbalance the short-term loss and to elevate predatory
activity to the level of sound business practice.
Below-cost pricing may be a prerequisite for accomplishing
these corporate and social goals when a corporation is attempting
to establish a foothold within a market. Although this is often
the goal of sophisticated corporations located in highly industrial-
ized nations, the need to establish product demand, goodwill, and
distribution channels is of particular importance to infant
industries in developing nations. These industries may be efficient
in terms of general labor costs, but inefficient in terms of labor
skills and production technology. Below-cost pricing, therefore,
often is necessary to achieve the rewards of successful entry and
future cost reduction. Moreover, any efficiency or technology
gains acquired during the entry process will tend to provide
spillover rewards to both the firm itself and to other businesses
located within the developing nation's economy5°
Generally, the addition of a new competitor to the market is
beneficial to competition. It enhances consumer choice, stimulates
rivalry and innovation, and restricts the ability of others to elevate
their prices.61' As a result, below-cost pricing undertaken to
permit market entry should not give rise to any substantial
antitrust concern.
Unfortunately, the point at which a new entrant becomes a
market incumbent is unclear. Problems arise when the new
entrant, having established a substantial foothold, continues to
engage in below-cost sales. At this point, the entrant may be
seeking unearned and unjustified rewards. For example, a foreign
entrant who is already receiving a variety of cultural-specific
rewards may continue to engage in below-cost pricing in an
649 See id.
650 See id, at 713, 719 n.93 (citations omitted) (discussing spillover effects).
61 David W. Barnes, Revolutionary Antitrust: Efficiency, Ideology, and
Democracy, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 59, 107 (1989).
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attempt to further deter investment by other potential entrants or
incumbents. By lowering the rate of profitability within the
industry, a foreign producer may attempt to stabilize the existing
market not only in terms of the number of competitors, but in
terms of research and development, innovation, or technological
advancement." 2
A less efficient producer, therefore, may be rewarded with an
opportunity to compete with its more productive rivals. In
Matsushita, for example, it was argued that the influx of television
sets at depressed prices substantially reduced the financial rates of
return on production facilities located within the United States,
thereby rendering any future investment in such facilities
uneconomic. 3 In a industry that soon would become profit-
less, the U.S. producers were forced to take dramatic cost-cutting
measures, including those that affected research, product develop-
ment, and future efficiency 6 4  Limit pricing5 5 might have
been used to accomplish the same result, but market power is a
requirement for the successful use of this theory.6 6
The ability to achieve these rewards should also be examined
in light of the ability of foreign producers to cooperate with each
other and to coordinate their activities toward the accomplish-
ment of these goals. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that
predatory pricing conspiracies are inherently "speculative,"65
that they are "incalculably more difficult to execute" 658 than
single-firm predation, and that, once created, these conspiracies are
652 See PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, I ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEm APPLICATION 159-64 (1978).
653 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 602
n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
654 See Benz, supra note 22, at 740 n.200 (citing a letter from former Zenith
counsel).
615 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,
698 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983) (defining
limit pricing as setting "prices above average total cost but below the short-term
profit-maximizing level so as to discourage new entrants and thereby maximize
profits over the long run"); see also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,
724 F.2d 227, 234-35 (1st Cir. 1983) (alluding to difficulties in determining
whether a price reduction is profit-maximizing in the short run).
656 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 652, at 159-60.
657 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
658 Id. at 590.
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difficult to maintain.659 Anticompetitive coordination may be
based on only the most tenuous of agreements. Because these
agreements are illegal, they must be substantially invisible. As a
result, coordination is generally doomed by a strong incentive to
cheat in order to avoid predatory losses and by the desire to free
ride on the actions of co-conspirators."'
Such beliefs are invalid when applied to conspiracies having
their origins abroad. The ability to conspire successfully depends
on the ability to coordinate the actions of the conspirators,661
and the ability of the conspirators to communicate directly with
each other.662 A successful conspiracy also depends on variables
such as: (1) the incentive to cheat and deviate from the group;
663
(2) the capacity to punish those who fail to conform; 664 (3) the
degree to which conspiratorial agreements are condoned by the
government; 66 and (4) the nature of the rewards to be achieved
by the conspiracy.66
As a result, whether a conspiracy is incalculably difficult to
maintain depends on the cultural characteristics of the nation in
which the conspiracy was created and maintained.667 In many
nations, for example, a sense of collectivism and a loyalty to the
group are viewed as substantially more important than the right
to pursue individual goals. 6 ' The ability to maintain coopera-
tion between business entities is greater in a society that: (1)
encourages conformity; (2) values consensus building and risk
avoidance; (3) emphasizes the importance of maintaining and
respecting the group; and (4) stresses the pursuit of social or-
der.669 This ability also is increased where: (1) the conspirators
are already involved in domestic cartelization or interlocking
659 Id. at 589.
660 See id. at 590; see also Elzinga & Mills, supra note 23, at 576.
661 See John S. McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the A merican
Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 191, 198 (1960).
662 See id. at 200.
663 See id. at 197 ("In cartels the first problem is that of defection . . .
664 See id. at 196-98.
665 See id. at 202.
666 See id. at 200-04.
667 See supra section 5.3.1.
668 See id.
669 See generally WHITEHILL, supra note 555 (discussing cultural differences
and how they affect the business environment).
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relationships; (2) communication channels among network
members have already been established; (3) unbridled competition
is viewed with disfavor; and (4) the government provides a
unifying and guiding influence. 70
The incentive to adhere to the terms of a conspiracy also can
be affected by a variety of other factors. The U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, has assumed that all predatory pricing
conspiracies are designed to obtain future monopoly profits.67'
The probability of achieving this goal in the international setting
is slight because the predator must defeat not only its prey but all
other potential global competitors and therefore the willingness to
cheat is enhanced. Where, however, the goal of the conspiracy is
more modest-such as increasing the level of exports or market
share, providing employment opportunities, or gaining access to
hard currency-the greater probability of success might reduce the
incentive to cheat. Similarly, a business enterprise that is less
profit-oriented, that possesses a variety of sociopolitical responsi-
bilities, and that is free to pursue long-term strategies might be less
likely to engage in cheating for the purpose of acquiring a short-
term gain.
The incentive to cheat is affected by the ability of co-conspira-
tors to punish those who fail to follow the agreement. 72 One
commentator, for example, indicates that "excess capacity can
facilitate coordination by increasing the ability of the oligopoly to
punish firms that deviate."6 73 Furthermore, the members of a
particular conspiracy also may be members of a much broader
business network that encompasses a variety of other business
obligations, interdependencies, and relationships.67 4 As a result,
the failure to honor an agreement with a member of that network
may lead to the imposition of sanctions by other members of that
group whose goodwill is a prerequisite for corporate survival. 75
Moreover, if interfirm cooperation advances national interests, a
670 See generally id. (observing that it is easier to maintain such relationships
in Japan than in the United States because of the cultural differences and their
effect on the corporate climate).
671 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
588-89 (1986).
672 See McGee, supra note 661, at 196-98.
673 Baker, supra note 14, at 600.
674 See WHITEHILL, supra note 555, at 95-96, 100-01 (describing keiretsu).
675 See id. at 94-96.
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willingness to jeopardize the success of that cooperation might
result in varying degrees of governmental disfavor.6
Both the ability to conspire and the willingness to deviate
from the agreement will vary from culture to culture. Where
anticompetitive conspiracies are viewed with disdain, conspirators
may be forced to rely on a series of nebulous signals or tacit
collusion. On the other hand, where the competitive process is
viewed differently, conspirators may be allowed to engage in more
blatant forms of interfirm cooperation. These observations should
not be used to criticize the enforcement procedures of different
nations because to do so would impose the cultural history and
the economic beliefs of one nation on another. The degree of
tolerance accorded anticompetitive conspiracies has nothing to do
with morality, but is instead a reflection of differing attitudes
toward alternative economic systems. These attitudes, in turn, are
founded on centuries of cultural, political, and philosophical
influences that vary substantially among nations. As a result, an
anticompetitive conspiracy may be viewed as either a method of
reducing consumer welfare or as a means for achieving a variety
of social goals.
In either case, the use of strategic behavior, the ability to
segregate markets, and the existence of a variety of different
predatory rationales and predatory rewards can result in below-
cost pricing behavior that is based on sound business judgment.
This, however, addresses only one-half of the predatory equation.
Because predatory pricing results in lower prices for U.S.
consumers, the question remains why the United States should be
concerned with predatory pricing activity absent the ability to
obtain market power and subsequently to raise prices above the
competitive level. The answer is that even in the absence of
traditional market power, predatory pricing activity: (1) reduces
global efficiency; (2) substantially injures more efficient producers;
(3) imposes considerable social and total welfare costs on both the
United States and other nations; (4) endangers the long-term
interests of the world's consumers; and (5) severely frustrates the
goals of the WTO Agreement.67 In support of these conten-
tions, it will be argued that the concepts of market power and
676 See id. at 92-93.
67" See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in
FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 9.
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recoupment must be viewed in light of relative efficiencies, and
that these concepts must be used as tools to implement the spirit
of the WTO Agreement and to reduce or eliminate U.S. reliance
on antidumping remedies.
5.4. The Need to Redefine the Concept of Market Power
The antitrust laws are designed to protect "competition, not
competitors." Despite the fact that competition is "inherently
vague and not self defining,"679 it is identified with the promo-
tion of economic efficiency. As the court noted in Roland
Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus.,68 competition is merely the
reflection of "the allocation of resources in which economic
welfare ... is maximized." 61  It is believed "that the unre-
strained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress."
68 2
As a result, anticompetitive conduct often has been tied to the
ability of a firm to harm an equally or more efficient business
rival, thus causing a decrease in the overall efficiency of the
relevant market 3.6  Barring the application of the rarely used per
se rule, only those activities that demonstrate the potential to
harm competitors on non-efficiency grounds, and thus to harm
the market itself, should be matters of public concern. 4
Similarly, business strategies that restrain competition will be
acceptable when these activities enhance the efficiency of the
imposing firm and thus the efficiency of the market in which it
operates.85 Restrictions that tend to increase output, decrease
cost, or lower consumer prices will be viewed as procompetitive
rather than restrictive under a rule of reason analysis.86
"78 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
679 Lande, supra note 7, at 81.
680 See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
68I Id. at 395.
682 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
683 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach., 698
F.2d 1377, 1384 (9th Cir. 1983), cerm denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
684 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 652, at 153-54.
685 See generally id. (proposing that not all competition restraints should be
prohibited under the Sherman Act).
686 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103, 109-20 (1984) (holding that a fair examination of the
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In order to equate increased efficiency with increased competi-
tion, antitrust policymakers must arrive at a consensus concerning
the nature of economic efficiency. This concept could be defined
in terms of national welfare or net welfare, where gains to
consumers would be weighed against losses to producers. A total
welfare standard, therefore, would reflect both consumer surplus
and producer surplus. 87  Moreover, a total welfare standard
impact of a restraint might include an examination of the efficiencies and pro-
competitive justifications involved); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (noting that the decision to apply
the per se ile or the rule of reason depends upon whether the restriction was
designed to increase economic efficiency and render markets more competitive);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)
(indicating that even the exchange of price information may increase economic
efficiency and render markets more competitive); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977 stating that vertical restrictions may
stimulate interbrand competition by alowing the manufacturer to achieve
distribution efficiencies); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1363 (8th Cir. 1989)
(stating that to be anticompetitive, a practice must be capable of materially
impacting an equally efficient competitor or permanently eliminating an
efficient competitor); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227,
232 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing the ability to exclude equally efficient competi-
tors); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 87 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982) (describing competition in terms of
relative efficiency); and In re Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 208, 217
(1982) (holding that the party imposing restraints may defend based on pro-
competitive efficiencies). But cf Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and More
Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U.
PA. L. REv. 1214, 1232 (1977) (warning that the antitrust laws address values
other than economic efficiency and that courtrooms are not merely "laborato-
ries for empirical investigation of issues framed by economists").
687 See Morris, supra note 4, at 945-46 n.4.
Economists equate economic efficiency with total welfare. In
individual market analyses, ... economists use the term "consumer
welfare" (or "consumer surplus") to describe the benefits of buyers, and
economists use the term "producer welfare" (or "producer surplus") to
describe the benefits of suppliers. Total welfare simply equals the sum
of consumer welfare and producer welfare.
Id. at 945-46 n.4; see also Hawk, supra note 64, at 1164 ("In an economy open
to imports and foreign competition, the antitrust policy objective might be a
net national welfare standard which aggregates the citizens' consumer surplus
and the profits of domestic firms .... "). But see Ordover & Saloner, supra
note 32, at 578 (emphasis omitted):
The losses to firms, in terms of diverted profits, can, in principle,
outweigh gains in consumers' surplus causing domestic social welfare
to fall. . . . Yet, there is no persuasive reason why the foreign
government should be kept to the same standards of conduct as that
which applies to domestic and foreign firms.
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could include not only losses in market share and profits on the
part of efficient firms, but it could reflect a variety of other social
costs as well. These social costs could include the preclusion of
entry investment, the idling of resources, expenditures for job
training, expenditures for unemployment and welfare benefits, and
the redeployment of resources to less efficient endeavors.88
Consistent with Chicago School ideology, however, economic
efficiency has instead become synonymous with consumer welfare.
U.S. antitrust policy, and the policy of many OECD nations is
based on the exclusive goal of maximizing that welfare. 689 In
order to accomplish this goal, the market must be free both to
direct or allocate society's resources to the locations most
responsive to consumer wishes and to allow businesses to pursue
productive efficiencies to satisfy those wishes.
A market must be able to engage in perpetual self-correction.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the primary, if not exclusive,
evil to be avoided is the creation and exercise of market power
that inhibits or frustrates the corrective process.6 1 The focus of
the market power inquiry will be directed at a defendant's ability
to raise prices and restrict output.69 2 When price and supply are
unresponsive to consumer preference, lower output redirects
resources to less desirable uses and higher prices result in the
imposition of a tax on purchasers. 693 Market power is generally
determined by the size of the defendant's market share, and
because market power is generally a prerequisite for antitrust
681 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 48-50.
689 Cf, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 107 (observing
that the Sherman Act was designed as a prescription for consumer welfare);
BORK, supra note 7, at 7, 51 (arguing that the basic goal of antitrust law should
be to maximize consumer welfare); INTERIM REPORT, supra note 30, at 2, 5, 9
(providing that competition policy is primarily designed to enhance economic
efficiency and to ensure the efficient odlocation of resources).
690 The importance of the latter factor is emphasized in BORK, supra note
7, at 405 (concluding that the "[failure to consider productive efficiency.., is
probably the major reason for the deformation of antitrust's doctrines").
691 The self-deterring characteristics of markets are discussed supra section
2.1.
692 See infra section 5.4.2.
693 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,
supra note 46, at 174 (concerning the taxing of purchasers); National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 106-08
(1984); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
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liability, firms lacking substantial market share are often free to
engage in activities that would be unlawful when undertaken by
larger firms.694 The OECD has clearly adopted the position that
a predator must have "some real measure of market power before
a predation rule should apply"6 9 and that when the relevant
market structure makes it unlikely that market power could be
exercised, any predatory pricing inquiry should end.
696
By their very nature, both international dumping and
predatory pricing practices will seldom, if ever, meet these
consumer welfare criteria. Both of these practices involve
lowering consumer prices rather than imposing a consumer
tax.697 Both tend to increase the amount of goods that are
immediately available to purchasers rather than restrict the
quantity of output.698 Furthermore, while the dumping remedy
does not require market power, the international pricing predator,
who participates in the most extreme form of dumping, will
seldom possess a sufficient share of the international market to
meet the market power prerequisite.
These criteria are applied because antitrust enforcers have
chosen to define competition solely in terms of consumer welfare.
This reflects a conscious decision, and not an economic truism,
that the antitrust laws will be limited to addressing the needs of
consumers; the total or net welfare of the nation will be left to
other forms of governmental intervention.
Additionally, the fear of market power, and its justification as
a prerequisite for liability, are based on the belief that the ability
to exclude a business rival is predicated on the existence of market
power6" and that any temporary market failure will be quickly
694 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113
S.Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993) (stating that market power is a prerequisite for antitrust
liability); McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (looking to market share
as a gauge for market power); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
460 (1986) (holding that a "naked" restriction on price or output cannot be
justified in the absence of market power).
69 PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 31.
696 See id. at 82.
697 See supra section 1.1
698 See id.
699 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 652, at 300-02 ("The definition of
exclusionary conduct is predicated on the existence of substantial market
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corrected in its absence. This belief is based on the assumption
that because business entities are rational profit maximizers, they
would not attempt predatory activities unless they possessed
market power or had the realistic expectation of achieving it. The
existence of different rationales and rewards tends to indicate that
these beliefs may be misplaced. Not only is the international
market far less free to self-correct, but the ability to exclude may
be exercised by firms possessing substantially less market share
than that traditionally viewed as necessary.
5.4.1. The Consumer Welfare Focus in an Imperfect
World
In a perfect world, all firms would compete on an equal basis.
Each would be subject to the same governmental regulation,
government subsidies and international barriers to entry would
not exist, competition would be based on the merits of quality
and cost containment, and prices would closely approximate
marginal cost. In such a world, a lower price could only
represent greater productive efficiency, or extremely irrational and
self-destructive behavior. Under these circumstances, antitrust
policy could be limited to prohibiting the creation and exercise of
market power. Without market power, predatory pricing could
never be sustained and, strategically, this impossibility would be
known to all potential targets. This policy could thus be directed
exclusively at protecting consumer welfare because the most
efficient competitors would always survive. Similarly, any firm
that could not compete in such a market would not be worthy of
protection.
Unfortunately, the international marketplace is far from
perfect. Economic, cultural, and governmental environments vary
widely throughout the world, as do the incentives and opportuni-
ties created by those environments. As a result, while focusing on
the short-term consumer welfare of U.S. purchasers may be an
adequate policy in a closed domestic economy,7' this policy fails
power.").
0 One commentator has argued that
A net national welfare standard, rather than the domestic consumer
welfare standard, might be more appropriate in the international
context. In a closed economy, the primary... policy objective is
consumer welfare .... In an economy open to imports and foreign
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to consider the effects of external influences. This policy also fails
to provide any impetus for efficiency-based international competi-
tion and it fails to provide any stimulus for the opening of foreign
markets. Until attitudes toward efficiency and market power
change, antidumping advocates will continue to argue the
necessity for a level playing field among international competitors,
and potential predatory pricing plaintiffs will be channeled away
from antitrust remedies, and toward discriminatory and efficiency-
inhibiting antidumping relief.
As a result of these failures, it is conceivable that a less
efficient foreign producer could substantially injure, and actually
exclude, a more efficient U.S. rival.701 The existence of govern-
ment subsidies and home-market monopoly profits, when coupled
with a variety of nationalistic and cultural incentives that
emphasize the acquisition of market share, provides foreign firms
with both the will and the ability to outlast their more efficient
free-market rivals.0 2. While this practice may be efficient in
terms of short-term U.S. consumer welfare, it is extremely
wasteful in terms of productive efficiency and imposes significant
social or public costs.703
The failure of antitrust policy to protect the productive U.S.
firm from international price predation is even more interesting
given that productive efficiencies are considered important in a
variety of other domestic antitrust contexts. Several lower courts
have held that a pricing policy will not be anticompetitive unless
the policy is "capable of materially impacting on an equally
efficient plaintiff's viability as a market competitor."7' Further-
more, some commentators have noted that only conduct "which
permanently eliminates efficient competitors ... should be
competition, the antitrust policy objective might be a net national
welfare standard ....
Hawk, supra note 64, at 1164 (footnote omitted).
70 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 4849; see also Ong, supra note 4, at 431
("[M]assive subsidies distort competition by enabling less efficient producers to
drive more efficient producers from the market.").
702 See, e.g., Eckes, supra note 4, at 423-24 discussing subsidies to European
steel makers which ultimately "exacerbated the decline of the U.S. steel
industry"); see also Ong, supra note 4, at 430-31; Benz, supra note 22, at 695,
699-701, 716-720, 741.
703 See Eckes, supra note 4, at 423-24; Epstein, supra note 31, at 43-50, Ong,
supra note 4, at 430-31; Benz, supra note 22, at 695, 699-701, 716-20, 741.
' Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1363 (8th Cir. 1989).
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prohibited."7 °5 The incremental cost benchmark is based on the
belief that pricing above marginal cost could only be used to harm
less efficient firms, and thus should not be a matter of antitrust
concern, while pricing below marginal cost could damage more
efficient rivals and thus should be suspect.7'
By de-emphasizing the relevance of productive efficiencies, the
current consumer welfare focus also encourages both a global and
domestic misallocation of resources.707 It is ironic in the wake
of the WTO agreement that as global economies become more
interdependent and as more nations develop competition policies
aimed at increasing allocative efficiency, defined in terms of the
welfare of consumers located in the particular nation, overall
global wealth may actually decline.
Assume, for illustrative purposes, that company A ("A"), a
foreign producer, produces product X ("X") at an unsubsidized
cost of $10 per unit. A, however, receives either an undetectable
or lawful domestic subsidy of $2 per unit or, alternatively,
because it can support a loss by means of monopoly profits at
home, it sells the product in the United States for $8 per unit.
Assuming that A lacks market power, and thus cannot later
recoup its losses, the U.S. consumer receives a $2 benefit from the
predatory price. Furthermore, assume that at least one U.S.
company ("B"), which was producing or could have produced X
more efficiently at a cost of $9 per unit, is deterred from compet-
ing. B therefore chooses to produce product Y instead at a cost
of $15 per unit. Finally, assume that A, if it had chosen to
produce product Y, could have done so at a cost of $12 per unit.
For a variety of reasons, such as a desire to gain a foothold in the
product market for X, anticipated spillover effects, or nationalistic
pressures to engage in technological rather than labor-intensive
industries, and in light of the existence of finite resources, A
continues to produce product X rather than product Y.
"I Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1344 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussing
Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975)).
71 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st
Cir. 1983) (holding that "[w]lien prices exceed incremental costs" they will not
"have a tendency to exclude or eliminate equally efficient competitors").
707 For discussions concerning misallocation of resources, see Eckes, supra




1996] THlE ANTIDUMPING/ANTITRUST DICHOTOMY 183
Under such circumstances, it could be argued that company A
would be inefficiently producing product X and company B
would be inefficiently producing product Y As a result, there
would be a global loss of $1 for every X produced, by producing
X for $10 rather than $9, and a global loss of $3 for every Y
produced, by producing Y for $15 rather than $12. Moreover,
from a domestic standpoint, the U.S. consumer would be saving
$2 on every X that was purchased, but spending $3 more on every
Y that was purchased. Assuming similar quantities, U.S. consum-
er welfare would be reduced by $1 per pair of purchases.
Such a scenario highlights the importance of freely permitting
global specialization. Foreign firms must be absolutely free to
manufacture and export those products which they can produce
more efficiently than their competitors. The free movement of
goods must not be inhibited by the use, or by the threatened
misuse, of antidumping policies designed to protect domestic
industries from alleged price discrimination regardless of the
relative efficiencies of the foreign and domestic firms. At the
same time, inefficient foreign competitors, who can compete only
by offering their products at prices that are below cost, should be
discouraged from engaging in such activities. Similarly, more
efficient U.S. firms should be protected from possible predatory
exclusion and must be encouraged to enter new markets, to invest
in research and development, and to take legitimate business risks
in the expectation of reasonable profits. While specialization may
cause some U.S. industries to contract, others will reap the
rewards of substantial expansion.708  Moreover, long-term
consumer welfare will be enhanced not only when consumers are
free from potential monopoly prices, but also when they are free
to reap the benefits of new and better products.!" These
products will be forthcoming only when efficient domestic firms
are allowed to generate the profitability and cash flow necessary
for their development.7 0
Finally, policymakers must resist the temptation to believe
that foreign subsidies, which create lower prices for U.S. consum-
70 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS,
supra note 46, at 46 (arguing that NAFTA will produce this effect).
709 See Eckes, supra note 4, at 423.
710 See id. For a discussion of long-term consumer welfare, see Ong, supra
note 4, at 429-30; Benz, supra note 22, at 701; Semeraro, supra note 22, at 629-
31.
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ers, result in social costs only to foreign countries or that home-
market monopoly profits impose costs only on foreign and
domestic consumers."' In addition to the costs resulting from
either exclusion or the loss of profitability and cash flow, these
practices may lead to a variety of other opportunity losses as well.
The existence of artificially high prices in foreign countries, for
example, reduces the level of disposable income or purchasing
power in the hands of foreign consumers. If prices were to be
lowered, foreign consumers would be capable of buying additional
products from the United States. Similarly, the money used to
subsidize inefficient enterprises could be better spent on develop-
ing the educational system or the transportation and commu-
nication infrastructures of the country. These actions would
attract additional foreign investment, providing U.S. companies
with expansion opportunities, and would tend to raise the nation's
standard of living and demand for U.S. products. If accompanied
by additional U.S. output, such an increase in demand could
benefit U.S. consumers by means of increasing economies of scale,
lowering consumer prices, and encouraging product development.
Both U.S. producer welfare and U.S. consumer welfare are
inescapably linked to the market conditions existing abroad. The
current consumer welfare focus, with its emphasis on short-term
price reductions for U.S. purchasers, fails to recognize this
interplay. As a result, a new predatory pricing policy must be
established that will reduce the political pressure to protect
inefficient U.S. industries and provide more realistic protection to
U.S. businesses from the pricing strategies of less efficient foreign
entities. By doing so, this policy would spur not only a
redeployment of economic resources, but would enhance both
consumer welfare and U.S. global competitiveness. 2
5.4.2. Market Power: An Elusive Concept
Both the courts and commentators have been authoritative
concerning the definition of market power and its place as a
711 See Warner, supra note 4, at 823-24 (discussing the fact that the home
country bears the social costs resulting from high-priced home-market sales
when nonpredatory price discrimination is employed).
712 On the problem of consumer welfare and U.S. global competitiveness,
see Victor, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Overview,
supra note 4, at 399-400.
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predatory pricing prerequisite. First, market power historically
has been defined as the ability of a seller, or a group of sellers
acting in concert, to raise prices or restrict output by excluding a
rival, severely disciplining a rival, or deterring entry by a potential
rival." 3  Second, the presence or absence of such a power has
been determined primarily by examining the size of the
defendant's market share."4 Third, in the absence of market
power or the ability to acquire market power, prohibitions of
below-cost pricing do not apply."5
Despite the piety of these rules, the concept of market power
is extremely elusive and depends on how the relevant product and
geographic markets are defined. In the international setting,
market power is subject to widely divergent views concerning
both its relevance and the percentage of market share necessary to
give rise to its existence. 16 The definition of market power
varies depending upon both the nature of the restraint imposed
and the statutory section applied.17 The definition also is
subject to significant qualification depending on the existence of
both excess capacity and asymmetric market conditions. 18
Antitrust enforcers will always retain a significant degree of
discretion when determining the parameters of the relevant
product and geographic markets. As a result, the size of a
defendant's market share, which, in turn, depends on how the
market is defined, will remain a somewhat subjective determi-
nation. The relevant market is defined according to a variety of
rules, such as reasonable interchangeability of products, price
sensitivity and cross elasticity of demand, production substitution
and cross-elasticity of supply.719 The lack of perfect information
713 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Inage Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,464
(1992); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969); McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858
F.2d 1487, 1505 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
714 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464; McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1505.
715 See PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 23-32 (discussing the various
approaches to applying a predatory pricing rule).
716 See id. at 31.
717 See discussion infra notes 724-34 and accompanying text.
718 See infra notes 735-39.
719 See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 276 (1964); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962); United States v. E.I. du
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concerning market conditions and consumer/supplier response,
however, combined with a host of interpretations to which
information is susceptible, invariably requires that choices be
made among various alternatives. As economic analysis becomes
more sophisticated and the number of relevant economic factors
increases, the number of options confronting decisionmakers will
also multiply.
As a result, the relevant markets can be defined in whatever
manner necessary to achieve the desired outcome in the case. The
effect of product differentiation on market definition, for example,
continues to be a source of debate. Product differentiation can be
used to alter consumer tastes and thereby disaggregate a seemingly
uniform market;720 it thus should be a major criterion in deter-
mining market power. As the court noted in Graphic Prods.
Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 2 product differentiation, which may
be acquired by activities such as advertising and styling, enables a
firm to raise its prices above the purely competitive level without
the loss of a substantial share of its business.7 2  As a result,
substantial product differentiation may cause the relevant product
market to contract and the resulting market power to expand. If
Kodak is followed in future cases, even a single brand of a product
could be the relevant market for Sherman Act purposes.'n
In addition to the subjective nature of market definition, the
concept of market power is far from lucid for a variety of other
reasons. First, the size of the market share necessary to give rise
to market power has not been universally accepted. In the United
States, for example, various courts and commentators have argued
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956); Equifax, Inc. v. FTC, 618
F.2d 63, 66 (9th Cir. 1980); Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 307-08
(7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F.
Supp. 867, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F.
Supp. 576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
"2 See Hearing on the Oversight on Department ofJustice s Vertical Restraints
Guidelines Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65
(1985) (statement of Lawrence A. Sullivan).
721 Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir.
1983).
72 See id. at 1570 n.15 (citation omitted).
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that a market share of 50% may be sufficient;724 a market share
of 50% is insufficient;7' a market share of 55% is sufficient if
accompanied by other market characteristics; 26 a market share
of 60% should be adequate;72 and a market share of 60% should
be inadequate.728
In contrast, many nations would apparently exhibit market
power concerns at market share levels substantially lower than
those required in the United States. In Australia, for example, a
40% market share has been held to imply a substantial degree of
market power.729 In Canada, the new predatory pricing guide-
lines indicate that a producer that possesses 35% or more of the
market will be considered to have the power to unilaterally affect
industry pricing.7 " In Portugal, a dominant position has been
defined as 30% or more of the national market,"' while in
France, a firm was found to possess dominance with a 36% share
of the overall market, if accompanied by a larger share in a
relevant submarket. 32  Furthermore, some nations have a
variety of statutes that either downplay or eliminate the need for
market power analysis. Some of these statutes outlaw sales-at-a-
loss and are thus oriented toward unfair competition,733 while
724 See U.S. Anchor Mfg. v. Rule Indus., 7 F.3d 986, 1001 (11th Cir. 1993)
(stating that less than 50 % is inadequate as a matter of law), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2710 (1994) ; Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2
(5th Cir. 1969) (stating that a 50% share may be sufficient).
"' See United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 305-07 (8th Cir.
1976) (holding that a 50% share did not present a dangerous probability of
success in achieving market power), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977) .
726 See Kelco Disposal v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir.
1988) (noting that above 55% is sufficient along with other market characteris-
tics), affd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
727 See McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1506 (11th
Cir. 1988) (proposing that 60-65% is sufficient to present a genuine issue of
material fact), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Oliver E. Williamson,
Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE Lj. 284, 292 (1977)
(stating that 60% is necessary).
72' See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Williamson on Predatory
Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337, 1348 (1978) (proposing that 60% is not enough).
729 See Warner, supra note 4, at 848.
See Canadian Predatory Pricing Policy Stresses Market Orientation
Approach, IJan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1568, at 725
(June 4, 1992); see also Warner, supra note 4, at 864.
731 See PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 42.
732 See id. at 56-57.
71 See id. at 7-8.
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others are aimed at prohibiting cartel activity or illegal predatory
conduct specifically directly toward destroying a particular
rival.
734
Although it is important to recognize that countries will differ
over the degree of market share necessary to constitute market
power, it is even more important to recognize that no precise
level of market share can ever be established. This is because the
market share/market power relationship depends upon a variety
of market conditions. Where barriers to entry are low, it would
seem appropriate to increase the market share level necessary to
establish market power. Alternatively, where barriers to entry are
substantial, a finding of market power would appear justified at
market share levels significantly lower than those otherwise
required. Moreover, the relative sizes of the market participants
would affect the market share/market power mix.73 A firm
that is twice as large as the next largest competitor should be
subject to substantially greater antitrust scrutiny.7 36
The argument that market power can never be viewed solely
in terms of market share is highlighted by the fact that a firm's
actual market power, or at least its realistic potential for acquiring
such power, is greatly influenced by its level of excess capacity.
A firm that controls a substantial share of the market, for
example, but possesses no excess capacity, would not engage in a
predatory pricing scheme since it would be unable to meet the
resulting increase in demand. At the same time, a firm with a
more modest market share, but possessing excess capacity, could
be a much more powerful market participant. As the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized in Cargill,737 "It is possible that a
firm with a low market share might nevertheless have sufficient
excess capacity to enable it rapidly to expand its output and
"I See id. at 7-8, 33-35, 36-38, 40-41, 47-48, 59-60, 60-61, 77; see also Warner,
supra note 4, at 843-44, 860.
See Canadian Predatory Pricing Policy Stresses Market Orientation
Approach, supra note 730, at 725 (reporting that the Canadian predatory pricing
guidelines, while establishing a 35% market share threshold, also employ
considerations concerning the "number of sellers, the degree of size inequality
among the firms, and trends in market share over time"); see also Warner, supra
note 4, at 864.
73' See Warner, supra note 4, at 864 (stating that the Canadian Bureau of
Competition Policy requires that a predator must be at least twice as large as
its competitor).
"' Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
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absorb the market shares of its rivals." 38 As a result, predatory
pricing would be a rational strategy if the predator had either a
substantial market share, or a substantial degree of excess capacity
that would enable it to gain a large market share.73
The market power concept also depends on the type of
anticompetitive conduct being examined. Conduct involving
actual monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act is at
one extreme.740 In order for an allegation of actual monop-
olization to be successful, the defendant must possess monopoly
power rather than simply market power.7 41 Alternatively, when
a predatory pricing claim is based on a section 2 attempted
monopolization allegation, the plaintiff must instead demonstrate
"a dangerous probability" of achieving monopoly power.742
While proving a dangerous probability of success will require
evidence of the defendant's ability to recoup its losses through the
exercise of market power, the degree of that power will be
somewhat less than that required in an actual monopolization
case. As the court noted in Northern Propane,43 whether a
defendant has sufficient market power to be dangerously close to
acquiring a monopoly "requires analysis and proof of the same
character, but not the same quantum, as would be necessary to
establish monopoly power." 44  Furthermore, if a predatory
pricing action is brought under the primary-line price discrimina-
tion provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, a plaintiff will only
be required to show a "reasonable possibility" that a substantial
injury to competition will result.7 45 Although the Court in
Brooke Group clearly indicated that a Robinson-Patman claim
would be subject to the same recoupment standard as a Sherman
711 Id. at 119-20 n.15.
739 See PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 81 (noting that in order to
pursue a feasible predatory pricing stratey, the "predator must have a very
substantial share of the market or at least the capacity to acquire such a share").
740 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
741 See McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
742 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2578, 2587 (1993) (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884,
890 (1993)).
743 858 F.2d 1487.
744 Id. at 1505.
74s Brooke Group, 113 S.Ct. at 2587.
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Act section 2 attempted monopolization case,746 the incipiency
aspects of the Robinson-Patman Act provide ample opportunity
for a lessening of the market power requirement. 47
At the other end of the spectrum are those activities that are
prohibited even without a detailed analysis of market power. As
the Supreme Court has noted, proof of actual detrimental effects
on competition "can obviate the need for an inquiry into market
power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects."'748 As
a result, because "the absence of proof of market power does not
justify a naked restriction on price or output, 749 and "market
power is only one test of 'reasonableness, ' "7 ° this restriction
will be "presumed unreasonable without inquiry into the
particular market context in which it is found.""5 ' Sherman Act
section 1 conspiracies designed to either raise price or restrict
output generally fall within the auspices of this approach.
The evidentiary requirements involved in other types of
section 1 allegations also support the premise that the concept of
market power varies. In a tying case, for example, the defendant
only needs sufficient economic power over the tying product to
appreciably restrain competition in the market for the tied
product.752 This power need not be in the form of a monopoly
or even a dominant position within the market.7 3 Instead, this
power may be sufficient even though it "falls far short of
dominance and even though the power exists only with respect to
some of the buyers in the market."754 Moreover, when predato-
ry pricing is alleged within the context of a section 1 conspiracy,
it can still be argued, despite Brooke Group, that the market power
746 See id. at 2587-88.
7 See id. at 2602-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74' FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (citation
omitted).
749 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984).
710 Id. at 110 n.42 (quoting with approval the Solicitor General) (citation
omitted).
751 Id. at 100.
75 2 See Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-03
(1969).
753 See id.
714 Id. at 503 (noting that an "appreciable restraint results whenever the
seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in the market").
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of the conspirators is totally irrelevant. The conspiracy to restrain
trade is prohibited when accompanied by an antitrust injury to
the plaintiff.755 The potential success of the illegal agreement or
its effect on consumer welfare should not be at issue.5 6 As a
result, although the ability to recoup and the possession of market
power may be relevant in determining the rationality of the
alleged predation, it is not a prerequisite for a finding of unlawful
conduct.
5.4.3. Market Power: A Set of Proposed Alternatives
The emphasis on the evils of market power directly reflects an
economic and political tradition that stresses the importance of
entrepreneurial freedom and the sanctity of the invisible hand of
free-market forces.7 7 Antitrust policymakers must be able to
adapt the law to the social, political, and economic conditions of
a given time. As a result, the concept of market power has
remained both elusive and subjectively applied. Since the
definition of market power is only a function of policy rather
than an economic truism, it is possible to alter its nature in light
of external international impediments.
Whether predatory pricing is redefined unilaterally or by a
WTO agreement, it is important to recognize the nature of the
market power compromise involved. The current market power
requirement has negated any antitrust remedy for international
price predation.75' It is unlikely that a single seller would have
dominance in the world market. It is equally unlikely that any
conspiracy among sellers would ever be found to be economically
feasible in light of Matsushita.59  On the other hand, the
See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
756 See supra notes 185-89; see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2602 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof of a conspiracy. It is the joint
plan to restrain trade, however, and not its success, that is prohibited by
Section 1."); S. REP. No. 403, supra note 4, at 8 (noting the "long-standing rule
that a predatory pricing conspiracy is illegal without regard to its actual or
potential market effect" (footnote omitted)).
"' See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
7" See discussion supra section 1.
... See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
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antidumping laws have no market power requirement at all.7,0
Instead, they simply require a material injury that is "not
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant."76' The imports
under investigation "need not be the sole or even principal cause"
of the material injury.762 As a result, the antidumping prerequi-
site will be met if the imports contribute, even slightly, to the
problems of the affected industry.763
By proposing a compromise concerning this dichotomy, this
Article is not suggesting that legitimate market dominance or
market power be condemned. Nor is the Article proposing the
condemnation of excess capacity or the sale of products at prices
with which U.S. producers cannot compete. Neither price
discrimination nor the practice of dumping would be attached.
What must be condemned is the international sale of goods at
below-cost prices. By allowing a set of provable defenses such as
new entry, obsolescence, and reasonable expectations of future
costs, such a condemnation would have the effect of punishing
only two forms or producers-those who, irrespective of their
relative efficiency, possess a predatory motive and those who,
regardless of their motives, are simply less efficient. Any firm
that chooses to price its product below its costs would fall within
one of three categories: 1) temporary justification; 2) active
predation; or 3) relative inefficiency. By exempting the first and
condemning the latter two, this compromise would not be
designed to protect U.S. businesses, but would be designed to
protect efficient businesses throughout the world.
Any potentially adverse effects resulting from an increase in
successful predatory pricing claims will be more than offset by the
pro-competitive effects stemming from the abolition of
antidumping remedies. By recognizing the overall benefits that
would accrue from this trade-off, policymakers would be free to
consider the concept of market power in light of a variety of
different perspectives.
An actual predatory pricing conspiracy among competitors,
when accompanied by sufficient below-cost sales to establish an
antitrust injury to the plaintiff, should be condemned. While it
760 See 19 U.S.C. S 1673 (1994).
761 19 U.S.C. S 1677(7)(A) (1994).
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is true that de minimis sales would not give rise to an antitrust
injury, the presence or absence of market power should play no
role in determining whether recovery should be granted when the
existence of a conspiracy can be demonstrated. In Matsushita, the
court examined the issue of market power not as a prerequisite to
recovery, but as a factor to be used in determining the likelihood
of whether a conspiracy existed."' In Brooke Group, market
power was a prerequisite to recovery, but the decision was limited
to Robinson-Patman and Sherman section 2 allegations. 65 As
a result, where a section 1 conspiracy is demonstrated, market
power and consumer welfare effects should be irrelevant.
In the event that there are several foreign producers selling in
the United States at below-cost prices, but making their pricing
decisions independently and not pursuant to a conspiracy,
policymakers should consider applying the concept of cumulative
market power. The purpose of this doctrine is "to allow
causation of material injury to be established in cases where the
cumulated sources are not capable of being found injurious when
viewed independently."766 In the predatory pricing context, this
doctrine could be applied where non-conspiring predators
individually lack market power, but where their combined
predatory sales have the potential for excluding or injuring U.S.
producers and long-term consumer interests.
The courts have defined market power in terms of the ability
to restrict output and raise price.767 On occasion, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court has expressed concerns over the "ability to
alter the interaction of supply and demand" and the need for price
and output to be "responsive to demand."768 The Court has not
required proof of market power when an anticompetitive activity
"is inconsistent with the Sherman Act's command that price and
supply be responsive to consumer preference."769 As a result, a
firm that intentionally chooses to produce so much of a product
76 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
596-97 (1986).
765 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.
Ct. 2578, 2586-91 (1993).
"" USX Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 205, 219 (1988).
767 See discussion supra section 5.4.2.
76 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984).
769 Id. at 110.
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that it can be sold only when offered at below-cost prices is
hardly acting in a manner responsive to consumer preference. In
this case, consumers would clearly be indicating that they valued
the product itself somewhat less than they valued the resources
dedicated to its production. The stimulation of additional
purchases would represent an unlawful alteration of the acceptable
rules of supply and demand.
Policymakers must learn to resist the temptation to view
market power solely in terms of actual exclusion from the market
or blatant deterrence of market entry?0  They also must not tie
market power to a traditional form of recoupment that encom-
passes only the subsequent acquisition of monopoly profits.?71
The concepts of market power, recoupment, and rationality are
inherently linked and any attempt to examine one of these aspects
without considering the others will only lead to misleading
conclusions.
The ability to engage in strategic behavior, the existence of
segregated markets, and the effects of political and cultural
diversity must be considered when determining the rationality of
business conduct? 2 Recoupment must be viewed in terms of a
rewards system, where consideration is given to: (1) the ability to
maintain a presence within the market at a particular period of
time; (2) alter future market conditions and perceptions; (3) engage
in at least partial cross-subsidization; and (4) influence the level of
research and development, cash flow, and available capital7 3
Other more culture-specific rewards also must be recognized such
as the pursuit of market share rather then return-on-investment,
the creation of stable employment environments, the acquisition
of hard currency, and the governmental favor acquired through
the realization of national goals? 4  Policymakers must under-
stand both the purposes behind business conduct and the actual
rewards to be recouped therefrom in order to use the market
power prohibition to guard against the increasing manipulation of
consumer and producer decisionmaking.
The concept of market power must be tied to the ability of a
770 See supra section 5.4.2.
771 See supra section 5.4.2.
m See Baker, supra note 14, at 594-98.
See id. (discussing the approach of the Brooke Group court).
7 See supra section 5.3.
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firm to injure or discipline an equally or more efficient business
rival and it should be designed in such a way that it helps
stimulate the opening of foreign markets.775 In a competitive
market, the best indication that a firm is more productively
efficient than its rival is that it is capable of earning a profit, or at
least avoiding a loss, while selling its product at a price that is
lower than that of its competitor. Alternatively, a firm that is
unable to match the price of a nonpredating competitor, other
than by selling its product at a below-cost price, is deemed a less
efficient business entity. A profit, or the absence of loss, is
defined in terms of a particular product being sold in a particular
market, rather than in terms of a firm's overall profitability.
Overall profitability could simply reflect the sale of a large
number of different products, some of which were sold at prices
well above cost, or the ability to price discriminate and thereby
earn monopoly profits in one or more geographical markets.
When examining the price/cost relationships, problems can
arise concerning multiproduct firms and cost averaging, the
applicability of the meeting competition defense, the proper cost
benchmark to be employed, the existence of forward pricing, and
the difficulties involved in international discovery. Nevertheless,
the current market structure/market power approach, although an
excellent mechanism for dismissing predatory pricing claims, does
not reflect the concerns of relative efficiency, the resulting
misallocation of global resources, the real support given to
antidumping advocates, and the ultimate goals of the new WTO
Agreement. By creating a link between the concept of market
power and productive efficiency-by defining market power in
terms of the ability to harm more efficient rivals776 and by
assuming that below-cost pricing reflects either predatory intent
or lower efficiency in the absence of a defense-this proposal
enhances global economic welfare by encouraging competition on
the merits. Moreover, by limiting punishment solely to below-
cost sales, whether conducted by active predators or less efficient
producers, this approach ties market power to a total or a net
'5 See supra note 84.
776 See Wood, supra note 1, at 1173 (discussing the relationships between
efficiency and injury under the antidumping statutes).
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global efficiency standard.'
The antidumping laws often are justified as a means of
offsetting market access restrictions that exist in many exporting
countries and that underlie the ability of exporting firms to
dump.'78 As a result, any predatory pricing policy that aims at
abolishing the antidumping laws must attempt to fill the vacuum
caused by their absence. Because dumping only occurs when
markets are segregated, the best approach would be to tie
predatory pricing to the opening of foreign markets. As those
markets become subject to the rigors of outside competition, the
ability to dump would decrease.
One mechanism for achieving this result would be to create a
fundamental link between the possession of market power in the
exporting country and the market power prerequisite under U.S.
antitrust laws. While not a truism, a firm's possession of market
power in its own country could imply that the market was closed
to the forces of outside competition.
For example, assume that a foreign producer, firm X ("X"), is
selling its product in the United States at a price that is admittedly
below cost. X has a 10% share of the U.S. market and a 5% share
of the world market. It also has, however, a 95% share of the
domestic market, a percentage that could imply the existence of
market access restrictions. If the relevant geographic market were
defined in terms of the two nations-the United States, the
country in which the alleged predation was occurring, and the
home country, in which the firm has a monopoly-the likelihood
77 See id. (discussing a proposal that attempts to strike a balance between
producer interests and consumer welfare under the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty statutes, and that places substantial importance on efficiency crite-
ria).
[T]he injury that should be legally recognized [under the antidumping
and countervailing duty statutes] is the injury suffered because the
practice in question causes lost market share or sales to a competitively
structured industry. If the competing foreign firm is more efficient,
adjusting for any advantage conferredby the unfair trade practice, or
if the U.S. industry does not conform roughly to the model of a
competitive (and hence efficient) market, a closer look at the injury
suffered is required. Only the injury that corresponds to the loss that
a competitive industry would suffer should be recognized-should
"count" toward satisfaction of the injury requirement in the statutes.
Id. at 1173.
78 See Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 4, at 1.
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that X would have market power in the alternatively defined
market would increase. This market definition both narrows and
broadens the traditional approach to market determination. It
excludes all geographical areas, other than the United States and
the home country of X, from the relevant market even though
the predator and the victim may actually compete in those areas
around the world. It also includes the home country of X, despite
the fact that the U.S. victim may not be competing in that
country due to market access restrictions. Additionally, if excess
capacity were considered, the market power of many foreign
competitors also would increase because of this market definition.
The advantage of finding a greater degree of market power and
of increasing the likelihood that a predatory pricing allegation
would succeed is that it tends to punish firms that earn monopoly
profits in closed markets and that have the ability to engage in
dumping. When the relevant geographical market is defined as
the consuming and producing nations, the likelihood of punish-
ment is directly proportionate to the degree of foreclosure. The
higher the degree of domestic market foreclosure, the greater the
likelihood that the requisite market power exists. If entry barriers
were lowered, the fear of an adverse predatory pricing ruling
would be reduced.
Another potential advantage of this approach is that antitrust
enforcers could exert some influence over foreign conspirators. A
predator that possesses only a non-dominant share of its home
market, but who is a member of a conspiracy that dominates the
market, should be deemed to individually possess the degree of
market power held by the conspiracy as a whole. This standard
is justified because the dominant conspiracy serves to exclude
outside competitors, providing each individual predator with a
source of monopoly profits.
Whether viewed in the context of single-firm or conspiratorial
market share, the existence and exercise of market power would
still be required under this approach before predatory pricing
liability would attach. Because the relevant geographic market is
defined in a manner that enlarges the market power of the
predator, it can be argued that traditional notions of consumer
welfare should be applied. Nevertheless, the possession of market
power is best examined in terms of the ability to harm, although
not necessarily exclude, a more efficient rival.
The concept of market power, like all antitrust theory, should
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never be immune from critical inquiry. Like the approach to the
broad issue of protectionism, the approach to market power is
constantly subject to alteration by judicial interpretation and
statutory amendment. These arguments, however, are limited to
potential developments in domestic law. A second approach, to
which this Article now turns, would be to alter the international
law established by the WTO Agreement.
5.5. The Creation of a WTO Standard
The world is not ready for a universal antitrust code or to
accept an international enforcement authority.779 A universal
antitrust code requires substantially more economic integration
and market access. 780 Furthermore, nations would have to be
granted significant latitude to develop competition policies
consistent with their individual "needs, current stage of economic
and institutional development, legal systems and competition
history and experience." 71' For example, while an emphasis on
consumer welfare may be appropriate in some economies, many
developing nations emphasize the protection of their producers
and the advancement of their industrial base when establishing or
enforcing an antitrust agenda.
As a result, this Article does not suggest the creation of a
private party cause of action under the antidumping laws. Such
a remedy would at once violate the WTO Agreement, which
provides that an antidumping action may only be initiated and
conducted by a member nation,7 2 and would proliferate an
" Indeed, even the head of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
concedes: "I'll be dead before a world antitrust enforcement authority is
established." Interview: Anne K Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, supra note 78, at 9.
710 See Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 4, at 3-10, 28, 30-31. Hoekman
and Mavroidis state that "[i]f a credible argument could be made that the
abolition of antidumping would follow the adoption of common competition
policies, this would greaty strengthen the case of those calling for international
competition rules." Id. at 28. They note, however, that "the precondition for
this to be possible appears to be that countries are ready to contemplate
significantly deeper integration (including free trade) than they have been
willing to pursue in the recent past." Id.
781 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 30, at 6.
"82 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 1 n.1, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS,
supra note 29, at 145; see also S. REP. No. 403, supra note 4, at 13.
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already discriminatory, efficiency-intolerant form of statutory
relief. Likewise, this Article does not suggest that the
antidumping laws be amended to seek out only predatory
dumping. Such an approach could lead to the application of a
dual standard, with domestic predation judged by a consumer
welfare perspective and foreign predation judged by a producer
welfare perspective. This conflict would be inconsistent with the
goals of national treatment. Below-cost dumping could be
harmonized with the consumer welfare approach of the antitrust
laws. Unfortunately, in light of the current recoupment and
market power prerequisites, harmony would only result in the
extinction of international predatory pricing remedies.
U.S. antitrust policy adequately protects domestic consumers
from foreign conduct that would diminish the consumers' short-
term welfare. 783 A foreign cartel, for example, reaping monopo-
ly profits in the United States presumably would be challenged by
the Department of Justice. Moreover, foreign conduct that injures
U.S. exporters can be attacked regardless of whether such conduct
directly harms U.S. consumers.784 While protecting both con-
sumers and exporters, however, current antitrust policy fails to
provide any realistic remedies for domestic producers competing
in the U.S. market against foreign rivals engaged in predatory
pricing activities.
Confronted with the political necessity of providing domestic
producers with protection, policymakers may choose to overcom-
pensate through the use of antidumping laws and grant relief
whenever imports, even if more efficiently produced, contribute
minimally to a domestic injury. In contrast, policymakers could
reduce or eliminate antidumping remedies by providing U.S.
businesses with a realistic opportunity to recover for injuries
caused by predatory pricing. This opportunity could be provided
by: (1) recognizing the fallacy of universal rationality; (2)
adopting a broader and more culturally diverse approach to
international recoupment; (3) de-emphasizing the relevance of
market power; and (4) concentrating on the issue of relative
783 See U.S. Broadens Enforcement Posture on Foreign Application of Sherman
Act, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1560, at 479 (Apr. 9, 1992)
(quoting former Chief of the Antitrust Division James Rill as saying that the
Department of Justice has "always applied our law to challenge ... cartels
aimed at raising prices to [U.S.] consumers . .
784 See id.
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efficiency.
By defining international competition in terms of relative
efficiency, rather than in terms of single-nation consumer welfare,
this approach would be more consistent with the global welfare
theories in the WTO Agreement. The WTO Agreement is
designed to enhance global well-being.785  It neither views
competition in terms of enhancing the consumer welfare of one
nation at the expense of another, nor proposes that the existence
of low prices in one area of the world resulting from the availabil-
ity of subsidies or monopolistic profits in another, is beneficial to
competition. Instead, it recognizes that free competition, based on
free trade and market access, is the mechanism by which standards
of living, real income, and employment rates can be raised
throughout the world and by which the world's resources will be
best employed.786
Additionally, the WTO Agreement places substantial impor-
tance on relieving the plight of developing countries. It contains
many references to special treatment for developing country
members in the areas of dumping, subsidies, trade in services,
trade-related investment measures, technical barriers to trade, and
trade-related aspects of intellectual property.7 7 It also expresses
concern over the need to increase exports from these nations.
Furthermore, the Agreement emphasizes the importance of
disseminating knowledge and transferring technology to develop-
ing nations and for a reallocation of productive resources to
ensure that these nations share in the growth of international
785 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble,
reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 5.
786 See id.
787 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 15, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra
note 29, at 163; see, e.g., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
art. 27, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 257-59 (providing for a
procedure that allows developing nations to subsidize exports); General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services, Preamble, art. IV, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra
note 29, at 285, 287-88; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,
Preamble, art. 4, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 139, 140;
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Preamble, arts. 11, 12, reprinted in
FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 117, 127-29; Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Preamble, art. 66, reprinted in FINAL
TEXTS, supra note 29, at 320, 348; Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-
Developed Countries, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 385.
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trade.788  As a result, although the WTO Agreement is framed
in terms of economic trade, it also has a strong social component.
The efficiency-based predation rule proposed in this Article
does not recognize the existence of geographical boundaries. It is
not tied to the welfare of any individual nation, but instead
reflects the ability of producers to compete on the basis of merit.
If this rule could be applied without chilling lawful price competi-
tion, encouraging delay or sham litigation, or violating the
doctrine of national treatment, it would be, in conjunction with
the elimination of dumping remedies, an excellent foundation for
advancing the goals set forth in the WTO Agreement.
5.6. The Ability of the WTO to Act
In their discussion of competition policy and the GATT,
Hoekman and Mavroidis noted two substantial limitations on the
scope of the GATT regulatory mechanism. First, they noted that
the GATT only dealt with governmental policies and thus private
anticompetitive practices were beyond its reach. 89 If a contract-
ing Member approved or supported those private anticompetitive
practices, however, the GATT dispute settlement procedures could
be invoked.790  This governmental support could consist of
passive tolerance, such as the non-enforcement of antitrust laws,
or more active involvement, such as the creation of an antitrust
exemption or a subsidy.791 As a result, while GATT did not
specifically address the issue of competition policy, certain GATT
mechanisms could reach a variety of antitrust-related allega-
tions. 92  These mechanisms included violation com-
plaints-where an activity violated the Agreement itself-and non-
violation complaints-where an activity nullified or impaired an
existing concession.793
781 See, e.g., Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries,
reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 385-86 (stating that least-developed
countries "shall be accorded substantially increased technical assistance in the
development ... of their production and export bases ... [and] in trade
promotion ... to enable them to maximize the benefits from liberalized access
to markets").
7s Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 4, at 10, 22.
710 See id. at 10.
791 See id. at 10, 23, 25, 27, 31.
7912 See id. at 10, 25, 27.
793 See id.
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Second, because the GATT primarily focused on the issue of
market access, restrictive business practices that produced only
extraterritorial effects were not subject to GATT sanctions under
the non-violation complaint procedure because "only practices that
deny market access opportunities in the domestic market can be
the object of such complaints." 94 Unless an action directly
violated the Agreement itself, as in the case of an export subsidy,
practices by private parties and actions or inactions on the part of
the government concerning those practices would not be subject
to GATT if they only affected export markets.795 Thus, al-
though there are exceptions for direct violations of the Agree-
ment, the GATT mechanism was restricted to anticompetitive
behavior affecting the competitive conditions within the import-
ing country.
79 6
The new WTO Agreement does not fundamentally alter these
general limitations concerning the international sale of goods.
These limitations, however, should not have an inhibiting effect
on the ability of the WTO to adopt a universal definition of
predatory pricing. First, there is a precedent for the adoption of
a WTO agreement binding on individual contracting Members
that could be implemented by means of parallel domestic
enforcement against private parties located in foreign coun-
tries.797 The WTO Antidumping Code permits an action against
a private foreign firm regardless of whether its government
supported or approved the dumping practices conducted by that
firm.
798
Second, predatory pricing rules could be viewed as access
oriented. For example, domestic legislation that prohibits the sale
of products at below-cost prices, regardless of the nation's
particular posture concerning recoupment and market power,
directly raises issues about market access. Moreover, access
conditions in foreign markets, which enable foreign firms to
segregate consumers and reap monopoly profits, are directly
711 Id. at 24.
71- See id. at 23-24, 28.
796 See id. at 28.
797 See id. at 6.
798 See id. (noting that Article VI of the GATT permits "governmental
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linked to the ability to predate in export markets. 99 As a result,
market access in one country and predatory pricing in another
often raise identical issues.
The WTO Agreement specifically notes that the WTO may
"provide the forum for further negotiations among its Members
concerning their multilateral trade relations," as well as "a
framework for the implementation of the results of such negotia-
tions . . . ."0 Hence, the creation of a universal standard
concerning predatory pricing can be the subject of further
negotiations.
A WTO predatory pricing standard would be enforced by way
of private party or governmental action brought before a
designated domestic tribunal and not before a WTO panel. While
a general definition would be provided by the WTO, predatory
pricing allegations would be brought in a manner consistent with
the prevailing national law. If one Member believes that another
Member is in direct violation of the WTO Agreement by
applying a predatory pricing standard that is in conflict with the
standard created by the WTO, however, that nation could then
seek redress before a WTO panel. As a result, the mandates in
Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding would
apply only to an action on the part of a nation and not to the
original private party or governmental proceeding.0 1
Finally, many countries severely limit or do not provide for
private party enforcement of their antitrust laws. While there is
a growing sentiment in favor of allowing such an enforcement
mechanism, 02 the proposal presented in this Article would not
require such changes. In accordance with domestic law, each
nation would be free to decide whether predatory pricing actions
may be instituted by private business entities or whether such
actions are within the exclusive control of governmental authori-
ties. Whichever enforcement mechanism is selected, the domestic
tribunal must apply the predatory pricing standard created by the
"7 See supra section 5.2.1.
" Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. I, reprinted
in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 10.
801 Article 23 provides that Members shall adhere to WTO standards of
procedure when seeking redress for violations of obligations or impairments of
benefits. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, art. 23, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 370.
802 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 30, at 20.
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WTO.
5.7. The Nature of a WTO Standard
Subject to several defenses, qualifications, and explanations, a
WTO predatory pricing standard should be adopted so that all
systematic below-cost sales conducted in one Member country by
a business entity whose principal place of business is located in
another Member country are prima facie illegal. The burden of
proof would be placed on the alleged predator to present a
recognizable justification for its below-cost pricing structure. This
standard would apply only to international sales. Member nations
would be free to retain or adopt any approach when deciding
predatory pricing cases between domestic producers.
Furthermore, the prima facie standard would be applied
regardless of the presence or absence of predatory intent. This
standard would be designed to punish both producers who engage
in below-cost sales with a predatory motive and producers who
lack predatory intent but, due to their relative inefficiency, must
sell at below-cost prices in order to compete. On the other hand,
the existence of predatory intent could be relevant when determin-
ing the level of damages. International predatory pricing relief
should be limited to single, rather than treble, damages unless
predatory intent, as judged by a substantial burden of proof, is
demonstrated. Finally, this standard could be applied regardless
of the presence or absence of market power or, alternatively, in
accordance with a substantially different approach to the market
power determination.
The validity of this standard can only be examined in light of
the fundamental changes in the WTO Antidumping Code and
parallel domestic legislation proposed in this Article. Governmen-
tal authorities and domestic industries will no longer have the
right to initiate antidumping proceedings. Instead, recourse will
be limited to the initiation of a predatory pricing complaint on
the basis of below-cost sales. The antidumping remedy will serve
as a default mechanism that can be invoked only when a predato-
ry pricing defendant fails to provide accurate cost data, fails to
comply with lawful discovery orders, or attempts to delay an on-
going predatory pricing proceeding.
In exchange for relegating antidumping relief to a default
position and limiting the size of recoverable damages in most
predatory pricing cases, a substantial reduction in the recoupment
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and market power prerequisites would be possible. The concepts
of recoupment and market power are both inherently subjective
and substantially dependent on a number of variables. The
concept of recoupment, for example, should reflect: (1) the
motivational distinctions between domestic and international
predation; (2) the myriad of cultural factors that influence
corporate environments and rewards; (3) the lack of a universal
rationality regarding such factors as individualism and short-term
profit maximization; and (4) the availability of risk reduction
through segregated markets and governmental intervention.8 3
Similarly, the degree of market power will depend on: (1) market
definition; (2) market conditions; (3) the existence of informational
and financial asymmetries; (4) the availability of excess capacity;
and (5) the nature of the alleged antitrust violation'
°4
If the WTO could enforce a global consumer welfare standard,
or if every nation were able to enact and enforce consumer-
oriented antitrust laws, market power and recoupment would
satisfactorily govern predatory pricing analysis. In the absence of
ideal global enforcement, however, focusing on these prerequisites
serves only to reward some consumers at the expense of others,
thereby inhibiting the efficient allocation of global resources. As
a result, the proposed standard should be applied without
considering these prerequisites. In the event that this position
proves to be politically unacceptable, however, these concepts of
market power and recoupment should be redefined in substantial-
ly broader terms that would reflect the importance of relative
efficiency. For example, the ability of a predator to injure a more
efficient rival or to reduce its viability as a future competitor must
be included in the market power determination. Moreover, these
prerequisites should be limited to single firm, as opposed to
conspiratorial, predation and they should encompass all potential
distortions to consumer preference. Finally, they should be
applied in a manner that recognizes strategic rewards and the
diversity of recoupment, the effects of excess capacity and
cumulative market power, and the potential for more innovative
approaches to market definition.
The adoption of a WTO standard that substantially broadens
the scope of predatory pricing recovery in international cases
803 See supra section 5.4.1.
o See supra section 5.4.
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requires the dismissal of several anticipated counterarguments.
First, because the pursuit of increased market share through a
price reduction is the essence of competition, the chosen standard
must not chill lawful price competition by means of unfair or
indefinite application.05 In order for producers to compete
vigorously and for consumers to benefit from that competition,
businesses must be able to distinguish clearly between lawful and
unlawful conduct.806 Second, while the goal of providing a
realistic opportunity to deter international predatory pricing is
justifiable, the mechanism must be designed to discourage the
commencement of sham proceedings. It would be a hollow
victory if the incidence of international predatory pricing were
reduced, but a substantial tool for conducting non-price predation
was established in its place. Finally, in order to determine
whether an alleged predator is guilty of below-cost pricing,
considerable information about costs must be made available to
enforcement authorities. The sources of this information will be
located in another country and thus discovery may be problemat-
ic. As Donald Baker has indicated, broad U.S. discovery proce-
dures often are viewed by foreign governments and enterprises as
offensive and imperialistic, especially when aimed at dealings
between the government and the nation's businesses."7 Further-
more, even assuming that information eventually will be ex-
changed, the discovery mechanism can be an effective delaying
strategy.8 ' Antitrust lawsuits, for example, have been consider-
ably longer in duration than trade-related antidumping and
countervailing duty actions due to the substantial rights of
discovery that are provided.0 9
Whenever any form of conduct is legally condemned, actions
805 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986).
'o6 Cf id. ("[We must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes
a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by
discouraging legitimate price competition." (quoting Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d. 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983))).
807 See Baker, supra note 4, at 1156-57.
808 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 403, supra note 4, at 21 n.2 (acknowledging that
litigation devices including discovery can be "protracted, expensive, and risky").
809 See Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An
Antitrust Perspective, supra note 4, at 416 ("[M]ost trade law cases take only
approximately a year to complete, rather than the 'hiany years involved in the
typical private antitrust suit.").
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at the margin of legality may be inhibited by the desire to avoid
risk or uncertainty. The effects of condemning one activity,
however, must be weighed against the effects of legalizing another
so that a net benefit or loss can be determined. The existence,
use, and threatened use of the antidumping remedy substantially
chills price competition and invites non-price predation. One
commentator notes that because the Commerce Department rarely
declines to initiate an investigation, "[t]he mere filing of an
antidumping . . .petition can have a chilling effect on competi-
tion.""'0 The initiation of an investigation creates substantial
uncertainty on the part of U.S. importers because they will be
held responsible for payment if an antidumping duty is im-
posed. 1' Because they cannot be certain of their eventual
exposure until the proceeding is terminated or a review is
conducted, U.S. buyers may feel compelled to switch to domestic
suppliers, even where the prices charged by those suppliers are
higher."' This incentive to switch to higher-price suppliers will
likely result in higher prices to the ultimate consumer, and also
may encourage the filing of less than credible petitions. As
another commentator has observed, many U.S. firms are willing
to "seek protection and engage in rent-seeking" by means of
manipulating U.S. trade policy.
13
Dumping remedies also have a much more direct impact on
the domestic consumer price level. Exporters, fearing that an
antidumping petition will be filed, may charge higher prices than
necessary.8 14  Further, the price-discrimination focus of
antidumping laws often has the effect of prohibiting price
reductions.1 ' For example, assume that a foreign producer
manufactures a product at a cost of $10 per unit and sells that
product in its home market for $15 per unit. Less efficient U.S.
producers manufacture the same product for $12 per unit and sell
their output in the domestic market for $17 per unit. In light of
810 de Ravel d'Esclapon, supra note 293, at 548.
811 See id.
812 See id.
113 Elzinga, supra note 4, at 444.
114 See Morris, supra note 4, at 953 ("[Elxporters to the United States might
sell at significantly lower prices but for ITC enforcement of the antidumping
laws."); see also de Ravel d'Esclapon, supra note 293, at 549 (concluding that
producers not named in any petition may fear future filings).
815 See Morris, supra note 4, at 953.
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the uncertainty surrounding antidumping adjustments and the
potential damage caused by the filing of an antidumping petition,
the foreign producer might be concerned about undercutting the
$17 price established by U.S. manufacturers. But the foreign
producer, otherwise willing to accept some risk, would be
prohibited from charging in the U.S. market anything below the
$15 level. As a result, any chilling influence would be substantial-
ly greater under the existing antitrust/antidumping regime than
under the proposal presented in this Article.
In attempting to compare the net benefit or loss that would
result from this proposal, two other points should be briefly
reiterated. First, the procedures employed in antidumping actions
can lead to anticompetitive behavior and price-chilling effects.
These laws require collective action between competing domestic
firms when preparing the antidumping petition, and concerns,
therefore, may be raised about the exchange of highly sensitive
and otherwise confidential information. For example, informa-
tional exchanges concerning sales, prices, profits, losses, and
production levels may lead to price-fixing or price stabilization in
the future.1 6 Moreover, informal settlement agreements be-
tween the contesting parties would raise further antitrust problems
because these would represent horizontal agreements among direct
competitors..
17
Second, since the WTO standard only would apply to
international predation, it makes substantially less compelling the
argument that predatory pricing is both rare and inherently self-
deterring and that almost any rule restricting pricing policy would
merely serve to chill lawful conduct. International predators often
have the ability to lower predatory risk through the use of
governmental subsidies, simultaneous recoupment, cross-subsidiza-
tion, and discriminatory practices that restrict losses to only a
portion of total sales.18 Because the presence of lower risk
would be accompanied by a reduction in self-deterrence, the
current reluctance to regulate is unjustified in the international
816 See de Ravel d'Esclapon, supra note 293, at 551; see also Applebaum, The
Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, supra
note 4, at 414-15; Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 517.
817 See Applebaum & Grace, supra note 4, at 517; see also de Ravel
d'Esclapon, supra note 293, at 552-53.
818 See supra sections 5.2.1, 5.3.4.
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setting."'
In an attempt to inhibit sham proceedings, and thus to deter
their chilling effect on price competition, the proposed WTO
standard generally limits recovery to single damages. This
limitation, however, would be accompanied by the alteration or
elimination of the market power and recoupment prerequisites.
As a result, the new WTO standard would represent two
fundamental principles. First, there will be substantially less to
gain by the initiation of a frivolous lawsuit and there will be
substantially less to lose by a refusal to negotiate a settlement.
Second, parties who have been victims of predatory pricing
strategies will have the ability to recover irrespective of any effect,
or lack thereof, on short-term consumer welfare.
Existing U.S. procedures provide a variety of incentives for
initiating less-than-credible antitrust suits. By providing treble
damages,8 20 the antitrust statutes exert substantial pressure on
defendants, regardless of the legitimacy of the claim, to settle in
order to avoid potentially devastating losses. Moreover, the
ability of a successful plaintiff to recover attorney's fees and costs
from the defendant, 21 coupled with both the ability to pursue
a claim on a contingency fee basis and the lack of liability for
defendant's costs, lowers the plaintiff's monetary risk when
pursuing marginal allegations.822 Other nations, however, have
refused to provide such incentives. In Canada, for example, where
recovery is limited to single damages, and where an unsuccessful
plaintiff is generally required to pay a substantial portion of a
defendant's costs,s23 the balance between risk and reward has
been altered significantly.
Although the availability of treble damages is a valuable
819 See Semeraro, supra note 22, at 623.
820 See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 15(a) (1994).
821 See id. § 15.
82 See, e.l, Warner, supra note 4, at 878-79 (discussing differences in
procedure and enforcement between Canadian and U.S. antitrust laws); see also
Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust
Perspective, supra note 4, at 416 (noting some of the advantages of an antitrust
suit over a trade law action, including "injunctive relie, treble damages,
attorneys' fees, [and] full discovery rights").
823 See Calvin S. Goldman & John D. Bodrug, The Canadian Price
Discrimination Enforcement Guidelines and Their Application to Cross-Border
Transactions, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 635, 639-40 (1994); Warner, supra note 4, at
878-79.
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deterrent to anticompetitive behavior, and provides the necessary
impetus for private-party enforcement of the antitrust laws, the
particular risks involved in regulating international pricing activity
require limitations on these incentives. As a result, a WTO
standard, while providing broader rights and more realistic
opportunities for recovery, should generally limit relief to single
damages. Additionally, WTO Members might also consider the
effects of imposing costs on unsuccessful plaintiffs.
The concepts of limiting recovery to single damages and
imposing costs and attorney's fees on unsuccessful plaintiffs
previously have been employed by U.S. antitrust laws. The
Export Trading Company Act of 1982,824 for example, modifies
"the application of the antitrust laws to certain export trade."8z5
It provides that a party "who has been injured as a result of
conduct engaged in under a certificate of review" issued to a U.S.
exporter shall only recover actual, as opposed to treble, damag-
es.8 26  The courts may award both costs and reasonable
attorney's fees "to the person against whom the claim is
brought."8"' Similarly, the National Cooperative Research and
Production Act of 1993828 provides that antitrust claims arising
out of a qualified joint venture shall be limited to the actual
damages sustained,8 29 and that costs and reasonable attorney's
fees shall be awarded to the prevailing defendant "if the claim, or
the claimant's conduct during the litigation of the claim, was
frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith." 3 °
Under the proposed WTO standard, however, single damage
recovery, and potentially the imposition of costs against unsuccess-
ful complainants, would be applied when the plaintiff was seeking
relief pursuant to the standard's reduced burden of proof. In
other words, the WTO standard could provide single damage
recovery to victims of predatory pricing without proof of intent,
market power, or the ability to recoup losses. In determining
actual damages, however, tribunals must examine not only issues
"24 15 U.S.C. S 4001-4021 (1994).
81Id. S 4001(b).
826 Id. S 4016(b)(1).
827 Id. S 4016(b)(4).
828 Id. SS 43014306 (1994).
829 See id. S 4303(a).
830 Id. S 4304(a)(2).
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concerning lost profits and market share, but they also must be
willing to explore the more subtle effects that result from the
reduction in cash flow, research and development, and innovation.
This flexibility is required because, in the absence of market
power, more visible effects, such as actual exclusion from the
market, may be lacking.
Alternatively, if a plaintiff could demonstrate the existence of
predation coupled with either the presence of market power or a
dangerous probability of achieving market power, then treble
damages could be awarded. Because the dangers are considerable,
the award of punitive damages and the strengthening of the
deterrence mechanism would be warranted. Moreover, where a
predatory conspiracy could be demonstrated, treble damages
should be imposed even in the absence of market power. The
availability of treble damages in either of these cases, however,
would be negotiated by the Member countries during the process
of creating the WTO standard. While treble damages would be
appropriate under these circumstances, other nations may not be
willing to adopt this U.S. measure of damages.
Finally, irrespective of the burden of proof applied or the
damages sought, the WTO standard must require that all settle-
ments between the parties be approved by the tribunal. Unlike
cases dealing with other substantive issues, settlements concerning
alleged anticompetitive activity can result in the conspiratorial
conduct the law is designed to prevent. As a result, any settle-
ment between the parties involving an agreement between
competitors must be carefully scrutinized for its potential impact
on future price competition.
In order to enforce an international predatory pricing
standard, a mechanism must exist that encourages the sharing of
information among nations, the exchange of information between
litigating parties, and the timely pursuit of litigation proceedings.
The proposed WTO standard should be framed, therefore, as a
plurilateral trade agreement to which individual Member nations
can choose, or refuse, to become signatories. By choosing to
become a signatory, a nation would accept three primary
obligations. First, the nation would become responsible for
enforcing the basic provisions of the standard, such as the
definition of predatory pricing, the relevance and nature of market
power, and the imposition of damages, in all cases involving
predatory pricing by a non-domestic business entity. Second, the
19961
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nation would agree to forfeit its right to initiate antidumping
proceedings against foreign firms located in another signatory
country provided that those firms do not intentionally inhibit the
operation of the agreement. Third, the nation would cooperate
in sharing information among governmental antitrust authorities
and would substantially encourage private party compliance with
lawful discovery orders.
In exchange for accepting these obligations, a signatory nation
would provide corresponding benefits to its domestic firms. First,
those firms would have a realistic opportunity to recover damages
for predatory pricing undertaken by their foreign competitors.
Second, barring the existence of a conspiracy or substantial market
power, the firms would be able to compete internationally
without the fear of treble damage exposure. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, the firms would be able to compete in other
signatory countries without the fear that discriminatory and
protectionist antidumping proceedings will be invoked. In
contrast, firms located in countries that have refused to become
signatories to the agreement will continue to face treble damages,
at least in the United States, and the threatened or actual imposi-
tion of dumping remedies.
In order to ensure further the enforcement of this WTO
standard, there must be a means to punish private party defen-
dants in signatory countries who frustrate the operation of the
standard through the exercise of bad faith, the provision of
misinformation, or the use of intentional delay. One possible
mechanism for punishing this activity is the imposition of treble
damages in cases that would otherwise invoke only single damage
relief. A second option would use import restraining orders,
based upon the burden of proof generally applied in cases where
preliminary injunctions are sought,831 by which a plaintiff could
temporarily enjoin the import of the product at below-cost prices.
This order could be pursued through the judicial system or
through an administrative body such as the Federal Trade
Commission. One commentator has indicated, for example, that
"the elapsed time between the start of an investigation and the
decision to issue a prospective restraining order is comparable to
the elapsed time between the initiation of an antidumping
831 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65; see generally John Leubsdorf, The Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978).
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investigation and the final material injury finding. " 132  As a
result, a private party plaintiff "can . .. expect swift responses
from enforcement agencies when there is true predatory pric-
ing."8 33 Whether a judicial or an administrative process is used,
however, a preliminary injunction would help to counteract the
fact that private litigation is more lengthy than a governmental
antidumping action. By temporarily prohibiting the import of the
product at a below-cost price, the plaintiff would be granted
immediate relief and the defendant's impetus to delay the
proceeding would be substantially reduced.
A third, more controversial choice uses the antidumping
statute as a default procedure. Under this approach, a court
deciding that a defendant is systematically exhibiting bad faith or
engaging in intentional delay could terminate the litigation and
refer the case to the appropriate government agency for
antidumping proceedings. While potentially burdensome, this
mechanism would rarely be invoked since both parties would
generally prefer predatory pricing litigation rather than
antidumping proceedings.
From the plaintiff's perspective, transferring the proceeding to
an antidumping authority would eliminate the possibility of
monetary damages. Even if dumping occurs, antidumping duties
are paid to the government, not to the plaintiff or other members
of the affected industry. Yet, arguably, antidumping duties can
lead to direct economic rewards for the plaintiff. For example, if
the duty raises the imported product's price above that charged by
the plaintiff, the plaintiff could increase profits by increasing its
market share or by raising its price. Such conduct, however,
presents substantial risks. A predatory-pricing plaintiff renounces
the opportunity to recover direct and pocketable damages based
on the assumptions that: (1) the plaintiff will prevail in its
antidumping petition; (2) the duties imposed will force the foreign
competitor's price above the plaintiff's price; (3) the plaintiff's
domestic competitors will similarly raise their prices; and (4) the
foreign competitor will not simply lower its home-market price
to avoid the duty.
The defendant has a similar interest in maintaining the dispute
as a private action. In a private action, the defendant's liability
832 Warner, supra note 4, at 886-87.
131 Id. at 887.
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generally would be limited to single damages, while penalties in
antidumping proceedings reflect the entire difference between the
predatory price and the higher home-market price. Assume, for
example, that it costs a foreign predator $10 per unit to manufac-
ture a product. The predator sells that product for $15 per unit
in the domestic market, but for only $8 per unit in the United
States. Under the proposed WTO predation standard, the
defendant's liability generally is limited to actual damages incurred
by the plaintiff: in theory, $2 per unit sold. Damages greater
than that differential penalize lawful conduct, namely sales at or
above $10 per unit. Conceivably, however, the damages caused by
a predatory campaign may be substantially greater than that $2
differential and may include the short and long-term effects to the
plaintiff's business entity. Pursuant to an antidumping proceed-
,ing, the defendant may be accountable for $7 per unit. Even if
the producer chose to avoid the antidumping duty, it would still
be forced to give up some of its U.S. market share by raising U.S.
prices or to forfeit profits at home by lowering home market
prices. The increased risks associated with antidumping remedies
substantially encourage defendants to honor the obligations
undertaken by their signatory governments.
The proposed WTO standard is designed to reward efficiency,
to punish inefficiency, and to encourage a global specialization
that will enable nations to share in global wealth. Although
predatory intent, market power, and ability to recoup predatory
losses are relevant factors in an analysis of single-nation consumer
welfare, they are irrelevant to the determination of relative
efficiency and to the advancement of global welfare. As a result,
the absence of these factors cannot relieve defendants from
liability for actual damages.
34
The proposed WTO standard, however, must recognize the
realities of standard business conduct, permitting temporary
below-cost prices to be defended on grounds such as excess
inventory, seasonal demand fluctuations, obsolescence, and other
temporary loss-minimizing activities. 35 This perspective would
also encourage promotional pricing by new entrants or in
conjunction with the introduction of a new product. The WTO
114 These factors are relevant, however, for determining the appropriateness
of treble damages. See supra p. 250-51.
" See supra notes 135, 179-184 and accompanying text.
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standard also should consider forward pricing-the expectation
that costs will fall as production and sales increase.836
In regard to a meeting-competition defense, the Robinson-
Patman Act permits domestic price discrimination where the
lower price "was made in good faith to meet an equally low price
of a competitor . . . .3 Most courts have allowed good faith
sellers to "reduce prices below the appropriate measure of
cost"838 to meet competitors' prices. "To force a company to
maintain noncompetitive prices would be to turn the antitrust
laws on their head."
839
This defense, however, invites potential problems. In the U.S.
market, where competing businesses generally are subject to the
same level of federal regulation and where business mobility is
ensured by the Commerce Clause,"' the meeting-competition
defense is justified. Price reductions increase consumer welfare
and eventually drive inefficient competitors from the freely-
operating market. In the international setting, however, business-
es are not subject to equal levels of government regulation.841
Unequal playing fields can prolong below-cost pricing and given
that the proposed predatory pricing standard rewards efficiency,
a meeting competition defense could be counterproductive. A
meeting competition defense may be relevant in a pure price
discrimination case, where the prices charged are above cost. In
a predatory pricing case, however, this defense only promotes the
survival of producers who must charge predatory prices in order
to compete. If the predator is more efficient than its victim, the
defense should also be curtailed in light of the questionable
motives accompanying below-cost sales by a more efficient
producer. The only reason for such a strategy, other than those
already encompassed by the promotion, obsolescence, and express
inventory defenses, is to meet an equally low predatory price of
a competitor.
Due to the substantial distinction between price discrimination
836 See S. REP. No. 403, supra note 4, at 24 (discussing the "practice of
taking into account anticipated but as yet unrealized productivity gains").
837 15 U.S.C. S 13(b) (1994).
"I Denger & Herfort, supra note 23, at 553.
3Id. (quoting Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691
F.2d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted)).
" See supra notes 458459 and accompanying text.
841 See supra note 460-79 and accompanying text.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j. Int'l Econ. L.
and international price predation, a meeting-competition defense
should not be incorporated into the WTO standard. This defense,
however, may be acceptable to stimulate the opening of foreign
markets. For example, the defense could be available to firms
operating from open markets and thus subject to meeting-
competition strategies employed by foreign competitors.
Alternatively, if a market is closed to international competition,
and thus does not allow foreign competitors to meet the prices of
domestic firms, extending the defense to firms operating from that
market seems unreasonable.
Finally, the standard must respect the spirit of the new WTO
Agreement concerning preferential treatment for developing
nations. For example, the WTO specifically recognizes that these
nations must "effective[ly] participat[e] in the world trading
system,"842 and that preferential market access is "an essential
means for improving their trading opportunities."8 43  Similarly,
developed Members must give "special regard .. .to developing
country Members when considering the application of anti-
dumping measures. . 844 Government assistance plays an
important role in the economic development of these countries,
and therefore, special subsidy exemptions and compliance periods
must be provided to them.
In response to the special situation of developing or least-
developed countries, the WTO standard should limit private party
actions against producers located there. First, the already-existing
defenses concerning new entrants and new products can provide
substantial protection to infant industries in these nations. This
approach, however, calls for the establishment of relevant time
periods and market-share thresholds, similar to those in the area
of subsidies. 45 Second, a market power prerequisite could be
added when the defendant is operating in a developing or least-
developed nation. The slim possibility that such a defendant
would have market power would protect producers from all
42 Decision on Measures In Favour of Least-Developed Countries, reprinted
in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 385, 385.
843 Id.
844 Agreement On Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
On Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. XV, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29,
at 145, 163.
845 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, arts. 3, 27,
reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 229, 257-59.
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predatory pricing liability. Finally, the WTO standard could
apply a market-share threshold, defined in terms of the market
share of the nation rather than that of the individual firm.
Below this level, all of the nation's producers of the relevant
product would be immune from suit, regardless of a new entrant
or a new product defense.
The WTO Agreement currently provides that once a nation
reaches export competitiveness in a given product, it shall begin
to phase out export subsidies for that product over a two-year
period, if it is a developing country, or an eight-year period, if it
is a least-developed country.846 The Agreement defines export
competitiveness as the point at which the nation's exports in a
particular product reaches a global share of at least 3.25% for two
consecutive calendar years.8 47 A competitiveness threshold is
similarly justified in the area of predatory pricing. Producers in
a developing or least-developed nation, therefore, should be
immune from predatory pricing liability until the nation's exports
of the relevant product reach export competitiveness.
In proposing a WTO standard to govern international price
predation, drafters must note the difficulties surrounding the
price/cost determination. Fixed and variable costs often are
indistinguishable, not only because of international definitional
variations, but also because all costs become variable over
time.848 Multiproduct firms, common production facilities, and
joint costs further impair the accurate determination of a particu-
lar product's cost.849 Moreover, transfer pricing, forward pric-
ing, and cross-subsidization, 8s combined with the misrepresenta-
tion of costs,851 inevitably cloud the true cost/price relation-
ship.
852
Despite these difficulties, neither international nor domestic
846 See id. at 258 (art. 27.5).
117 See id. (art. 27.6).
848 See supra notes 133-134, 522-27 and accompanying text.
... See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
850 See id.
851 See PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 82.
852 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text; see also Transamerica
Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1383-84
n.3, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); Northeastern Tel.
Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 86-88, 89 n.19 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 82-83.
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predatory pricing can be condemned without examining the
cost/price relationship. All legitimate approaches towards
predatory pricing are ultimately based on whether the price level
is at or above the cost level. The two-tier or market-structure
approach, 53 currently employed by the U.S. Supreme Court and
supported by the OECD, does not negate this proposition.M1
4
By first examining the relevant market structure to determine
whether the market is conducive to the exercise of market power,
the two-tier approach serves as a screening device, dismissing
allegedly innocuous predatory pricing allegations. 55  If the
alleged predation poses potentially adverse market effects, the
court must examine the actual price/cost relationship. Thus,
although a wide variety of different tests or approaches may be
employed to dismiss a predatory pricing case, only the price/cost
analysis can actually impose predatory pricing liability.85 ' An
examination of the price/cost relationship remains a fundamental
prerequisite for imposing predatory liability. Otherwise, the most
egregious of predatory pricing behavior becomes legalized.
Balancing these analytical difficulties against the need to
protect productive efficiency, the WTO must determine which
cost benchmark to apply. The WTO could adopt the reasonably
anticipated average variable cost standard suggested by Areeda and
Turner and applied by many courts. The advantage of such
a benchmark is that pricing at the level of marginal cost results in
both a competitive and a social optimum."58 Forcing firms to
charge prices above marginal cost would not only reduce industry
output and waste economic resources, but would also ensure the
survival of less efficient rivals.5 9 One court has noted that
marginal cost pricing "fosters competition on the basis of relative
efficiency," 60 and the existence of a higher benchmark "would
provide a price 'umbrella' under which less efficient firms could
153 See generally Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 131 (proposing the use of
a two-tier approach or a market structure filter).
"4 See supra section 2.1.; PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 27, at 82-83.
855 See supra notes 131, 201 and accompanying text.
856 See supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text.
857 See supra notes 111-31 and accompanying text.
.8 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 101, at 711.
859 See id.
860 Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 80, 87
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
[17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/8
1996] THE ANTIDUMPING/ANTITRUST DICHOTOMY 219
hide from the stresses and storms of competition."86 Addition-
ally, from a consumer's perspective, any standard above marginal
or average variable cost forces some consumers to pay higher
prices for, and others to entirely forgo, the product.862
Despite its difficulties, the WTO could displace the marginal
cost standard with an average total cost standard.6 3 One com-
mentator compellingly argues that the marginal cost benchmark,
at least when applied in the international setting, has little validity
as a measure of relative efficiency.8" Not only do accounting
and recordkeeping practices differ among nations,6 5 but cultural-
based differences in cost structures, including those related to
wages, vertical integration, distribution methods, and the use of
capacity substantially affect the fixed/variable cost relation-
ship." Assumptions that firms with higher fixed costs and
lower variable costs are necessarily more efficient remain unfound-
ed.8
67
To account for exchange rate manipulation, import barriers,
and indirect forms of governmental aid, Epstein argues that the
United States should adopt an average total cost standard when
examining price predation by foreign competitors.868 Yet, the
average total cost benchmark could be justified on other grounds.
For example, the increased likelihood of predatory pricing in the
international setting,69 and the non-enforcement of antitrust
laws by many governments, providing unquantifiable regulatory
subsidies, 70 warrant a more encompassing provision.
A preoccupation with short-term marginal costs could also
reward artificially-created or culturally-biased cost structures,
thereby condoning social idiosyncrasies unrelated to efficiency
gains. Moreover, a short-term marginal cost focus does not
861 Id.
862 See id. at 90.
... See id. at 88-90; see also S. REP. No. 403, supra note 4, at 24.
6' See Epstein, supra note 31, at 51-52 ([Elconomists ... criticize the
[marginal cost] rule for failing to reflect current economic theories on long-run
efficiency. .. ").
86- See id. at 52.
866 See id. at 53-54.
"6I See id. at 55.
868 See generally id. (urging the adoption of the average total cost standard).
869 See supra section 5.2.1.; see also S. REP. No. 403, supra note 4, at 11.
87 See Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 4, at 26-27 (citation omitted).
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necessarily ensure that the most efficient firm will prevail, even in
the absence of cultural forces."' 1 Some commentators note that
this focus allows more efficient firms, with lower long-term
marginal costs, to be driven from the market by less efficient
firms, with lower short-term marginal costs. 72
In determining an appropriate cost benchmark, the WTO
membership should also consider whether subsidies7 3 should
influence the creation or implementation of a cost standard. A
variety of subsidies should be excluded when determining the
ultimate nature of a WTO standard. One commentator indicates
that many subsidies may actually correct market failures and may
represent a major source of necessary public goods. 4 Similarly,
innumerable forms of governmental assistance are not only
common throughout the world, but also apply domestically in a
nondiscriminatory manner for political, economic, and social
stability. Tying the existence of these subsidies to the decision
concerning the appropriate nature of a WTO cost standard would
invade governmental policy making and reject the sovereignty of
other Members.
The WTO, however, has chosen to condemn other subsidies.
For example, certain subsidies will be prohibited if they are
contingent "upon export performance" or "upon the use of
domestic over imported goods."7  Others will be deemed
actionable if they injure the domestic industry of another
Member, nullify or impair another Member's GATT benefits, or
seriously prejudice another Member's interests. 7 6 Moreover,
even some non-actionable subsidies may be the subject of
countermeasures if they fail to meet the conditions established by
the Agreement8 r: or if they result in "serious adverse effects" 78
171 See Epstein, supra note 31, at 53-55.
87z See e.g., McGee, supra note 101 at 301 (describing Posner's argument)
(citation omitted).
73 Subsidies can be challenged only by means of governmental action and
not by private party litigation. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, arts. 10, 11.4, 32.1, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 241-
42, 260.
874 See Barcel6, supra note 4, at 319-21.
175 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 3, reprinted
in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 231.
876 See id. at 233-35 (arts. 5-6).
8"7 See id, at 237-40 (arts. 8-9).
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to the domestic industry of another Member.
If a condemned subsidy is subject to a countervailing duty, the
relationship between subsidies and costs becomes irrelevant.
Where such a subsidy, however, has neither been exempted nor
made the subject of a countervailing duty, its relevance to costs
becomes extremely problematic.
Although contradictory to the WTO Subsidies Agreement, 79
subsidies of the same basic character as those condemned by the
Agreement, but which are not subject to countervailing measures,
theoretically should be relevant to the predatory pricing analysis.
If the purpose of the WTO standard is to stimulate competition
and enhance global welfare, it could be argued, again theoretically,
that it may be appropriate to consider some forms of public
assistance when determining the actual costs of production in
predation cases. That the costs incurred by a producer have been
lowered by a governmental subsidy does not mean that the actual
cost of producing that product, in terms of the total resources
dedicated to its production, has been altered in any way. As a
result, if a producer's costs have been reduced by means of a
subsidy that is not subject to a countervailing duty, it could be
argued that the cost level at which predatory and nonpredatory
prices are distinguished should be adjusted upward to reflect the
presence of that assistance.
In addition to a host of problems arising out of the doctrines
of comity, sovereign immunity, sovereign compulsion, and act of
state,88 0 the consideration of subsidies within the context of a
private party predatory pricing case would appear to directly
violate the terms of the WTO Subsidies Agreement.8 ' The
Agreement provides that "[n]o specific action against a subsidy of
another Member can be taken except in accordance with the
provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement."8 2
The Agreement provides that countervailing duties may only be
8"8 Id. at 240 (art. 9.1).
879 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, reprinted in
FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 229.
880 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 30, at 8, 20, 21; Kaplan & Kuhbach,
supra note 4, at 450; Benz, supra note 22, at 724-25, 733, 74142.
881 See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art.
7, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra note 29, at 235 (limiting recovery to
Members only, and not to private parties).
882 Id. at 260 (art 32.1) (footnote omitted).
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imposed pursuant to an investigation initiated by a Member and
conducted in accordance with a variety of substantive and
procedural mandates outlined in the Agreement.883 Specifically,
the investigation must be based on an application filed by an
affected domestic industry and must be expressly supported by
producers that account for at least 25% of total domestic produc-
tion.8" - In addition, the investigation may ultimately involve
consultations between member nations and recourse to a WTO
panel and the WTO Appellate Body.88
As the above provisions make evident, a predatory pricing
action instituted by an individual plaintiff seeking monetary
damages would not be a proper venue for the resolutions of such
disputes. Nevertheless, the existence of subsidies directly affects
the fundamental purpose of the proposed WTO standard, which
is to protect the interests of more efficient business entities. The
WTO, therefore, must not only respect the integrity of the
Subsidies Agreement, but also must attempt to discourage
subsidized predatory pricing episodes that may fall outside the
realistic enforcement of that Agreement.
A myriad of problems will inevitably confront the WTO.
One of the most challenging issues, that of determining the
remedies to be awarded, appears to present insurmountable
obstacles in light of the current WTO regime. Apparently, any
injunctive or monetary relief awarded to a private plaintiff that is
based on a finding of subsidized production contradicts the
provisions of the Subsidies Agreement.886 For example, assume
that an alleged predator produces a product at an average variable
cost of $10, but that this cost increases to $12 if an existing
subsidy is included in the calculation. Assume further that the
product is sold in the United States at a price of $11 per unit, that
"I See id. at 241-46 (arts. 10-13).
114 See id. at 242 (art. 11.4).
885 See id. at 241 (arts. 10-11) (discussing an investigation initiated by
member nation); id. at 241-54 (arts. 11-23) (describing substantive and
procedural mandates); id. at 241-43 (art. 11) (noting an application by or on
behalf of a domestic industry); id. at 242 (art. 11.4) (jproposijng the twenty-five
percent rule); id. (art. 11.6) (describing an investigation initiated without
application under "special circumstances*); id. at 231, 235-36, 240, 245-46 (arts.
4.1-4.3, 7.1-7.3, 9.1-9.2, 13) (discussing consultations between members); id. at
231-32, 236 (arts. 4.4-4.8, 7.4-7.6) (describing the panels); id. at 232, 236 (arts.
4.9, 7.7) (determining the appeals system).
886 Id. at 231 (art. 7).
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the predator has market power, and that the victim is driven out
of the market. If a straight average variable cost standard is
imposed, the victim would not be entitled to any form of
traditional damages. Alternatively, if the subsidy is included in
the variable cost calculation, the plaintiff could recover damages.
As a result, any such award, which could only be granted when
the effect of the subsidy was considered, represents nothing more
than an alternative form of countervailing duty.
To counteract these problems, the WTO could simply permit
private party enforcement of the anti-subsidies law. Alternatively,
the WTO could adopt a sliding scale approach by which prices
above average total cost would be lawful, prices below average
variable cost would be unlawful, and prices falling between those
two benchmarks would be examined in light of the existence of
subsidies. Both of these approaches, however, are accompanied by
their own sets of problems and therefore have no realistic
possibility of being adopted.
Despite the relationship between subsidies and predatory
pricing, the current international regime prohibits the harmo-
nization of these procedures and accompanying remedies.
Differences in national interests, in addition to tensions between
the interests of nations and the interests of individuals, require an
international compromise. This compromise would honor the
spirit of the Subsidies Code and business entities that are victims
of subsidized predation-where prices are above the actual costs
borne by the producer, but below the real or subsidized costs of
production-would seek relief through the countervailing duty
application process. 8 7 Additionally, assuming that antidumping
remedies were largely eliminated, the compromise would promote
the application of an average total cost benchmark with respect to
more traditional predatory pricing actions.
The adoption of Epstein's "total cost" standard may provide
more protection to a predatory pricing plaintiff than desired. 88
In light of the political realities involved in proposing the
abolition of antidumping remedies, however, such a standard may
represent an achievable form of compromise. It is worth
reiterating that the antidumping laws generally prohibit price
117 See id. at 241 (art. 10).
... See Epstein, supra note 31, at 55-56.
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discrimination regardless of the cost level,889 and that an import-
ed product selling at five-times the level of average total cost
would still be subject to antidumping duties if the adjusted home-
market price were higher. The use of an average total cost
standard, therefore, when coupled with the elimination of
antidumping remedies would be more viable. Additionally, the
availability of defenses, including those involving new entrants,
new products, and forward pricing, could reduce any overprotec-
tion that might accompany the average total cost standard. As a
result, this compromise would reinforce remedies that protect the
interests of efficient producers while limiting remedies that do not
preserve those interests.
Finally, in attempting to adopt an appropriate cost standard,
the WTO could consider two further propositions. First, the
WTO could mandate the inclusion of export subsidies into the
calculation of a predator's cost. Not only are export subsidies the
most blatant and clearly prohibited form of governmental
assistance, but they also are more easily proven than other forms
of public involvement. Second, the WTO could consider the
possibility of establishing two different cost benchmarks. An
average total cost standard could be applicable where the
defendant's home product market lacks effective international
competition, while an average variable cost standard could apply
where such competition exists. This determination of the
applicable standard could be made in light of market share
thresholds that reflect the degree of like-product imports into the
home market. This dual standard would further encourage the
development of a more open international marketplace. Although
the adoption of either caveat is not likely, these considerations
may serve as sources for negotiation.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide the
appropriate cost benchmark in predatory pricing cases, it is
doubtful that the Court would choose to apply the average total
cost standard. Additionally, most of the lower federal courts,
when forced to examine the price/cost relationship, have applied
some form of marginal cost theory.89  The application of an
average total cost standard to cases involving international
predation, therefore, would violate the national treatment
889 See, e.g., Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994).
o See supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text.
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provisions of the original GATT Agreement." 1 That Agree-
ment provides that imports "be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin
in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale . .*. It also can be argued that the national
treatment provisions would be violated if differing market power
and recoupment standards were applied to international predators.
Similarly, a violation would occur if differing rationales, rewards,
incentives, and strategies were examined, and if the meeting
competition defense were denied in international predatory pricing
actions.
The adoption of a WTO standard would render moot any
potential national treatment issues. As attested to by the variety
of preferences granted to developing countries, the WTO has
often found it beneficial to carve out exceptions to its general
principles. The Antidumping Code not only provides remedies
against foreign producers that could not be invoked against
domestic rivals, it also prohibits price discriminating foreign firms
from adopting the same defenses that would be available to
domestic competitors." 3 As a result, the adoption of a WTO
standard that provides a predatory pricing definition applicable to
all international actions, but that also allows national law to
govern domestic predatory pricing disputes, represents nothing
more than a supplementary agreement voluntarily undertaken by
Member nations.
If a WTO standard is not adopted, the United States must
alter its approach to the problem of predatory pricing. In this
regard, the recommendations presented in this Article can be
implemented without violating national treatment provisions.
First, any discriminatory treatment that might result from the
implementation of this proposal would be substantially less than
that already permitted under the WTO Antidumping Code.
Second, this proposal can be applied in a nondiscriminatory
manner.
The discriminatory aspects of the antidumping laws deny
foreign producers the opportunity to engage in pricing policies
.. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 3, 61
Stat. (5) A3, A18-19, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 204-08.
892 See id. 61 Stat. (5) at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 206 (art. 3.4).
'93 See 19 U.S.C. S 1677(a)-(b) (1994).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. I Int'l Econ. L.
that would be lawful if undertaken by a domestic producer.
These antidumping laws deny foreign producers a variety of
defenses that are available to their domestic rivals, and they
impose liability for a lower market share than would be required
domestically. Additionally, they apply a less-than-fair-value
criterion rather than the marginal cost standard applied in most
domestic antitrust cases." 4 Finally, the antidumping laws fail to
impose any substantial competitive injury or consumer welfare
requirement. 5
Although the application of the presented proposal demands
significant changes in views toward predatory pricing, it may be
applied consistently with the spirit of national treatment. While
the ultimate result may sometimes differ depending on whether a
domestic or foreign predator is involved, the standard applied in
all cases would be the same. A universally applied standard that
recognizes the importance of considering strategic behavior might
nevertheless lead to differing outcomes because the ability to
engage in such behavior depends on domestic conditions.
Similarly, a universal rule based on an assumption of rational
business conduct might lead to different judicial outcomes because
the concept of rationality may vary substantially among nations.
Any requirement of recoupment, while applied evenly to both
domestic and foreign producers, could also lead to diverse results
when viewed in terms of varying profit and market share goals,
governmental involvement, abilities to conspire, culture-specific
rewards, and international market structure.
The presented proposal does not require that separate rules be
applied to foreign and domestic producers. The same fundamental
rules can be applied to both domestic and international predation,
but these rules must also be applied in a manner that is free from
Westernized assumptions and that respects the realities of global
diversity.
6. CONCLUSION
In July 1995, the New York Times reported that "[i]n the
'" See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 2, reprinted in FINAL TEXTS, supra
note 29, at 14548 (detailing the WTO Antidum in Code's determination of
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early 1950's, more than 90 American companies made television
sets. Today, the last American-owned television manufacturer, the
Zenith Electronics Corporation, gave up its battle to survive on
its own and agreed to sell a controlling interest to a South Korean
industrial giant."896 Following the sales of the RCA and General
Electric brands to Thomson of France, Magnavox to Philips of the
Netherlands, and Motorola's television business to Matsushita of
Japan, the sale of Zenith was a reminder of the U.S. inability to
compete in the global marketplace. 97
These transactions raise the fundamental issue presented in this
Article. If these sales reflect the fact that foreign producers are
more efficient than their U.S. counterparts because of technologi-
cal advancement or lower labor and production costs, then such
transfers of productive resources are justified. Although such
transfers sometimes are painful to domestic industries, all nations
are entitled to exploit their comparative advantages.
In encouraging the efficient allocation of resources, however,
certain potential risks must be recognized. In the Matsushita
case,898 for example, the influx of television sets at depressed
prices was alleged to have substantially reduced investment return
rates, thereby destroying the incentive for any future investment
in production facilities. 99 In an industry rendered profitless,
U.S. producers were forced to engage in cost-cutting measures,
including those affecting research, product development, and
future efficiency.9 °
If an enterprise fails as a result of its own inefficiency or lack
of foresight, such allegations must be ignored. Business failure, as
well as success, is a natural risk of the free enterprise system. If
this decline in profits is due to foreign subsidies or below-cost
pricing, however, the law must be capable of recognizing its true
cause. Thus, antitrust enforcers must be able to investigate the
realities of the global market and demonstrate a willingness to
look beyond the boundaries of parochial economic theory.
896 Barnaby J. Feder, Last U.S. TVMaker Will Sell Control to Koreans, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 1995, at Al.
897 Id. at Al, D2.
898 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
899 See id. at 602 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
9 Benz, supra note 22, at 740 n.200 (citing a letter from Philip J. Curtis,
former counsel to Zenith, to Steven F. Benz (Oct. 1, 1989)).
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The presented proposal is based on the belief that governments
must move beyond policies focusing solely on a single nation's
welfare. These policies inhibit the creation of global wealth,
enrich one nation at another's expense, and prevent most nations
from improving their economic environment. Governments must
adopt an approach recognizing that growing economic interdepen-
dence requires a fusion of foreign and domestic policy reflecting
the link between domestic economies and the international
marketplace. This approach, whether viewed in terms of sound
economic policy or in terms of the pursuit of social goals,
establishes relative efficiency as the benchmark of valid interna-
tional business conduct. By denying protection to unproductive
entities and defining competition in terms of actual efficiency
rather than a particular nation's consumer welfare, this efficiency
criteria not only promotes the free-trade and social values inherent
in the WTO Agreement, but also encourages competition on the
merits transcending geographic boundaries.
Antidumping laws, based more on political bias than on
modern economic thought, serve no useful purpose under the
proposed approach. Such laws ignore relative efficiencies, and
thus they often subsidize inefficient domestic enterprises, legiti-
mize supracompetitive prices, and prevent consumers from reaping
the benefits of global competition and specialization. The WTO
Antidumping Code institutionalizes this remedy, and thus further
encourages a misallocation of global resources.01
To reduce reliance on antidumping laws, a mechanism must be
created to eliminate the resulting economic and political vacuum.
By refusing to recognize international diversity and denying the
fact that predation is more likely in the international setting,
current antitrust models cannot meet this challenge. Moreover,
these models will continue to be inadequate as long as they assume
the existence of free and self-correcting market forces that are not
present in the international setting. The current approach denies
potential recovery for international price predation by defining
competition in terms of consumer welfare, creating unrealistic
recoupment and market power requirements, and substituting the
court's economic expertise for that of corporate managers.
This Article has presented several recommendations that can
be implemented in a variety of forms and to a variety of degrees.
901 See supra sections 3, 4.1.
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These recommendations, however, are all based on the fundamen-
tal fact that universal rationality does not exist. Managerial goals
and philosophies can only be understood by exploring the
historical and cultural characteristics of a nation, including
individualism and collectivism, uncertainty and risk avoidance,
and time orientation.90 2
Business decisions are affected by factors such as: (1) the
pursuit of consensus and social order; (2) the relative importance
of profits and market share; (3) the relative value attached to
structured competition; (4) the influence of governments and the
sociopolitical nature of the enterprise; and (5) the degree of loyalty
owed to the worker, group, and nation.90 3 Because there are no
managerial axioms unaltered by corporate culture, the legal system
must no longer pigeonhole antitrust doctrines. By defining
recoupment, for example, solely in terms of recovering same-
market monopoly profits, or by viewing the incentive and ability
to conspire through a universal lens, the judiciary has merely
supplied simple answers to complicated questions.
This does not imply that predatory pricing cases must now
become social science exercises. Any rule requiring the consider-
ation of all factors in predation cases is not only unworkable, but
also invites substantial subjectivity. Nationalistic assumptions,
however, must be discarded and a new perspective on internation-
al predation, based on the recognition of global diversity, must be
created. This perspective would serve as a foundation for
developing policies concerning: (1) the nature and relevance of
market power and recoupment; (2) the appropriate cost bench-
mark; (3) the long-term relationship between producer and
consumer welfare; and (4) the burden of proof necessary to
survive summary judgment.
In developing this global perspective, antitrust policymakers
must first discard the assumption that international price preda-
tion is rare and self-deterring. Segregated markets, governmental
support, and the potential for cross-subsidization and simultaneous
recoupment undermine the accuracy of this assumption. Similar-
ly, it should no longer be assumed that: (1) there is only one
motive for price predation; (2) all predatory conspiracies are
uniformly doomed; (3) below-cost pricing is merely a gift to
902 See supra section 5.3.1.
o See supra section 5.3.
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consumers, unencumbered by other welfare effects; and (4) market
failures are quickly corrected as goods move freely throughout the
global marketplace.
Policymakers should instead assume that predation encompass-
es a variety of public and private rewards and that strategies
designed to reap those rewards often result in substantial costs to
domestic and global welfare. Moreover, policymakers must
consider the existence of asymmetric information and financial
resources, the lack of parity between market incumbents and new
entrants, and the ability to alter rivals' expectations.9 4 Further-
more, the reluctance to find predation should be tempered by
recognition of the lack of international agreement about market
power. Because market definition is inherently subjective, and
because market power depends on factors such as the market
restraint involved, the structure of the particular market, and the
nation in which the wrong occurred, traditional notions of market
power and recoupment should not be the sole determinants of
lawful pricing activity.
By questioning the universality of Western theory, antitrust
policymakers can strike a far better balance between the interests
of consumers and efficient producers. In an international market
lacking a common social, political, and economic identity, such a
balance is a prerequisite for understanding predation and provid-
ing realistic opportunities for private party recovery.
Increasing the availability of predatory pricing relief is an
appropriate basis for challenging current antidumping legislation.
Different compromises tying expanded predatory pricing remedies
to a reduction in the availability of antidumping relief should be
explored. These compromises include using an average total cost
standard, applying alternative market definitions, and eliminating
the traditional market power prerequisite. Various damage and
default mechanisms, encouraging timely cooperation in the judicial
process and discouraging frivolous proceedings also should be
explored. Although these compromises are more dramatic than
current laws, Uruguay Round participants, with the exception of
the United States, would favor judgment by a more demanding
antitrust standard if released from the draconian provisions of
See supra section 5.
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antidumping laws.'
While focusing on the tensions in the antidumping/antitrust
dichotomy, this Article has emphasized the fact that these tensions
are symbolic of a major policy decision confronting the United
States. The United States has the power to help create a new
international economic order either by unilateral action or by
exercising its considerable influence within the WTO. In such an
order, the legality of international pricing strategies is determined
by the relative efficiencies of the competitors and not by the fact
that a higher price is being charged elsewhere. When viewed in
its broader perspective, such a policy can stimulate substantial
social and economic change. By further reducing barriers to trade
and promoting efficiency and specialization, this approach not
only increases global income, but it also provides an opportunity
for more nations to share in the resulting wealth. Sound
economic policy thus could serve as the basis for addressing the
international community's social needs.
The decision to pursue this order will have its detractors. Less
productive enterprises will find little solace in increased competi-
tion or in the fact that the transfer of their protected wealth will
benefit less fortunate economies. As a result, it must be under-
stood that the decision to seek a new economic order will not be
based on difficulties surrounding appropriate cost benchmarks or
dissimilarities in international accounting practices. Instead, such
a decision clearly will depend on whether the United States can
exhibit the political will and global leadership that will be
required.
15 The United States was isolated in its antidumping negotiations since
"[v]irtually all the other 115 participants in the Uruguay Round have said that
antidumping laws... are a form of creeping protectionism." GA TTParticipants
Criticize New U.S. Antidumping Proposal, supra note 64, at 2004.
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